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EXPORT SUBSIDIES IN AN IMPERFECTLY 
COMPETITIVE MARKET WHEN MARKET SHARE 
MATTERS: THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL 
WHEAT TRADE 
PANU K.S. KALLIO 
Abstract. A dynamic, game theoretic model with switching costs provides better under-
standing of motives that keep export subsidies a part of exporters' agricultural policies. 
Switching costs include factors, such as transactions costs and political considerations, 
that affect an importer's purchasing decisions. Effects of these costs are dynamic in 
nature, because switching costs vary with the levet of earlier purchases. 
Behaviors of exporting countries and firms are not driven solely by maximization of 
current welfare and profits, but also by the desire to increase current market share, 
which could improve future welfare and profits. In our multi-period framework, export-
ing countries face a tradeoff between exploiting current market share with higher prices 
and lower export subsidies, or competing for larger market shares with lower prices and 
larger subsidies. 
In wheat export competition to Morocco, the EU and U.S. are noncooperatively 
behaving "super-powers" whose actions influence each other's agricultural policies and 
world prices. Subsidized exports of EU and U.S. wheat are sold abroad by large 
exporting firms who may also have market power. 
Econometric estimates of import demand functions suggest switching costs exist in 
the Moroccan market, and switching costs from U.S. wheat are larger than costs from 
EU wheat. Exporting firms charge lower prices and higher export subsidies are awarded 
by governments when switching costs are present. This suggests that costs of export 
promotion programs may be higher than is often expected. 
Investigation of alternative institutional arrangements (game structures) showed that 
unilateral elimination of export subsidies is the worst scenario for the country eliminat-
ing subsidies. Improvement of U.S. welfare in the free trade case explained its initial 
willingness to eliminate export subsidies under GATT. MacSharry CAP reform helped 
make GATT upper bounds for EU export subsidies more acceptable, consistent with the 
notion that it was an important element in reaching GATT agreement. 
Finally, results show that, while it is important for exporting countries to prevent 
formation of a firm cartel, some degree of firm level market power is welfare improving 
for exporters. Results also suggest that order of play has important implications for 
players' market power and so, strategic behavior. 
Index words: Trade policy, Export subsidies, Switching costs, Imperfect competition, 
Dynamic oligopoly, Wheat 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 15, 1994, 111 countries meeting in Morocco signed the Final Act of 
the Uruguay Round GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Agree-
ment. At the same time, GATT as an institution was replaced by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Agriculture for the first time since GATT's incep-
tion in 1947 played a central role in the negotiations. The ability of countries to 
define and control export subsidies in agriculture was one of the main issues 
under discussion in these negotiations. The Agreement on Agriculture, which 
was part of the Final Act document, attempts for the first time to bgn new export 
subsidies. However, existing subsidies are allowed to continue subject to agreed 
reductions. Even after these reductions, export subsidies will remain an impor-
tant part of international trade for certain agricultural products, especially wheat, 
which were previously heavily subsidized. This situation persists despite the 
substantial amount of agricultural trade policy research that has been conducted 
over the last twenty-five years (e.g. Abbott 1985, Anania et al. 1992) showing 
losses in national and world income due to export subsidies. Therefore, a better 
understanding of the motives that keep export subsidies as a part of an exporting 
country's agricultural policy is needed. 
Another concern of this research is the fact that governments of exporting 
countries, as well as exporting firms, often seem to he interested in their market 
shares in world commodity markets in addition to their short run welfare and 
profits. For example, Gehlhar and Vollrath (1997) state that the -U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture commonly uses market share as a measure of export per-
formance. Also, one of the reasons for the introduction of the Export Enhance-
ment Program (EEP) by the U.S. was to recapture a larger share of the interna-
tional agricultural commodity market (Hillberg 1988). This emphasis on market 
share probably has effects on adopted export policies in international agricul-
tural trade, but so far agricultural trade research has not been able to explain 
why market share matters. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed further light on export promotion 
behavior of major exporting countries in international agricultural markets. An 
improved understanding of the major players' behaviors in international mar-
kets can have positive implications for future multinational trade negotiations as 
well as for individual trading countries. On the one hand, the better the motives 
for using export promotion policies are understood, the better starting point is 
provided for future GATT negotiations. On the other hand, this improved un-
derstanding can help major exporting countries identify implications that their 
own behaviors in international agricultural trade have on each other's behaviors. 
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1.1. Imperfect Competition in Agricultural Trade 
International agricultural markets often exhibit conditions of imperfect competi-
tion, with interdependence among countries and firms trading their products 
(McCalla and Josling 1981). In many cases the trade of commodities is domi-
nated by a few large countries or regional blocs, who can affect world prices. 
Furthermore, institutions exist through which market power in trade may be 
exercised: the Export Enhancement Program in the United States and export 
restitutions of the European Union, for example. This market power is found 
more often in public agencies than in private firms, although in markets such as 
the international wheat market large exporting firms also may have some market 
power (Patterson and Abbott 1994, McNally 1993). 
By looking at the underlying criteria used to fix export subsidies of large 
exporting countries like the U.S. and EU, it is clear that these countries carefidly 
follow each other's behavior in the market when setting their subsidy levels 
(CAP Monitor 1996, Hillberg 1988). Understanding of export policy behavior, 
therefore, requires methods that can capture strategic interaction between these 
market agents. In addition, whenever exporting firms have market power, they 
can influence price either through the level of price they negotiate in the import-
ing country or through the level of export subsidy they get from their govern-
ment. 
Agricultural trade research has for a long time recognized the importance of 
imperfect competition. McCalla in 1966 first argued that wheat trade should he 
explained as a duopoly involving the United States and Canada. Thereafter, , 
several journal articles have been published in this area. The most commonly 
utilized method has been the static conjectural variations approach (e.g. Kolstad 
and Burris 1986, Paarlberg and Abbott 1986, 1987, Thursby and Thursby 1990). 
This approach, however, has been criticized as an ad hoc way to model dynamic 
features in a static framework (e.g. Tirole 1988, Helpman and Krugman 1989). 
Some other recent studies have applied explicit game-theoretic methods in order 
to capture strategic interactions between players in the market, but the majority 
of these studies have also used static models in their analysis (e.g. Hillberg 
1988, Johnson et al. 1993, Kennedy et al. 1996, Abbott and Kallio 1996), even 
though in practice firms and governments are interacting repeatedly. So far, a 
very limited number of dynamic, game theoretic agricultural trade studies exist 
(e.g. Karp and McCalla 1983, McNally 1993). 
Another important matter that should he recognized when analyzing trade 
policy behavior is politics. Agricultural trade policy complements domestic 
agricultural policy in its income redistributional goals. It is apparent from casual 
observation of agricultural trade policy that governments respond to the con-
cerns of favored domestic groups, especially agricultural producers (and pro-
ducers generally). As Krugman (1997) states, it is a fact of life that trade policy 
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tends to place a much higher weight on producers than on consumers. The 
political economy literature emphasizes these distributional considerations, view-
ing trade policy as a device for income transfers to preferred interest groups in 
society (Helpman 1995). 
Empirical work in this area specific to agricultural trade has been done by 
Sarris and Freebaim (1983), Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), Johnson et al. (1993), 
Kennedy et al. (1996) among others. Ali of these studies used the political 
preference function (also called criterion function) approach suggested by Rausser 
et al. (1982). In this approach the policymaker's objective function is given as a 
weighted sum of domestic special interest groups' welfares. Note that there is 
an overlap with imperfect competition studies mentioned earlier. When strong 
special interest groups exist in the market, they can, by lobbying, make the 
govemment utilize its market power such that it favors these special interest 
groups. The existence of export subsidies, for example, illustrates the producer 
bias in agricultural policy setting. 
1.2. Importing Country Behavior 
Another important aspect of intemational agricultural trade is the behavior of an 
importing country. Several factors affect an importing country's purchasing 
decisions. The price of the product is an obvious and often the most important 
factor. However, in reality it is very seldom observed that an importing country 
purchases ali of its imports from the least expensive supplier. Another factor 
affecting the importing country's decision to buy is the quality of the good. For 
example, qualitative characteristics of EU wheat and U.S. wheat are not the 
same, and this difference is argued to he one of the factors affecting trade flows 
of these two goods in the world market (Ackerman 1993). 
One general group of factors that may also influence an importing country's 
purchasing decisions is called switching costs ("brand loyalty"). Wilson et al. 
(1987), for example, found that some degree of brand loyalty exists in intema-
tional wheat markets. Blandford (1988) as well as To (1994) state that these 
costs, borne by the importing country, of switching from one exporter to another 
might exist for many reasons. An importer incurs costs negotiating a contract or 
agreement with a supplier, and these transaction costs with a new exporter may 
be higher than with an existing exporter. Traditions of language and custom 
may limit an importing country's willingness to switch between suppliers, for 
example. Another category is leaming costs. There is more risk involved when 
buying from a new, unfamiliar source than when buying from an existing 
supplier. There also might exist political costs of switching between exporters. 
One would expect products supplied by political allies to he viewed differently 
from others. In addition, guaranteed credit programs and govemment relation-
ships can induce switching costs. Under U.S. credit guarantee programs, for 
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example, an importing country can only use the proceeds of a guaranteed loan to 
purchase U.S. products. 
In the group of traditional agricultural trade models, Armington-type models 
have been developed to account for features that differentiate commodities 
according to country of origin. This approach was first applied in agricultural 
trade modeling by Grennes et al. (1977). Armington-type models exhibit much 
smoother changes in trade shares than the traditional spatial equilibrium model, 
and account more adequately for observed trade flows. However, one problem 
with Armington-type trade models is that they are static models in which differ-
entiation between wheat suppliers is done using a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion parameter. Effects of switching costs, on the other hand, are dynamic in 
nature, because switching costs that an importing country faces now are created 
by earlier purchases of the good. In order to capture the effects of switching 
costs a dynamic modeling framework is needed. However, as mentioned earlier, 
a very limited number of dynamic, game theoretic agricultural trade studies 
exist, and none have employed the switching cost approach. 
1.3. Product Focus 
This study focuses on international wheat trade, since wheat exports have been 
heavily subsidized and the market is highly concentrated. For the years 1972/73 
through 1995/96, five exporters — the U.S., EU, Canada, Australia, Argentina — 
supplied an average of 92.2 percent of world wheat exports (International Grain 
Council). Although the roles of Argentina, Australia, and Canada are important 
parts of the international wheat market story, the emphasis of this research is on 
export promotion behavior of European Union and United States and how they 
relate to each other. After ali, the noncooperative strategic behavior of these two 
exporters is one of the main reasons why export subsidies still (can) exist in 
international agricultural trade after the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement 
(Abbott and Kallio 1996). They were the main combatants over agricultural 
export subsidies in GATT negotiations. The fact that it was only after long 
bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the EC that an agreement in the 
export subsidy reductions was reached illustrates well their importance in inter-
national agricultural trade (OECD 1995). 
The European Union and the United States can he described as two noncoop-
eratively behaving "super-powers" in the international wheat market, whose 
actions in the market have an influence on each other's agricultural policies as 
well as on world market prices. The most significant strategic variable for these 
countries has been an export subsidy. In the European Union, export restitutions 
(export subsidies) are used to ensure that EU wheat is competitive on world 
markets. Export restitutions are intended to bridge the gap between the usually 
higher EU intervention price that wheat traders could receive on the EU market 
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and the lower price they would obtain by exporting to the world market (CAP 
Monitor 1996). Similarly, in 1985 the Export Enhancement Program was estab-
lished to make U.S. agricultural exports more competitive and to counterbalance 
"unfair trade practice of the European Community" (Hillberg 1988). Wheat has 
been one of the most heavily subsidized exports of both the EU and U.S. since 
the introduction of the EEP. 
Subsidized exports of EU and U.S. wheat are sold abroad by large exporting 
firms, and some evidence has been provided that firm level price competition is 
oligopolistic (imperfect) in nature (Patterson and Abbott 1994, McNally 1993). 
The best markets in which to observe consequences of the strategic interac-
tion between the EU and U.S. are the North African importers (Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia), traditional buyers of French wheat and flour. This is 
because these markets have been the largest targets of the EEP. In the case study 
of this research we concentrate on the Moroccan wheat import market which 
has been controlled almost exclusively by the EU and U.S. (from 1980/81 
through 1993/94 over 95 percent of Moroccan wheat imports have been either 
from the U.S. or EU). 
Wheat is a heterogeneous product, since importing countries do not view 
wheat from different sources as qualitatively identical products. For example, 
Moroccan buyers find EU wheat to have lower protein content and higher 
moisture content than U.S. wheat. These qualitative differences have an impact 
on how much wheat importing countries decide to purchase from each source 
(Ackerman 1993). Furthermore, support exists for the fact that importers in the 
international wheat market may experience some costs of switching from one 
supplier to another. Wilson et al. (1987), for example, used a Markov model to 
study import loyalty in international wheat markets. They found that brand 
loyalty in international wheat markets exists, and they also stated that the U.S. 
as wheat exporter seems to enjoy greater brand loyalty than the EEC. 
1.4. Methodology and Objectives 
The characteristics of international wheat market suggest that in order to analyze 
behaviors of major players in the market, such as the EU Commission, the U.S. 
government and their exporting firms, strategic interaction between them needs 
to be recognized In addition, when importing countries experience costs of 
switching between wheat suppliers, these costs need to be taken into account in 
the modeling framework. One purpose of this dissertation is to develop a dy-
namic, game theoretic model of international wheat trade that incorporates 
strategic interaction among players who exercise market power, and simultane-
ously is able to capture impacts that switching costs have on players' strategies. 
This is accomplished in two stages. First, a theoretic two-period model of 
oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and switching costs is 
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constructed. The notion of switching costs draws upon consumer switching cost 
theory which has been developed to deal with fact that, in many markets, 
consumers who have previously purchased from one firm have costs of switch-
ing to a competitor's product, even when the two firms' products are function-
ally. identical (Klemperer 1995). 
The two-period model is developed such that the importing country has no 
switching costs in the first period but in the second period switching costs are 
developed as a result of its first-period purchases. Therefore, exporting coun- 
tries and firms have some additional market power in the second (final) period, 
because the costs of changing suppliers partially force the importing country to 
continue buying products it purchased in the first period. In each period, export- 
ing country governments simultaneously choose their export subsidies (taxes if 
negative) to maximize domestic welfare. After that, firms in both exporting 
countries simultaneously set their prices to maximize profits. The model is 
explained in detail to highlight the theoretical effects that the introduction of 
switching cost has on the behavior of exporting countries (both firms and 
governments). 
This modeling approach with switching costs was found to be useful because 
it provides insight into the importance attached to market shares by exporting 
countries. If an exporting country is able to increase its market share, this 
creates additional costs for the importing country to switch away from that 
exporting country's wheat in the future. Bach exporting country and each ex- 
porting firm realize this. Therefore, their behaviors are not just driven by 
maximization of current period welfare (exporting country) and profits (export-
ing firm), but also by the desire to increase current market share which could 
improve future welfare of the exporting country and future profits of the export-
ing firm. Hence, the notion of switching costs in the market provides an intui-
tive explanation why exporting countries and firms are often concerned with 
market share in addition to short run welfare and profits. 
Since one of the goals in this research is to empirically analyze the effects of 
policy shocks or other shocics in the economic environment of international 
wheat trade, two-period models are not the most appropriate to he used. In the 
real world we observe more than two periods, and any given period is not really 
well classified as either a first or a second period, but as some intermediate 
period which is not without switching costs. Therefore, the second stage of the 
modeling process extends the two-period model into a more general empirical 
multi-period model of competition in a market with switching costs. This em-
pirical model is then used to examine several scenarios in order to answer our 
research questions. 
In a multi-period framework with switching costs exporting countries in each 
period face a tradeoff between "the first-period action" and "the second-period 
action" of the two-period model. That is, they can either exploit their current 
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market shares with higher prices and lower export subsidies ("the second-period 
action") or compete for larger market shares with lower prices and larger subsi-
dies ("the first-period action"). In the switching costs literature, Beggs and 
Klemperer (1992) state that we should expect firms' incentives to exploit cur-
rent market share to dominate their incentives to increase market share that 
could be exploited later, and so lead to higher prices in markets with switching 
costs than in markets without switching costs. 
This research will answer two questions that follow from Beggs and 
Klemperer: 
Do exporting firms charge higher prices and collect larger rents 
when switching costs exist in international wheat trade? , 
Is the need for export subsidies smaller when switching costs exist 
in the international wheat market? 
Abbott et al. (1987) found that a target export subsidy program, like the EEP, 
can be welfare improving because it allows an exporting country to price dis-
criminate. By subsidizing relatively elastic markets, the exporting country is in 
effect taxing countries with relatively less elastic excess demand schedules. 
Switching costs make repeat-purchaser's excess demand more inelastic. This 
means that heavier subsidization may be required by an exporting country to 
increase its market share in a market with switching costs. 
The empirical model will also provide answers to research questions that 
concem the use of the Export Enhancement Program in a market where switch-
ing costs exist: 
Do switching costs make the EEP more costly than without consid-
eration of these costs? 
If switching costs make a targeted subsidy program's costs higher, 
does the unilateral termination of the EEP in a market with switch-
ing costs then become a more attractive export policy choice for the 
U.S. govemment than in a market without switching costs? 
1.5. Organization of the Study 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The next chapter provides back-
ground information on the institutional settings of the international wheat mar-
ket as well as evidence on strategic interaction betvveen market participants, in 
particular the EU and U.S. Chapter III surveys literature relevant to the analysis 
of world wheat market. The chapter begins with a critical review of the tradi-
tional agricultural trade modeling literature. The chapter then reviews empirical 
game-theoretic modeling techniques and their use in agricultural trade modeling, 
the political economy literature and switching cost theory. 
Chapter IV first presents a theoretical two-period international trade model 
with switching costs. Then the chapter extends the two-period model into a 
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more general multiperiod model with switching costs. The procedure for solv-
ing the multiperiod model is provided. Thereafter, in Chapter V, econometric 
estimates of the parameters used to construct the empirical model, along with 
econometric methods employed, are presented. 
Chapter VI provides empirical model solutions. First the chapter presents the 
base solution and validates the model results. Then it illustrates how the model 
can be used to analyze export policies of governments as well as price setting 
behavior of exporting firms when strategic interaction among players and switch-
ing costs between goods in the market are present. To accomplish this task, 
several different scenarios are examined. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the 
conclusions from this research and makes suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT MARKET AND EXPORT POLICIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the institutional setting for interna-
tional wheat trade. First, developments of wheat-specific export policies in the 
European Community and United States from 1980 onward are examined. Since 
we will concentrate on Morocco as a key importing country, the third section 
highlights some facts regarding wheat imports by Morocco. Then the effects of 
the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on export policies of the EU and U.S. are 
described. The final section provides evidence on strategic interaction between 
market 'participants, in particular the European Union and United States, in the 
international wheat market. 
2.1. Export Policy of the European Union 
The European Union (EU) is an economic union of fifteen countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)1. 
The centerpiece of the European Union's grain market policy is the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which is based on three fundamental principles. 
First, the Community functions as a single market for agricultural commodities. 
Given the history of agricultural protectionism in the original member countries, 
this implied the replacement of national price support policies with a common 
price support system. Second, preference is always given to domestic producers 
of member countries over foreign competitors. This requires the use of meas-
ures, such as duties and levies, to keep the price of imported grain above 
domestically produced grain and EC prices above world prices. The third princi-
ple states that European Community members jointly finance costs of the CAP. 
This led to the creation of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) to administer EC's agricultural expenditures. These principles 
On November 1, 1993, the European Union (EU) name came into being following the Maastricht 
Treaty. This incorporated twelve member countries of the former European Communities (EC) 
consisting (under the treaty of Rome) of the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. 
As the plural form was confiising, reference was often made to "The Community". Since 
January 1, 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden have joined the EU. (Tracy 1996). 
The terminology was further confused by the fact that the Maastricht Treaty renamed the 
European Economic Community the European Community, which continues to exist together 
with ECSC and Euratom. Here both expressions EC and EU have been used, depending on the 
context. However, these terms should be regarded as practically interchangeable. 
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were developed after signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Blandford et al. 
1993). 
During the 1970's, a significant transition in wheat trade took place in the 
European Community. Before the 1970s the Community was a net importer in 
the international wheat market, but the production stimulation and consumption 
disincentives created by the CAP led to a rapid increase in production of wheat 
relative to its consumption (Paarlberg 1993). As Figure 2.1 shows, from crop 
year 1978/79 onward, the European Community has been a net exporter of 
wheat with increasing quantities exported (IGC). These increasing exports of 
wheat have created significant additional costs for the EC budget through export 
subsidy expenditures usually needed to export wheat abroad. 
As indicated earlier, the EAGGF covers the costs of Common Agricultural 
Policy. Since its introduction, the CAP has accounted for the majority of ali 
Community expenditures. Agricultural price supports have increased steadily 
and now represent approximately half of all Community expenses. Of these, 
cereal price supports usually account for 15-30 percent of total price support 
payments. As an example, the cereal price support expenditures for 1993 totaled 
over 6.5 billion ECUs, of which 49 percent were devoted to export refimds. 
Primarily, these expenses are funded by value added tax revenues collected by 
member states. Import tariffs also provide the European Union with financial 
resources. The growing cost of agricultural support and increase in commodity 
surpluses create substantial difficulties for the CAP (EU Commission 1996). 
The costly price support system of the EU is based on five elements: target 
price, intervention price, threshold price, import levy and export restitution. The 
target price, the highest of three prices, is the one which producers should 
receive for their products at the farm-gate. However, this is only true when the 
Crop Year 
Figure 2.1. Net Exports of Wheat From the European Community. 
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EU is a net importer. In the case where the EU grain market supplies are in 
excess of domestic requirements, market prices are always lower than target 
prices. Target prices differ geographically, but Duisburg in Germany, which is 
located in the main grain deficit area, is used as the basing point. 
The intervention price is the minimum support price at which the Commu-
nity will purchase grain from farmers if they cannot obtain a higher price on the 
open market. The basis for this price is Ormes in France (the main surplus area). 
There is a range between the target price and the intervention price within which 
internal market prices for domestically produced grains are expected to remain. 
Since the EU is a net exporter of grains, domestic market prices have remained 
well below the target price, approximately around the intervention price. 
The minimum price for importing grain into the EU is the threshold price. It 
is calculated by subtracting the transport costs for shipping grain between the 
port and Duisburg from the target price. To ensure that the threshold price is the 
minimum import price the difference between the threshold price and the border 
price (e.g., c.i.f. Rotterdam2) is used as the import levy. The introduction of the 
new Uruguay Round GATT rules in July 1, 1995 revised this import regulation. 
The function of the threshold price has been assumed by the newly created "155 
percent intervention price"3. The difference between this and the c.i.f. Rotter-
dam price is no longer the import levy but the "import tariff'. With the abolition 
of the threshold price, the target price lost its purpose. The target price was used 
as the basis for the calculation of the threshold price. Since it is no longer 
needed for that purpose it was also abolished on July 1, 1995 (Toepfer 1995)4. 
To promote the marketing of surplus grain outside the Community, export 
restitutions (export subsidies) are used to ensure that EU wheat is competitive 
on world markets. Export refunds are intended to bridge the gap between the 
usually higher EU intervention price that wheat traders could receive on the 
European Union market and the lower price they would obtain by exporting to 
the world market. In addition to this price difference, the amount of the refund 
also depends on the destination. In exceptional circurnstances, when prices 
outside the European Union are above those inside, export levies may be im-
posed.5 Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationships between the five EU price sup-
port elements. 
2 c.i.f. is the abbreviation for costs, insurance, and freight. Prices paid by an importer at the 
border of an importing country are called c.i.f. prices. 
3 "155 percent intervention price" means that duty-paid import price of grain may not exceed the 
EU intervention price increased by 55 percent. 
"The effects of Uruguay Round GATT agreement on export policies are discussed in separate 
section of this chapter. 
5 These exceptional circumstances actually occurred during the time period of December 1995 to 
March 1996, when export taxes were imposed on wheat exports (IGC 1996). 
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Figure 2.2. The EU System of Grain Price Support 
Since the emphasis of this research is on export subsidies, we explore here 
more closely the process of awarding export refunds. Refunds are determined 
weekly by the Cereals Management Committee (CMC) when it adjudicates 
tenders for refunds and fixes other non-tendered refunds for the following week 
(CAP Monitor 1996)6. 
The procedure for open market tenders is as follows. Exporters submit their 
sealed bids to authorities in a member country, who then send them to the 
Cereals Management Committee. The exporter's bid must contain information 
on the desired export volume and per unit refund. The Management Committee 
at its weekly meeting decides whether to fix a maximum refund on the basis of 
the bids submitted. If a maximum refund is fixed then a contract is awarded to 
any exporter who has submitted a bid equal to or less than the maximum refund. 
After the contracts are awarded, successful exporters are required to apply for 
an export license for the quantity awarded. The licenses are normally valid for 
the month when the tender was originally submitted and for four months there-
after. Normally, these export licenses are transferable from the successful tenderer 
to another party within the EC and a market for them exists (CAP Moni-
tor 1996). 
6 Three types of tender are in use in trade — open market tenders for export refunds, tenders for 
the export of intervention stocks and food aid tenders. The open market tenders are most 
common. 
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Since allowing export refunds to be fixed by tenders can reduce EAGGF 
expenditure, tenders are widely used at present. Tenders can also be used to 
establish export levies, if these are in force (CAP Monitor 1996). 
When assessing the level of the maximum refund to be granted at the open 
market export tender, it is evident that the European Union follows carefully the 
strategic behavior of the United States in international wheat trade. In particu-
lar, the price for US Soft Red Winter wheat, fob Gulf, is most commonly used 
as an indicative price that the Community is competing against in the world 
wheat market. The EU Commission also decides on an indicative EU export fob 
price (before the refund), which would usually be the fob price for French and/ 
or UK wheat from a major export port. The maximum export subsidy awarded 
will be that which equates most closely the EU net export price with the world 
price (US Gulf price) (CAP Monitor 1996). 
2.1.1. The 1992 CAP Reform 
In May 1992 the agricultural ministers of the twelve EC member states agreed 
on a completely new regime for the EC grain market — popularly known as the 
MacSharry Reform (named after the Commissioner then responsible for agricul-
ture). In view of 1) the steadily growing surplus of grain in the Community of 
around 40 to 45 million tons, 2) the stagnating demand in both the export and 
domestic markets, 3) reduced producer prices (without compensation), 4) lim-
ited resources to finance this policy, and 4) aggravating conflicts with other 
grain exporting countries, there existed fruitful ground for adopting the reform 
measures now in force (Toepfer 1995). 
The primary goal of controlling the quantities produced is to be achieved by 
a combination of price cuts, area set-aside, and more extensive production 
methods. The price cuts are also intended to make grain more competitive 
against imported feed stuffs and to lead to higher grain consumption in the EU 
(Toepfer 1995). 
Farm incomes in the new system depend increasingly on direct income 
transfers (compensatory payments). This is because during the three year transi-
tion period (1993/94-1995/96) support prices for grains were cut by approxi-
mately 30 percent (almost 20 % in 1993/94 and not quite 8 % per year in 
1994/95 and 1995/96). Average farms, to a large extent, are compensated for 
these drastic price cuts (Toepfer 1995). Producers who set aside at least 15 
percent of their arable land are eligible to receive compensation. 
From the export policy perspective it is important to notice that, due to the 
MacSharry Reform, the same amount of wheat can be now exported with 
considerably smaller export refund costs to the EU budget. However, no reduc-
tion in total support payments on cereal production has occurred. Instead, an 
enormous increase in those payments has occurred. These facts can be seen by 
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comparing 1993 and 1995 EAGGF expenditures on cereal production. Export 
refund expenditures in 1995 were only 29 percent of 1993 export refund expen-
ditures (907 million ECU versus 3153 million ECU) although total support on 
cereal production was more than twice as large as two years earlier (14574 
million ECU versus 6459 million ECU). The major share of cereal support in 
1995 was paid through compensatory payments (10744 mill ECU) (EU Com-
mission 1996). 
2.2. Export Policy of United States 
In the United States price supports for grains were first introduced by the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act to alleviate hardship arising fi-om the Great De-
pression. Until 1996 the United States used a mix of acreage reduction pro-
grams, loan rate and target price protection, and storage programs, together with 
export subsidies to support farm prices and incomes. 
A key element in U.S. govemment program for grains is a support price 
called the loan rate. It is a price per bushel set annually through the political 
process. The loan rate is intended to operate as a floor price for grains, and to 
offer farmers an altemative to immediate sale of their grain at harvest. The 
farmers that participate in govemment programs have the option to place some 
or ali of their production under loan with a public corporation called the Com-
modity Credit Corporation (CCC). Farmers receive a payment equal to the loan 
rate for each unit of production pledged as collateral to the CCC. At any time 
during the next 11 months the farmer has the option of repaying the loan (plus 
interest and storage charges) and selling the stored grain on the open market. 
Alternatively, a farmer can default on his loan and the commodity becomes the 
property of the CCC. Forfeiture of grain to the govemment is most likely to 
happen on a large scale when market prices are below the loan rate (plus interest 
and storage charges) (Blandford et al. 1993), leading also to rapid growth in 
govemment stocks. 
Other elements of the U.S. price and income support system until 1996 were 
direct income payments, target price, acreage reduction, and export subsidy. 
Direct income payments, called deficiency payments, were made to participat-
ing grain producers based on the difference between a target price and the 
higher of either the market price or the loan rate (Blandford et al. 1993). The 
target price, which was generally above both the market price and the loan rate, 
was set through a political process at the beginning of each Farm Bill and it 
applied five years into the future. 
To he eligible for price and income supports, producers were required to set 
aside or take out of production a minimum proportion of their arable land. The 
purpose of this acreage reduction program was to raise the market price by 
reducing supply, and to limit the amount placed under loan and in CCC stocks. 
14 
The 1996 Farm Bill was signed into law in April 1996, providing new farm 
sector law for 1996-2002. The previous income support system, based on estab-
lished target prices and deficiency payments, was replaced by a series of annual 
payments (production flexibility contract payments) whose levels are unrelated 
to current market prices or production levels. Most acreage use restrictions from 
previous law were not continued. The mechanism of nonrecourse commodity 
loans was modified slightly. Minimum loan rates continue to be based on a 
moving average of past market prices, but maximum loan rates were also estab-
lished equal to 1995 loan rates (Young and Westcott 1996). 
Since the focus of this dissertation is on expon subsidies, the remainder of 
this section explains the U.S. export subsidy program, the final element of the 
price support system, in greater detail. 
2.2.1. The Export Enhancement Program 
In the 1950s and 1960s export subsidies were used extensively by the United 
States. They were terminated in early 1970s when the large wheat purchases by 
the fonner Soviet Union (the "Great Grain Robbery") combined U.S. expon 
subsidies with market failure at a time of world grain shortage7. 
Several factors contributed to the reintroduction of the expon subsidy pro-
gram in the mid-1980s. On the domestic side, the United States instituted the 
Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 which increased the target price and loan 
rate levels for wheat. In fact, loan rates exceeded market prices, increasing the 
incentive to sell to the CCC, and thus leading to large carryover stocks (Goldberg 
and Knetter 1995). On the international side, the early 1980s were plagued with 
global recession, which led to debt crises in many developing countries. Not 
only were there fewer resources to finance imports, but also the strong apprecia-
tion of the dollar eroded the competitiveness of U.S. wheat exports relative to 
foreign produced wheat. Last but not least, the extensive subsidization of wheat 
exports by the European Community meant that the EC was gaining wheat 
export market share while the United States was losing it, as can be seen from 
Figure 2.3. 
Ali these domestic and international factors contributed to the substantial 
reduction in the U.S. world market share in the early 1980s. In 1981/82 the 
United States owned 49 percent of the world wheat market, but by 1985/86 its 
share of international wheat exports had fallen to 29 percent. 
7 The market failure was information failure in which the former Soviet Union secretly pur-
chased a very large amount of wheat but in sufficiently small quantities from each exporting 
firm. Thus, the price was not increased with each sale as it would have in an efficient market 
featuring full information (Tweeten 1992). 
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Figure 2.3. EC and U.S. Market Share in the World Wheat Market Before 
Introduction of U.S. Export Subsidy Program. 
Against this background, the United States Food Security Act of 1985, which 
outlined the farm policy for crop years 1986-90, was enacted to reduce govern-
ment stocks and improve the situation in the export markets through a series of 
measures. A reduction in the loan rates was designed to lower U.S. prices for 
wheat, making U.S. wheat more competitive in the export markets while reduc-
ing the growth in government stocks. To maintain farm income support, target 
prices were frozen at the 1985 level for crop year 1986/87 and slowly decreased 
afterwards (Goldberg and Knetter 1995). 
In addition, the export subsidy program (Export Enhancement Program, 
EEP) was established to make U.S. exports more competitive. It was designed in 
such a way that it would simultaneously contribute to the reduction of govern-
ment stocks. Under the original program, government-owned surplus commodi-
ties were paid as bonuses to exporters to allow them to lower the prices of U.S. 
agricultural products in specific markets. Wheat and wheat flour have received 
the largest share of subsidy dollars, accounting for 75 percent of the total export 
subsidy expenditures in 1994 (Federal Register 1995). Haley and Skully (1995) 
state that wheat has accounted for over 80 percent of the value of ali EEP-
assisted sales. 
The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA that administers the 
EEP program specified four criteria for evaluating sales under EEP (Hillberg 
1988, Goldberg and Knetter 1995): 
Additionality: Bach EEP sale must increase agricultural exports 
above the level that would have occurred in the absence of the 
program. 
Targeting: Export subsidies should be targeted to markets where the 
European Community heavily subsidizes. That is, the EEP is not a 
global export promotion program. 
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Cost effectiveness: Sales should result in a net gain to the overall 
economy. 
Budget neutrality: The EEP must not cause budget outlays beyond 
what would have occurred in the absence of the program. At the 
beginning as an in-kind subsidy program the EEP served this pur- 
pose directly, since no cash payments were made to exporters and 
the government saved on the storage costs of the surplus commodi- 
ties. In the later years, even though in-kind bonuses were replaced 
by cash payments, the EEP can be viewed as a substitute for domes- 
tic support payments, because by increasing export sales and thus 
supporting higher domestic wheat market prices, the program re-
duces the amount of deficiency payments to producers. 
On November 27, 1989, the FAS reformulated the guidelines for the EEP in 
the Federal Register. The new guidelines emphasize the EEP's trade policy 
objectives. The first guideline requires that the EEP should have a potential to 
further the U.S. negotiating strategy in the GATT Uruguay Round by countering 
competitors' subsidies and other unfair trade practices. The second guideline 
requires FAS (EEP) to develop, maintain and expand markets for U.S. agricul-
tural commodities. The third states that the EEP should not have more than 
minimal effects on nonsubsidizing competitors. The last guideline requires that 
the overall EEP program level and subsidies for individual EEP sales should be 
maintained at the minimum budget level necessary to achieve the EEP's trade 
policy and export expansion goals (Ackerman and Smith 1990). 
Operationally, the EEP is a complex program that involves several steps. 
First, the FAS receives and reviews proposals on targeted countries and com-
modities from USDA officials, the American farming community, and foreign 
governments before selecting countries and commodities to target. If a proposal 
is approved, then it is announced as an initiative, specifying the targeted country 
and the maximum quantity to be exported under subsidy. After the initiative is 
announced, exporting firms negotiate with the targeted country to determine the 
quality, quantity, and price of wheat they will deliver. The conditional sales 
contract is then submitted as a bid to the FAS along with the firm's bid for EEP 
bonus (subsidy). If the price specified in the bid is less than the minimum 
acceptable price set by the FAS, the bid is rejected. If the price is higher, then 
FAS compares the bonus amount to the maximum acceptable bonus. If the 
exporter's bonus is too high, the bid is rejected8. If the price and bonus are 
accepted, the FAS compares its bonus amount to the bonus amounts of ali 
acceptable bids received and awards the subsidies in ascending order of bonuses 
until the approved quantity is filled (Goldberg and Knetter 1995). 
8 However, a rejected bid can be revised and resubmitted the next business day. 
17 
Prior to November 1991, these bonuses were paid in the form of commodity 
certificates with value equal to the per-unit bonus times the quantity of wheat 
shipped under the contract. Exporters could exchange the certificates for an 
equivalent value of surplus commodities in government storage or sell them. 
Since November 1991, the commodity certificates have been replaced by cash 
subsidies (Haley and Skully 1995). 
The EEP was originally arranged as a three year export promotion program 
in which $2 billion worth of surplus commodities were made available for 
exporters as bonuses. However, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 raised the ceiling to $2.5 billion, and by the end of 1990 approximately 
$2.9 billion had been allocated to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports. The Food 
Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act in 1990 significantly expanded the 
budget of the EEP, setting a minimum of $500 million per year for 1991-95. An 
additional $1 billion became available for the period October 1993 to Septem-
ber 1995, since no GATT agreement was reached by September 1992 (McNally 
1993). 
As mentioned above, the EEP was designed as a targeted subsidization 
program to recapture market share that the United States claimed to have lost to 
the European Community through its continued export subsidies. Initially the 
EEP was targeted primarily to the northern Africa (to Morocco among others) in 
strategic response to subsidized EC wheat exports to those markets (McNally 
1993). Figure 2.4 shows the development of EC and U.S. market share in the 
Moroccan wheat import market before and after the introduction of EEP. Con-
siderable changes occurred in market shares right after the EEP was introduced. 
For a moment the U.S. was able to capture almost the whole market. However, 
EC quickly regained its market share during the subsidy war between the EC 
and the U.S. triggered by the introduction of the EEP. 
— • — • EC 
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Figure 2.4. EC and U.S. Market Share in Morocco. 
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2.3. Importing Country Behayior: Morocco 
Grains are an important food item in Morocco and represent a large share of 
household food expenditures: 25.3 % in 1970 and 23.6 % in 1985. Most wheat 
produced, and a major share of imported wheat, is used to make bread, a staple 
of the Moroccan diet. Morocco's per capita wheat consumption is about 150 
kilograms per year. Wheat imports account for a large and increasing share. In 
1992 for example, wheat imports by Morocco were 118.5 kilograms per capita 
(Kchit 1994). The development of total wheat imports to Morocco are illus-
trated in Figure 2.5 below. 
Morocco generally imports only common milling wheat, although during 
drought years durum wheat is also imported. In some years small amounts of 
wheat are imported for feed use (Ackerman 1993). The major suppliers of 
wheat imports since 1979 have been the European Union and the United States 
(see Figure 2.4). 
Both the EU and the U.S. subsidize their exports to Morocco through export 
restitutions and EEP bonuses, respectively. In addition, they both subsidize 
exports through export sales credit guarantees. 
For U.S. wheat exports, the U.S. Department of Agriculture operates two 
export credit programs. Under the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-
102), USDA guarantees repayment of private credit extended to importers in 
specified countries and covers credit extended for up to three years. The Inter-
mediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103) covers private credit 
extended for more than three years and up to ten years. 
Morocco used the GSM-102 program to assist its commercial purchases of 
U.S. wheat from 1981 through 1987. At the same time it became one of the 
major participants in the blended credit program in 1984 and 1985. This pro- 
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gram combined a zero-interest government loan with a credit guarantee. The 
blended credit program was suspended in 1985. In 1987, Morocco for the first 
time used the GSM-103 program to obtain 7-year loans to buy U.S. wheat. By 
1988, ali of Morocco's commercial wheat imports from the U.S. were financed 
through the GSM-103 program. Loan repayment difficulties restricted Moroc-
co's participation in the GSM-103 program in 1991 and 1992. The GSM-103 
financing for Morocco was reinstated in May 1992 and continues to he a 
important factor governing the decision to import U.S. wheat (Ackerman 1993). 
While the EU does not provide credit assistance as a community, credit is 
offered by some member countries. France has been the major EU wheat ex-
porter to Morocco. An agency of French government, the Compagnie Franpise 
des Assurances pour le Commerce å 1'Ext6rieure (COFACE), guarantees repay-
ment of short-term credit. Ackerman states that in the Moroccan case the basic 
loan terms have been comparable to U.S. guaranteed loans: coverage for wheat 
sales has been about 95 percent of the principal for loan terms of five or more 
years. 
It is also important to notice that quality of the imported wheats differ, so 
U.S. wheat and EU wheat are not perfect substitutes in the Moroccan market. 
The U.S. has exported primarily hard and soft red winter wheat to Morocco. 
Wheat varieties from European Union are classified by end use as superior 
breadmaking wheats (varieties with a consistently good baking value), standard 
breadmaking wheats, corrective wheats (strong or improving varieties), and 
wheats for other uses (animal feed or biscuit production). On average, wheat 
types exported from the EU to Morocco are reputed to he of lower protein 
content, higher moisture content, and higher test weight than U.S. wheats 
(Ackerman 1993). 
Abbott et al. (1993) found remarkably similar institutions in agricultural 
markets of many less-developed countries (LDCs). For international wheat trade 
this means that parastatal trade monopolies in these countries exercise control 
over import levels of wheat, either directly or through licensing arrangements. 
In spite of the many critiques directed against typical agricultural trade policy 
regimes found in LDCs, parastatal marketing boards (or other public agencies 
controlling agricultural trade and domestic markets) seldom disappear (Abbott 
1993). Morocco, which is the importing country used in our case study, is no 
exception. 
The Office National Interprofessionnel des C6r6ales et L6gumineuses (ONICL) 
is the parastatal agency controlling wheat trade in Morocco. It has been under 
study for reform or elimination under Morocco's structural adjustment program 
negotiated with the World Bank. Morocco, in fact, reformed its wheat trade 
regime in 1996 to comply with GATT and World Bank conditions, but ONICL 
continues to play a role in negotiating export subsidies from the EU and the U.S. 
EEP program. 
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Importing countries do not base their purchasing decisions solely on the 
price of the product. Earlier, it was mentioned that EU wheat and U.S. wheat 
differ in quality, and additional, useful information on Morocco's behavior as a 
wheat importing country can be gained by studying results of a survey con-
ducted by Ackerman (1993). Her survey looks at factors influencing wheat 
import decisions of Morocco. Interviewed people included major decisionmakers 
responsible for Moroccan imports of wheat, users of imported wheat, and inter-
ested observers. Among the respondents were a representative of the Moroccan 
grain purchasing agency (ONICL), representatives from the Ministry of Fi-
nance, two importers, representatives of the national professional millers or-
ganization, one private miller, and the U.S. director of the Cereals Market 
Reform Project. 
The official of ONICL and the two importers ranked the following four 
criteria as most important decisions: price, availability of credit, test weight 
quality standard, and government and trade relationships. The price factor was 
the most important for Moroccan grain buyers. 
Prices bid by licensed importers take into account price subsidies from the 
U.S. and the EU. According to Moroccan importers and government officials, 
exporters experience greater uncertainty in obtaining approvals for EEP sales 
than in receiving subsidies for sales of EU wheat. In some years, this perceived 
uncertainty encouraged the pro curement of wheat from EU locations rather than 
U.S. origins. 
The second major factor affecting ONICL's purchase decisions is credit. The 
United States offers the Moroccan Ministry of Finance credit guarantees under 
GSM-103. On the EU side, the French government offers a line of COFACE-
guaranteed credit each year for imports of ali French products, including agri-
cultural products. The Moroccan Ministries of Agriculture and Finance consider 
the loan terms, coverage, and relative interest rates when determining which 
governments' credit package is best suited for the Moroccan government. 
Test weight is the most important quality factor for Moroccan importers.9 It 
was indicated that test weight is a problem mainly for U.S. soft red winter 
wheat, which has test weights below those of other exporters' wheats. Repre-
sentatives of the Moroccan Millers' Professional Association indicated that they 
would prefer wheat with a high-protein content and low-moisture level, and that 
they are planning to install testing laboratories at the ports to make their own 
more thorough tests of the quality of imported wheat. 
The last major factor affecting purchasing decisions is government and trade 
relationships. Moroccan importers indicated that they have better relationships 
with European suppliers. In particular, Morocco has a long diplomatic and 
9 Importers seek wheat with test weights above 60 pounds per bushel. 
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economic relationship with France. In addition, the possibility of negotiating in 
the French language with suppliers in similar time zones was preferred. 
These results of Ackerman's survey have provided useful insight into the 
importing country's behavior in the world wheat market. In addition, several 
other factors affect an importing country's purchasing decisions. One such 
general group of factors is called switching costs. These importing country' s 
costs of switching from one wheat exporter to another might exist for many 
reasons. An importer incurs costs negotiating a contract or agreement with a 
supplier, and these transaction costs with a new exporter are higher than with an 
existing exporter. Another category is leaming costs. There is more risk in-
volved when buying from a new, unfamiliar source than when buying from an 
existing supplier. There also might exist political costs of switching between 
exporters. One would expect products supplied by political allies to be viewed 
differently from others. Actually, some of the survey's results, such as guaran-
teed credit programs and govemment relationships, can be viewed as forms of 
switching costs. For example, guaranteed credit programs to some extent lock 
Morocco in the EU and U.S., since COFACE-backed French. loans can only be 
used to purchase French wheat and GSM-103 program can only be used to 
obtain loans to purchase U.S. wheat. 
From the economic modeling perspective we can conclude that an importing 
country sees EU wheat and U.S. wheat as imperfect substitutes, implying a 
model with product differentiation. Another important aspect is that the import-
ing country cannot switch freely between suppliers when making purchase 
decisions. These switching costs imply that current decisions are affected by 
history. Therefore, the decision making process is dynamic in nature. In later 
chapters, we develop an economic model of this market which attempts to take 
into account these aspects of intemational wheat trade. 
2.4. Effects of the Uruguay Round GATT Agreement 
on Export Policies 
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations were launched at the ministerial 
meeting in Punta del Este in September 1986. From the start, agriculture for the 
first time played a central role in the negotiations. At that time world prices 
were on a downward slide, reaching their lowest point for many years. Agricul-
tural exports of the United States had been falling considerably, and farm 
support payments escalated (IATRC 1994). Export subsidy programs were re-
introduced, and trade disputes became more common and more bitter. In the 
European Community, subsidized exports were the main outlet for surplus 
production, at an increasing cost for the Community's budget. Other exporters 
of agricultural goods began to suffer under the burden of the subsidized export 
market competition of the two agricultural "super-powers". These conditions in 
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the world markets made it easier to reach a general consensus that it was 
necessary to reform policies in order to achieve trade liberalization in agricul-
ture (IATRC). 
In July 1987, the United States initially proposed to phase out over a ten-year 
period all agricultural import restrictions and all subsidies that directly or indi-
rectly affect trade. The EC offered a more cautious proposal involving a more 
modest, phased reduction in support to agriculture. 
Given the very wide gap between the negotiating positions of the EC and the 
U.S. it proved extremely difficult to reach agreement. The Mid Term Review 
meeting, originally convened in Montreal in December of 1988, failed to break 
the impasse. When the Mid Term negotiations were resumed in Geneva in April 
1989 agreement was reached on a mid-term package which involved a freeze in 
current domestic support and protection levels. More explicitly, an engagement 
was made not to intensify tariff and non-tariff access barriers, and to freeze 
support prices to producers (OECD 1995). However, reductions of export subsi-
dies proved to he the most difficult task. The EC in particular was reluctant to 
accept any specific limitations. This point was a major factor in the collapse of 
the ministerial meeting held in Brussels in December 1990 to bring the Round to 
a close (IATRC). 
Soon after the GATT failure in 1990, EC Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray 
MacSharry, proposed a fundamental reform of the CAP. Within about a year the 
Commissioner pushed through his pian for reform. In May 1992, the EC's farm 
ministers agreed to (1) cut cereal support prices, (2) shift away from price 
supports to direct income payments, and (3) link farmers' payments to a set-
aside program which aims to remove 15 percent of total arable land from 
production. Thus, the CAP reform, by reducing the need for EC's export subsi-
dies and trade barriers, provided much desired help for the Uruguay Round 
GATT negotiations. 
Concurrent with the CAP reform process, GATT negotiations resumed. In 
1991, the agreement in principle to accept discipline in each of the three areas of 
import access, domestic support and export subsidies was achieved. From the 
end of 1991 onwards the negotiations on agriculture continued on the basis of 
the Draft Final Act which had been put forward by Arthur Dunkel, then Direc-
tor-General of the GATT. This paper put forward specific quantitative actions 
and measures designed to strengthen trade disciplines in each of the three areas 
which had been accepted as essential and integral parts of a meaningful agree-
ment on agriculture (OECD). 
Although the EC's CAP reform opened the possibility of a solution to the 
agricultural negotiations, several aspects of the Dunkel Draft remained prob-
lematic. These related to the size of the export subsidy reductions. The issues 
proved highly contentious and it was only after long bilateral discussions be-
tween the U.S. and the EC that an agreement was reached. In the so-called Blair 
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House Accord a smaller reduction in the volume of export subsidies was agreed, 
relative to the original Dunkel Draft. Later, in the last minute negotiations in 
December 1993, some flexibility was granted in the use of base period from 
which annual export subsidy reductions are made (OECD). 
Detailed country schedules were negotiated by the 15th December 1993 and 
were verified in the months leading up to the ministerial meeting in Marrakesh 
in April 1994 (OECD). Country schedules of the EU and U.S. are presented in 
the next section. 
2.4.1. Export Subsidy Reduction for the EC and U.S. 
The ability of countries to define specific limitations on the volume and value of 
export subsidies in agriculture was one of the main issues under discussion in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. The Agreement on Agriculture bans new 
export subsidies, but existing subsidies are allowed to continue, subject to 
reduction. The terms of export subsidy commitment call for a 21 percent reduc-
tion in the quantity of subsidized exports and a 36 percent cut in the expenditure 
on export subsidies during the six-year implementation period1°. Where the 
volume of subsidized exports in the more recent years was higher, countries 
could generally use the average 1991-92 export subsidy levels as starting points 
for reductions, instead of the original 1986-90 base period (the front-loading 
provision). However, for the final year of the implementation period, volumes 
and values have to be the same as they would have been had the earlier base 
period been retained.11 While this adjustment was important in gaining final 
agreement for the GATT negotiations, it allows the EC and the U.S. to use 
significantly larger export subsidies in wheat throughout the implementation 
period than would have been the case under original provisions of the Dunkel 
Draft (OECD). 
Schedules of export subsidy commitments state the maximum level of export 
subsidies allowed to exist during the implementation period. In the cereals 
sector, the commitments are divided into two categories: wheat/wheat flour and 
coarse grains. The details of the value and volume commitments in wheat for 
the European Union and for the United States are illustrated in Table 2.1. 
10 For developing countries the reductions are smaller, amounting to a 14 percent reduction in 
the quantity of subsidized exports and a 24 percent cut in the expenditure on export subsidies 
during the ten-year implementation period. 
11 Therefore, when reductions are calculated from the 1991/92 base level, the reduction in the 
quantity of subsidized U.S. wheat exports is 32 percent of 1991/92 base level (instead of 21 
percent) and the reduction in the expenditure on U.S. wheat export subsidies is 57 percent 
(instead of 36 percent). Similarly for EU wheat, the reduction in the quantity of subsidized 
exports is now 34 percent and the reduction in the expenditure on export subsidies is 49 
percent. 
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Average base level 
1986-90 1991-92 
Commitments 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/ 2000/ 
2000 	2001 
Annual quantity commitments of the EU (1000 tons) 
	
19 119 	17 982 	16 846 	15 709 	14 573 	13 436  
Annual value commitments of the EU (million ECUs) 
2 069 	1 884 	1 698 	1 512 	1 327 	1 141  
Annual quantity commitments of the U.S. (1000 tons) 
20 238 	19 095 	17 952 	16 809 	15 665 	14 522  
Annual value commitments of the U.S. (million US$) 
765.5 	685.2 	604.8 	524.5 	444.2 	363.6 
17 008 	20 255 
1 783 	2 255 
18 382 	21 449 
568.4 	855.2 
Table 2.1. EU and U.S. Commitments on Wheat Export Subsidies. 
Sources: CAP Monitor 1996, USDA. 
In addition to GATT commitments, the 1996 Farm bill limited total EEP 
funding by the U.S. even more during the first three years of the GATT imple-
mentation period. The limits are $350 million in fiscal year 1996, $250 million 
in 1997, $500 million in 1998, $550 million in 1999, $579 million in 2000, and 
$478 million in 2001. These restrictions are not surprising when we look at the 
context in which the additional voluntary restrictions were made. No EEP-
bonuses were awarded since July 1995. The EU was using export taxes instead 
of export subsidies on wheat exports, and world grain storage was lower than 
ever before. Therefore, it is very unlikely that high (if any) export subsidies will 
be needed during the first few years of the GATT implementation period. On 
the other hand, it is much harder to predict what will happen after those first few 
years. Export subsidies could reemerge if world prices fall, and GATT con-
straints might then become binding. That is why we do not find any additional 
voluntary restriction made by the U.S. for those last three years of the GATT 
implementation period. 
2.5. Noncooperative Strategic Interaction and Market Power 
in International Wheat Trade 
Reducing export subsidies was a major accomplishment of the latest GATT 
Agreement. The Uruguay Round made progress, but activist government poli-
cies remain a basic feature of world trade in wheat. The failure of GATT to 
eliminate export subsidies can be seen as a result of countries' making their 
decisions based on their perceived self-interest, and not collaborating, which 
could have led to improved welfare of the world. A Prisoner's Dilemma- type 
situation occurs in which each country is worse-off because all countries subsi-
dize their exports heavily (Kennedy et al. 1994). 
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Next, some examples are given to illustrate how two "superpowers", U.S. 
and EU, influence each other's and other exporters' policies. Understanding of 
international wheat market behavior and policy impacts requires methods that 
account for strategic interactions of these market agents. 
It is not difficult to find suggestive evidence on noncooperative strategic 
interaction between the European Union and the United States in international 
wheat trade. One of the first obvious signs of this behavior in recent history 
happened in 1983 when the U.S. sold wheat flour to Egypt at a highly subsi-
dized price. An export payment was made to U.S. wheat millers under an 
agreement between the U.S. and Egyptian government that provided for the sale 
of flour equal to one million metric tons of wheat. Wheat was released to flour 
millers from CCC stocks to enable millers to contract for sale and delivery to 
the Egyptian market without financial losses. Actual export flour prices aver-
aged about $138 per ton (compared with U.S. wheat flour prices of $250-$260 
per ton) (Grigsby and Jabara 1985). This "largest flour sale in history" was 
arranged to capture the Egyptian wheat market from the EC (Gardner 1996). 
In May 1985 the U.S. responded to "unfair trade practices of the EC" (export 
subsidies) by announcing the EEP. This was the beginning of an era which is 
often called the grain subsidy war (Libby 1992). In the early years, the main 
stage of operations was wheat trade to North Africa. Since then, the program 
has been broadened to include more products and countries. Both the United 
States and the European Union claimed to be matching the other's export 
subsidies. Figure 2.6 shows trends over time in EC and U.S. wheat subsidies 
from 1986/87 to 1995/96 that are consistent with this claim. 
By looking at the underlying criteria used to fix export restitutions in the EU 
and EEP bonuses in the U.S., it is clear that noncooperative strategic interaction 
between the EU and the U.S. exists. As an example, part of the statement given 
Figure 2.6. EC and U.S. Wheat Export Subsidies, 1986/87-95/96. 
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in May 25, 1995 by Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Serv-
ices, Eugene Moos, follows: 
"The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) helps the United States 
meet subsidized competition in targeted markets — particularly com- 
petition from the European Union. The EEP has in many cases, 
increased, or prevented further declines, in U.S. exports; it has 
challenged unfair trade practices by others; and it has pressured our 
trading partners to engage in serious negotiations on bilateral and 
multilateral agricultural trade issues. The EEP will remain an im-
portant part of our trade policy arsenal, and we will continue to use 
it — as the administration pledged — to the maximum extent permit- 
ted under the subsidy reduction commitments provided for in the 
GATT Uruguay Round Agreement" (United States Congress 1995). 
Another aspect that makes the world wheat market imperfectly competitive 
is the fact that exporting firms have the potential to exercise market power to 
influence the market price. Several studies have looked at this issue. Drawing 
on the industrial organization literature, Caves and Pugel (1982) were among 
the first to study concentration and market power of international wheat export-
ing firms. In their analysis it was concluded that there was not sufficient evi-
dence to declare that imperfect competition existed among international wheat 
exporting firms. Thus, their conclusion was in contrast with the public percep-
tion of imperfect competition in this sector. However, Caves and Pugel did not 
offer any direct test of the relationship between pricing behavior and market 
structure. Later, Patterson and Abbott (1994) provided this test. Their paper 
analyzed the relationship between export pricing behavior and market structure 
in the U.S. wheat and corn sectors in which the data for wheat covered 98 
destination countries for U.S. wheat. In contrast to Caves and Pugel, their 
results suggest that the pricing behavior of U.S. wheat exporting firms does not 
reflect pure competition. However, Patterson and Abbott also add that the 
magnitude of the exporting firms market power is quite small, supporting our 
perception that it is exporting countries' governments instead of firms that 
exercise the greatest power on the market. 
A market structure study by McNally (1993) provides another piece of 
evidence on the imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) nature of the U.S. wheat 
exporting firms. Her study focused on those exporting firms who participated in 
the Export Enhancement Program from 1985 to 1989. McNally calculated two 
measures of firm concentration: firm concentration ratio and Herfindhal- 
Hirschman Index (HHI). The EEP data four-firm concentration ratio, CR4= 
69 %, was about the same as the one found by Patterson and Abbott 
(CR4=69.8 %). According to Connor et al. (1985) categorization the industry 
comprised of wheat exporting firms participating in the EEP is highly concen-
trated oligopoly. The second measure of industry concentration discussed by 
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McNally was the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index. The study stated that HHI for 
firms participating in the EEP is HHI=1398. According to standards established 
by the Federal Trade Commission, McNally's HHI-value indicates that this 
wheat export industry in the U.S. is moderately concentrated. 
The above studies have looked at the market power of firms exporting U.S. 
wheat. They suggest that these firms have a degree of market power to influence 
price. Similar studies and/or publicly available data for subsidized wheat ex-
ports from the EU do not exist. We have some insight on concentration based on 
several conversations with EU wheat trade experts. The major multinational 
wheat exporting firms that participate in the EEP also trade EU wheat. How-
ever, a large portion of EU wheat is traded by French exporting firms (e.g. 
Soufflet). In general, it is believed that EU wheat exports are approximately 
equally concentrated (or possibly a little less concentrated) than U.S. wheat 
exports. 
If we consider EU wheat exports to Morocco, which is the importing country 
in our case study, we notice that France has been the dominant exporter. From 
1988/89 through 1991/92 it has covered over 80 percent of EC wheat exports to 
Morocco. A large portion of wheat exports from France is handled by French 
exporting firms. On the other hand, U.S. wheat exports to Morocco are mainly 
traded by large American grain companies. Because of this concentrated market 
structure we have suggestive evidence that firms have a degree of market power 
to influence price. Therefore, from the economic modeling perspective it seems 
plausible to assume that exporting firms of EU and U.S. wheat are involved in a 
price competition game in the imperfectly competitive Moroccan wheat market. 
2.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the European Union and the United States are two 
noncooperatively behaving "super-powers" in the international wheat market 
whose actions in the market have an influence on each other's agricultural 
policies as well as on world market prices. The most significant strategic vari-
able has been an export subsidy, on which the GATT Uruguay Round Agree-
ment has set upper bounds. The chapter has also provided some evidence that 
exporting firm level price competition is oligopolistic (imperfect) in nature. 
Finally, the chapter has provided useful insight into an importing country's 
behavior in the world wheat market. The importing country sees the products 
from different suppliers as imperfect substitutes. Another important aspect is 
that an importing country faces costs when switching between suppliers in 
making purchase decisions. These switching costs imply the decision making 
process is dynamic in nature. In later chapters we develop an economic model 
which attempts to take into account these aspects of international wheat trade. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
National agricultural policies, particularly those of major trading countries or 
country groups (e.g., the European Union and the United States), often have 
come into conflict due to their interaction through international trade. Agricul-
tural trade policy is largely a consequence of policy instruments put in place to 
achieve domestic policy goals (e.g., the levels and stability of farm incomes and 
food security). Even after the Uruguay Round GATT Agreement, international 
trade in agricultural products continues to he influenced by agricultural trade 
policies, and by export subsidies (or export taxes) in particular. This situation 
persists despite the substantial amount of agricultural trade policy analysis that 
has been conducted over at least the last twenty-five years showing losses in 
national and world income which are incurred due to export subsidies (e.g. 
Abbott 1985, Anania et al. 1992). 
In the framework traditionally used to analyze trade issues, a neoclassical 
perfectly competitive model, export subsidies always reduce the welfare of the 
subsidizing country. This means that either decisionmakers are acting irration-
ally or the assumptions of the competitive model are in error. Paarlberg (1984) 
claims that the following four assumptions are critical to the outcome of the 
traditional perfectly competitive model of international trade: 
ali goods are homogeneous; 
the model is static and characterized by certainty; 
ali political interest groups have equal influence on the policy 
maker; and 
ali agents are price takers — thus the subsidy is exogenous to the 
system. 
Developments in international trade theory have relaxed these assumptions 
of the traditional model and therefore helped us in our attempts to understand 
why policymakers might use export promotion policies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey these maj or developments in interna-
tional (agricultural) trade modeling and in industrial organization literature 
relevant to the characteristics of world wheat market. The chapter begins with a 
critical review of the traditional agricultural trade modeling literature. 
International wheat markets are believed to he imperfectly competitive. Chap- 
ter II provided some evidence that exporting firm level price competition is 
oligopolistic (imperfect) in nature. At the country level a few exporting coun-
tries dominate the supply of wheat in the world market. The governments of two 
"superpowers", the EU and the U.S., follow carefully each others' behavior in 
the market when setting their export subsidies. One objective of this research is 
to develop an international wheat market model in which we can capture real 
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world strategic interaction between the participants in this market. To do this 
requires that we use the tools of game theory in the model building process. 
Therefore, section 2 will review modeling techniques for empirical game-theo-
retic models. Then, in the following section, agricultural trade modeling litera-
ture that uses these tools is reviewed. 
Next, we note that politics and special interest group pressures have impor-
tant effects on trade policies. Political economy explanations of trade policies 
are important, because they may help to develop an understanding of why 
subsidies rather than taxes are used as trade interventions. 
Chapter II also claims that an importing country cannot switch freely be-
tween suppliers when making purchase decisions. For example, the transaction 
costs that an importer faces when negotiating a contract with a new supplier are 
higher than with an existing exporter. In addition, more risk is involved when 
buying from a new source than when buying from an existing supplier. Guaran- • 
teed credit programs, government and trade relationships, as well as language 
preferences also create switching costs. Therefore, the last section of this chap-
ter will provide some basic background on switching cost theory. 
3.1. Traditional Agricultural Trade Models 
The purpose of this section is to review the literature on traditional agricultural 
trade models, used by institutions like U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for 
policy analysis, projections, forecasts, and as a means of gaining a better under-
standing of the economic forces and policy regimes that determine agricultural 
trade. 
Traditional approaches to agricultural trade modeling can he divided into 
three different categories: 1) spatial equilibrium models, 2) nonspatial equilib-
rium models, and 3) trade flow and market share models (generally of the 
Armington-type). These models are generally static and assume perfect compe-
tition. The first two categories also assume a homogeneous good, in contrast to 
the last category where products are differentiated by origin. Surveys of this 
literature are provided by Thompson (1981), Thompson and Abbott (1982), and 
Sarris (1981). 
3.1.1. Spatial Equilibrium Models 
In his review of agricultural trade models, Thompson (1981) states that spatial 
price equilibrium models were one of the most popular approaches to agricul-
tural trade modeling, particularly for purposes of trade policy analysis. Thompson 
supports this statement by citing nearly three dozen spatial equilibrium models 
of international markets for wheat, rice, corn, sugar, pork, beef, oranges, rapeseed, 
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and peanuts. The feature that distinguishes these models ftom the nonspatial 
equilibrium models, discussed next, is that spatial equilibrium models endogenize 
trade flows and market shares. 
An example of a spatial equilibrium model is the world wheat trade model of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Dixit and Sharples 1987). There also exists 
a spatial equilibrium version of USDA's SWOPSIM model, although the origi- 
nal model is nonspatial (Roningen et al. 1991). 
One of the principal arguments for use of the spatial equilibrium models was 
that they generate trade flows and market shares, variables that often are of 
interest to the users of these models. However, this appears to be a questionable 
advantage, because spatial equilibrium models have not been very successful in 
explaining real world trade flows. A number of reasons can be presented to 
explain these deviations, ali concerning invalid assumptions made in the spatial 
equilibrium formulation. One explanation could be that the spatial equilibrium 
models are designed to model trade flows for homogeneous products, but the 
product might not be perfectly homogeneous. For example, in the international 
wheat market there are many varieties of wheat, each with different principal 
uses. They are not perfect substitutes for one another. Moreover, importing 
countries may differentiate among exporting countries on historical or political 
grounds. Therefore switching between suppliers may not be as easy as these 
models assume. 
Another problem is that spatial equilibrium models are usually static. Some 
users of trade policy analyses need information on the time path of adjustment 
of supply, disappearance, and price. 
A very problematic assumption in spatial equilibrium trade models is their 
assumption that ali trading countries behave in a perfectly competitive market. 
As was shown in Chapter II, international wheat exports are in the hands of very 
few countries-  and firms. In addition, several importing countries as well as 
exporting countries also have either parastatal agencies or private monopolies 
taking care of their foreign trade. This suggests that the perfectly competitive 
market assumption of the spatial price equilibrium formulation may not ad-
equately approximate the behavior of the different market participants in inter-
national grain markets. Nevertheless, the fact that spatial equilibrium models 
generally do not do very well at accomplishing one of their principal goals — to 
account for trade flows — casts doubt on the justification for using a spatial 
equilibrium formulation when trade flows are of particular interest. 
One advantage of the spatial equilibrium formulation of an agricultural trade 
model is that it is an efficient means of examining the effects of changes in 
transport costs on the net trade positions of trading regions. However, because 
trade flows are sensitive to small changes in transport costs (as well as to policy 
variables) in these models, one must interpret the predicted effects on trade 
flows with caution. Such doubts with respect to the spatial price equilibrium 
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approach have raised a number of questions concerning its adequacy for pur-
poses of policy analysis (Thompson 1981). 
3.1.2. Nonspatial Equilibrium Models 
Nonspatial price equilibrium models represent a special case of spatial equilib-
rium models. Trade flows between specific pairs of countries are suppressed 
and only the net trade position of each trading country is found. Therefore, it is 
not possible to study effects of bilateral agreements, bilateral quotas or targeted 
subsidies, which are fi-equently used in international agricultural trade. The 
main advantage of nonspatial price equilibrium models is that they are easier to 
solve than are the spatial equilibrium models. Nonspatial equilibrium models 
are solved as a system of simultaneous equations rather than by optimization. 
A number of the nonspatial equilibrium models explicitly include detailed 
domestic market models and price linkage equations, rather than merely reflect-
ing the behavior of each country by a single import or export equation. 
An example of nonspatial equilibrium model is USDA's SWOPSIM model 
(Roningen et al. 1991). The Iowa State University FAPRI trade model, and the 
grain-oilseeds-livestock (GOL) model of the USDA also belong to the class of 
nonspatial price equilibrium models. 
3.1.3. Armington-Type Trade Flow and Market Share Models 
The class of differentiated product models recognizes that individual commodi-
ties are not perfectly homogeneous. Thus, the first problematic assumption 
mentioned by Paarlberg is relaxed. There may exist physical differences in 
quality, or the product may be differentiated in the eyes of the importer owing to 
such intangible factors as reliability of supply or political inclination of the 
government of the importing country. Many trade models treat imported com-
modities as imperfectly substitutable for the "same" commodities produced 
domestically. Alternatively, the same commodity from each different origin is 
treated as a different good. 
Armington (1969) developed a theory for a trade model in which goods are 
differentiated by country of origin. This approach assumes that utility is weakly 
separable and homothetic, such that a buyer's (importer's) decision process may 
be viewed as a two-stage utility maximization procedure. In the first stage the 
importer decides how much of a particular commodity to import. In the second 
stage, given the total amount imported, the importer decides how much to 
import from each supplier. To simplify the model and reduce the number of 
parameters to be estimated, it further assumes that the total quantity of the 
product imported has a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification. 
This specification implies weak separability between different import sources. 
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The Armington approach permits the calculation of cross-price elasticities be-
tween imports from ali sources using estimates of the aggregate price elasticity 
of demand for imports, a single elasticity of substitution, and import market 
shares. 
The Armington approach was first applied in agricultural trade modeling by 
Grennes et al. (1977). Abbott et al. (1988) also used this approach to explain 
why the Russian grain embargo caused price movements in a direction opposed 
to that predicted by spatial equilibrium models. Hjort (1988) recognizes also 
quality requirements, and therefore introduced a three-stage version of Armington-
type model. The additional stage in her model is the second stage, where the 
importer determines what quality class(es) of wheat will optimally satisfy wheat 
import demand. Also, Haley (1995a, 1995b), in his studies on EEP, uses this 
three-stage version of the Armington-type model. 
Armington-type models exhibit much smoother changes in trade shares than 
spatial equilibrium models, and account more adequately for observed trade 
flows than the spatial equilibrium model. On the other hand, homotheticity and 
separability of the utility function are strong assumptions. These restrictions 
were tested and rejected using data from the international cotton and wheat 
markets by Alston et al. (1990). 
3.1.4. Evaluation and Critique 
Ali of the critical assumptions stated by Paarlberg are made in these models, 
except the homogeneous product assumption, which is relaxed in the Armington 
approach. One main concern for our research is that ali the models discussed 
make the perfect competition assumption. It has been demonstrated in several 
studies that this assumption is not realistic for international agricultural trade 
(see Chapter II). Since the late 1970's, the development of agricultural trade 
models with imperfect competition characteristics has been very rapid. Some of 
these models use game theoretic tools to study behavior in agricultural markets. 
Therefore, empirical applications of game theory are reviewed next. 
3.2. Empirical Games and International Trade 
International wheat markets are believed to he imperfectly competitive. Large 
exporters and importers have potential market power. When we have an imper-
fectly competitive market structure (e.g., an oligopolistic market structure) a 
firm or country no longer meets a passive environment (Tirole 1988). One 
challenging objective of this research is to develop an international wheat 
market model in which we capture real world strategic interaction between the 
participants in the market. To do this requires that we use the tools of game 
theory in the model building process. Therefore, it is useful to see how game 
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theory can be used and has been used in industrial organization (JO) and trade 
theory, and how it has been applied to empirical studies in the trade literature. 
In economics, the techniques of noncooperative game theory are most widely 
used in industrial organization (JO). Throughout the 1980s the bulk of research 
effort was devoted to development of a new body of theory which rests upon use 
of game-theoretic oligopoly models. This so called new JO was a break from the 
past tradition of modeling markets as either competitive, in which case firm 
interactions could be safely ignored, or monopolistic, where interactions were 
assumed absent. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s international trade economists have also 
sought to incorporate oligopoly and other forms of imperfect competition into 
the analysis of international trade and trade policy in order to examine (or 
represent) important empirical regularities and policy concerns. The ability of 
traditional trade theory to do this was found to be inadequate. The assumption 
of perfect competition was unrealistic and reasons for trade, such as different 
factor endowments between countries or comparative advantage, were not able 
to explain outcomes like intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade 
between similar countries. Furthermore, such models failed to successfully in-
corporate important policy-relevant considerations, such as firm-level increas-
ing returns to scale, learning by doing, R&D, and inter-government and/or inter-
firm strategic rivalries. Because of these problems the "new" trade theory was 
born. 
The new trade theory is mainly an application of the analysis of strategic 
behavior developed in the new JO literature. Therefore, it also uses game theory 
as a tool in its analysis. This new trade theory simultaneously models imperfect 
competition and international trade. A number of good surveys of trade policy 
with imperfect competition (which apply the tools of game theory) have been 
written (see for example, Grossman and Richardson (1985), Dixit (1987), 
Krugman (1989), Krishna and Thursby (1990) and Brander (1995)). 
Game theory is a theory of strategic interaction. As Harsanyi (1995) states in 
his Nobel Prize lecture, it is a theory of rational behavior in social situations in 
which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the 
other players' countermoves are likely to be. 
Games in Game Theory can be divided into two categories: 1) noncoopera-
tive games and 2) cooperative games. Almost ali the applications of game 
theory in international economics (and in economics in general) fall into the 
noncooperative category. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) describe the idea of 
noncooperative games as follows: 
"The word noncooperative means that the players' choices are 
based only on their perceived self-interest, in contrast to the theory 
of cooperative games, which develops axioms meant in part to 
capture the idea of fairness. Noncooperative does not mean that 
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players do not get along, or that they always refuse to cooperate. 
Noncooperative players motivated solely by self-interest can ex- 
hibit cooperative behavior in some settings." 
The models of noncooperative game theory can be divided into four broad 
groups. One of the groups is static games with complete information. In static 
games of this type, ali agents move simultaneously, so no agent has the opportu-
nity to react to another's move. Another way to say this is that a static game is a 
model of interactive decision-making in which each decision-maker chooses his 
pian of action once and for ali, and these choices are made simultaneously 
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Complete information implies that each agent 
knows everything there is to know about the structure of the game — not only 
about his own choices, but also the choices available to other agents. A second 
group of games is dynamic games with complete information. In these agents 
adopt strategies in which their current actions depend upon the past actions of 
the other agents. 
The last two groups of noncooperative game theory are the static games of 
incomplete information and the dynamic games of incomplete information. A 
distinction between games with complete and with incomplete information is 
based on the amount of information the players will have about the basic 
structure of the game. Lack of information about the structure of a game can 
take many different forms. The players may lack full information about the 
other players' (or even their own) payoff functions, about physical or the social 
resources, about strategies available to other players' (or even themselves), 
about the amount of information the other players have about various aspects of 
the game, and so on (Harsanyi 1995). That is to say, the distinction is based on 
the amount of information the players will have about those characteristics of 
the game that must have been decided upon before the game can be played at ali. 
Harsanyi (1967, 1968a-b) presented a way to convert an incomplete informa-
tion game into a game of complete information. He did this by introducing a 
prior move by nature that determines players' "types" (see for example Harsanyi 
1995). In the converted game the incomplete information becomes imperfect 
information about nature' s moves, so the converted game can be analyzed with 
standard techniques. Now the distinction is made between games with perfect 
and with imperfect informationl . In games with perfect information, ali players 
will have full information at every stage of the game about ali moves made at 
earlier stages, including both personal moves and chance moves (i.e., nature's 
moves). In contrast, in games with imperfect information, at some stage(s) of 
the game the players, or at least some of them, will have only partial information 
1  Note that this distinction is different from the earlier distinction between games with complete 
and with incomplete information. 
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or none at ali about some move(s) made at earlier stages (Harsanyi 1995). A 
game with imperfect information is also called a Bayesian game. 
Since our goal in this research is to build a dynamic, game theoretic model of 
the international wheat market, we need to examine modeling techniques for 
empirical game-theoretic models. Both static and dynamic games are studied. 
Static games are described first because the majority of the research has used 
this approach. 
3.2.1. Static Games 
For concreteness, let us say that players are firms, and when the game is static 
their payoffs are single-period profits. In general, a player's strategic variable 
can be price, quantity, advertising, capacity or any other variable under the 
firm's control. Only price and quantity competition are considered here. Dis-
crete changes such as entry and exit are ignored. 
In a competitive industry, market prices are exogenous. When an input or 
output is variable (optimally allocated) its shadow price equals its market price. 
Moreover, each firm can make its decision in isolation. This is true because its 
payoffs do not depend on the actions of other players in the market. In an 
oligopoly, in contrast, output prices are endogenous, which raises two issues. 
First, even when an output is optimally chosen, market and shadow prices may 
not be equal. This means that the competitive profit function, which depends 
only on market prices, must be modified. Second, profits depend on other firms' 
choices, firms make optimal decisions conditional on rivals' actions. 
Suppose that firm i is large enough to have market power in its product 
market. The price/quantity relationship is expressed by inverse demand func- 
tions, 
(3.1) 
	
(q),  
where q = 	is aggregate output sales in the market. Firm i's net profit, or 
total revenue minus total cost, is 
(3.2) 	 z'o (q) = 	(q)ql — c' (ql), 
where c(  q9 is s cost function. Notice that rival outputs appear in each func-
tion. It is assumed that eachzio is concave in . 
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The solution concept is Nash equilibrium2, in which ali firms choose their 
strategies such that each firm' s strategy, si, maximizes that firm' s payoff, condi-
tional on the strategies chosen by other firms 
(3.3) max2t 	i = 	n. s' 
Although it is easy to write down the maximization problem (3.3), it is not 
immediately obvious what it means. For the problem to be well defined, it is 
necessary to know what sort of game the firms are engaged in (e.g., Cournot, 
Bertrand, or dominant firm with competitive fringe). For example, in the Cournot 
game the strategic variable si is the quantity variable qi. In the Bertrand game it 
is the price variablepi. To see the difference between these games, it is useful to 
examine the first-order condition with respect to qi conditional on rival choices 
for the above maximization problem: 
P' + di± q'  	11-1q1 	0 (3.4) 	 aq j (V 	aqi 	• 
The reason the unusual terms dq j 	appear in (3.4) is that, for a Nash equilib- 
rium, partial derivatives are taken holding other firms' strategies constant, and 
the strategic variable need not be q. The term ajj /dq j  is called a conjectural 
variation of firm i about firm j. With Cournot competition, in which strategic 
variables are quantities, these terms equal zero. 
Suppose, in contrast, that firms' strategic variables are prices,pi. In this case, 
each player conjectures that his opponents' prices will be unaffected by his 
choice. It can be shown (see for example Slade (1995)) that the Bertrand 
conjecture for the differentiated products case is dqj dql  
where si is firm i's market share; Ei is the partial own-price elasticity of demand 
(holding rival prices constant), E = -(dqi 143i )pl I q i ); and Eli is the partial 
cross-price elasticity of demand, E fi = —(aj j I dpi)(pi I qj). For the homoge-
neous product case without capacity constraint the Bertrand conjecture is minus 
one. This is equivalent to a perfectly competitive model, since the first-order 
condition reduces to price equals marginal cost. 
2  In a Nash equilibrium, no player would find it in his or her interest to deviate unilaterally from 
a Nash equilibrium strategy. If a set of strategies is not a Nash equilibrium then at least one 
player is not consistently thinking through the behavior of the other players. That is, one of the 
players must expect the other player not to act in his own self-interest (the assumption of 
noncooperative behavior is not met). 
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These conjectures vary considerably with different strategic variables. There-
fore, when a static game framework is applied to policy analysis it becomes 
critical to correctly choose the strategic variable (or conjecture). As an example 
we can look at the strategic trade policy literature. First, Brander and Spencer 
(1985) showed in their two exporting country model that under Cournot compe-
tition national welfare can be increased, relative to that with free trade, when 
one of the governments pre-commits to intervention and does so in the form of 
an export subsidy. Subsequently, Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that the 
Brander and Spencer conclusion was sensitive to the strategic variable used by 
export firms. In particular, they showed that if the firms competed on price and 
played a Bertrand game, then an export tax was the optimal policy. 
3.2.2. Dynamic Games3  
Static models can provide useful summary statistics concerning the outcomes of 
oligopolistic interactions, but they are only the first step in the economist's 
attempt to understand strategic interactions. To capture more complex strategic 
behavior we need to look at dynamic models. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) 
identify two reasons for employing dynamic models of oligopoly in preference 
to static models. First, the behavior and performance of a mature industry 
depend crucially on the history of that industry, and this history-dependence is 
best modeled in explicitly dynamic models. Second, nonstationary industries, 
whether growing or declining, require explicitly dynamic models. 
There are many ways to introduce dynamics into games. Only one class of 
dynamic games, the state-space game, is examined here. Most empirical dy-
namic game analysis falls into this class4. 
A state-space game can also be called a difference game or a differential 
game. It is a difference game in discrete time and differential game in continu-
ous time. In these games payoff-relevant history is collapsed into one or more 
variables, the state. Moreover, the players, who have long time horizons, antici-
pate rival reactions to ali of their actions. Since optimal control problems 
constitute a special class of (infinite) dynamic games with one player and one 
criterion, the mathematical tools used for such problems are applied in dynamic 
game theory, as well. 
In these games certain variables are chosen by the players in every period. 
Such variables, xl(t), are called players' controls (actions). There are many 
3  This introduction to state-space games follows the presentation of Slade (1995). 
4  Another class of dynamic games are repeated games with time-independent payoffs. With 
repeated games, payoff fimctions are constant over time, but strategies can depend on payoff-
irrelevant history. 
38 
possibilities for controls. For example, players' might choose output, invest-
ment in capacity, advertising effort, tariff level, or export subsidy level. In 
addition to the controls, there is a state vector, k(t) that is common to ali players. 
It denotes the position, or state, or payoff-relevant history of the game at date t. 
This state could be stock of physical capital for example. 
The relationship between the state and controls is governed by the state 
equation of the dynamic game. This equation is a difference equation in the 
discrete-time case and a differential equation in continuous-time case, hence the 
names difference game and differential game, respectively. To avoid confusion 
only the differential game structure is used below to explain the set-up proce-
dure of a state-space game (for difference games see Basar and Olsder 1995). 
The state equations (equations of motion) of a differential game are 
dk(t) 
(3-5) 	 dt 	\ 
= f(k(t),x(t),t), 
where x(t) is the vector of controls. The state equations are assumed to he 
continuously differentiable. 
Bach firm earns an instantaneous profit that depends on both the current state 
and controls, 
(3.6) 	 7r. = zi (k(t),x(t),t). 
The above equation shows that profits depend on history only as it is embodied 
in the current state. Therefore, it is irrelevant which way the state evolved. It is 
assumed that equation (3.6) is differentiable and concave in x(t). 
The objective function of player i is his discounted profits, 
(3.7) 	 =IT (k(t), x(t), t)dt + 
VI  (k(T), 
t=o 
where T 	is the duration of the evolution of the game, which is specified a 
priori. 	is the instantaneous profit times a discount factor, and 'ui is the 
terminal payoff which depends on the state at the end of the game. 
In order to specify a nonzero-sum differential game, the next necessary 
ingredient is an information structure. The terms open-loop, feedback, and 
closed-loop are used to distinguish between different information structure as-
sumptions in dynamic games. Each player's strategy is a sequence of functions 
that map the players' information, S2i(t), into a choice of controls, 
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(3.8) 	 {xi (t)= 	(S21 (t))}, 	0<t<T 
where 411  is assumed to be continuously differentiable. Differences between 
information structure assumptions can be seen by looking at the contents of 
S2i(t). Players' information structure is an open-loop pattern when players can-
not observe the state after t = 0 (i.e., they commit to their controls as of time 
zero). Strategies, therefore, are time paths for the actions that can depend on the 
initial conditions but are independent of the state. Furthermore, since an open-
loop calculation only involves choice at time zero, it is essentially static. 
In contrast, games with state-dependent strategies are fundamentally dy-
namic. If players can condition their strategies on other variables in addition to 
calendar time, they may prefer not to use open-loop strategies in order to react 
to exogenous moves by nature, and to possible deviations by their rivals from 
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, closed-loop and feedback strategies are mies 
for choosing controls as functions of the state as well as time. 
The distinction between feedback and closed-loop information structure is 
that with feedback information, players know only the current state (payoff-
relevant information) whereas a closed-loop information pattern includes the 
way in which the state has evolved (payoff-irrelevant information). Formally 
this can be stated as follows, 
	
{k(0), t} 	open /oop 
(3.9) 	S-2(t) = I {k(t), t} feedback, and 
0 	t,t} closed loop. 
A Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies is called an open-loop equilib-
rium (as with Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria, this is not really a new 
equilibrium concept but rather a way of describing a particular class of games). 
Open-loop equilibria coincide with subgame perfect equilibria5, since the only 
proper subgame is the game itself. Feedback equilibria (i.e., Nash equilibria in 
feedback strategies) are usually required to be subgame perfect. When this is the 
case they are also known as Markov perfect equilibria. In contrast, closed-loop 
equilibria need not to be subgame perfect6. 
5  By definition, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the extensive form game is a Nash 
equilibrium for the game that, also, gives a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame of the 
game (Kreps 1990). 
6  Most empirical game models have used either open-loop or feedback information structure. 
Therefore, closed-loop equilibria are not studied here. 
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Control-theory techniques can be used to derive necessary conditions for 
differential games. A game in open-loop strategies is similar to N simultaneous 
optimal-control problems, where N is the number of players. A game with 
feedback strategies, in contrast, is similar to N simultaneous dynamic-program-
ming problems (or to N control problems) where players recognize that other 
players' future choices are influenced by the state. In each case, the state 
equations are constraints on the optimization. To keep games more tractable, 
considerable differentiability has been assumed in the models7. To show equi- 
librium conditions, assume that player i wishes to choose x' = 	(,.) to maxi- 
mize V' subject to the state equation and the initial condition k(0) = k0. In the 
feedback equilibrium, the following necessary (first-order) conditions must he 
satisfied for each player 
(3.10) 
dki 
 = 	(k,x,t), 
dt 
k(0)= ko 
(t) 	 (9111' r 	(k, t) 
(3.11) 1./ dt 	• £=ire*/ 	(Å j ) 
V j =1,...,N 
	
(3.12) 	 Wi (k,t)E arg max 	(k,xi x,  
(3.13) 	 (T) = 	T)  dcal).:( 	Vj = 1,...N , 
where H1 (1c,x,t ,i11= (k,x,t)+1,Au f (k,x,t) is the Hamiltonian and 
(A11 , 	is the costate lval riable for player i. In contrast to static 
games, these shadow prices are marginal values of the state, not of current 
choice variables. However, as with static games, shadow prices are closely 
related to equilibrium strategies. In equation (3.11), a&PLialcj is the vector of 
7  Starr and Ho (1969a) restricted their attention to objective functions that are continuous and 
almost-everywhere-differentiable (i.e., piecewise continuously differentiable) functions of the 
state variables. 
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partial derivatives of player 	strategy with respect to the jth component of the 
state, with the convention that the derivative of Hi with respect to the vector xe 
(i.e., 071/107x' ) is a column vector. Note that the troublesome second term in 
(3.11) is absent in a one player game (i.e., optimal control problem) because 
N=1, and in an open-loop problem because 07•P eidkj = 0. So, whenever this 
term is nonzero we would expect open-loop and feedback solutions to be differ-
ent (Starr and Ho 1969b). 
Under the feedback information structure assumption, each agent takes into 
account the influence of his actions on the state, both directly and indirectly. 
The indirect effect occurs because the state enters other agents' decision rules 
and affects their future actions. The second term in equation (3.11) captures this 
fact that player i cares about how his opponents will react to changes in the 
state. The problem is that games with feedback strategies become very difficult 
to solve. In particular, because of the cross-influence term in the costate-vari-
able equation, the evolution of the shadow price of the jth state variable for 
player i is determined by a system of partial differential equations, instead of by 
ordinary differential equations as in the one-player case. As a result, very few 
differential games can be solved in closed form. 
It is clear from the above that both the first-order conditions and shadow-
price equations can be very complex or even intractable for state-space games. 
Moreover, the functional forms for strategies and shadow prices are usually 
unknown. Therefore, most empirical research has focused on linear-quadratic 
(LQ) games, which have a closed form solution. LQ games are games for which 
the equations of motion are linear in the state and control variables and objec-
tive functions are quadratic in the state and control variables. 
This review of dynamic games was done in the context of continuous-time 
dynamic games (i.e., differential games). This is a common approach in theo-
retical state-space models since it is mathematically more convenient (e.g. Slade 
1995, Fudenberg and Tirole 1986). However, empirical works often use a dis-
crete time dynamic game structure since that better illustrates some real world 
phenomena and/or because of data availability. To deflne a discrete-time dy-
namic game, equation (3.5) would be replaced by a difference equation and the 
integral in (3.7) by a summation. Then the equilibrium feedback solution is 
obtained by backward induction (Kydland 1975). 
The empirical model of this dissertation uses a discrete-time dynamic game 
model to study international wheat trade. We study the subgame perfect equilib-
rium (Markov perfect equilibria), which, for a finite horizon model, is obtained 
by working backwards from the last period. Players' actions are conditioned on 
payoff-relevant information: the state. Players understand how their current 
behavior will affect players (themselves and others) in the future. 
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3.3. Imperfect Competition in (Agricultural) Trade Models 
Since the beginning of 1980s international trade economists have sought to 
incorporate oligopoly and other forms of imperfect competition into the analysis 
of international trade and trade policy to capture important empirical regulari- 
ties and observed policy regimes. A massive number of journal articles have 
been published in this area. The most relevant part of this literature for this 
dissertation is strategic trade policy. Brander (1995) defines strategic trade 
policy to be trade policy that conditions or alters a strategic relationship be-
tween firms. This very restrictive definition implies that the existence of strate- 
gic interaction between firms is a necessary precondition for the application of 
strategic trade policy. A broader definition, which also includes interaction 
between governments in otherwise perfectly competitive situations, is adopted 
here. The study of strategic trade policy is fundamentally an application of 
noncooperative game theory. 
In spite of its problems, the simplicity of the static conjectural variations 
(CV) approach made it a popular tool in the 1980s. In this approach each 
country (firm) believes that if it increases its strategic variable by one unit, the 
representative other country (firm) will change its strategic variable by v units. 
The parameter v is the country's (firm's) conjectural variation; by allowing v to 
vary, it is possible to represent a variety of industry behaviors. However, there 
are some strong objections to the concept of conjectural variations. For exam-
ple, Helpman and Krugman (1989) state that the first objection to the conjec-
tural variations approach is that it seems to be an awkward compromise between 
static and dynamic analysis. 
A Nash equilibrium in either the Cournot or Bertrand case can be thought of 
as the outcome of a game in which countries (firms) choose quantities or prices 
simultaneously and independently. That is, Bertrand equilibrium and Cournot 
equilibrium can be thought of as the maximizing outcome of countries (firms) 
acting independently at a single instant. This very seldom is a realistic story, but 
it is consistent and grounded in maximization. The conjectural variations story, 
on the other hand, involves arguments of the form " if the U.S. increases its 
wheat exports by one unit, then EU will match half of the US's increase...." 
Therefore, it is a story that must involve a sequence of decisions taken over 
time. But if this is accommodated by the model, then it is important to make the 
dynamics explicit in the model. Trying to include the dynamic interaction of 
countries (firms) into a single-period (static) equilibrium concept leads to a 
situation in which one does not know what is supposed to be happening, and so 
the grounding in maximization is lost (Helpman and Krugman). 
The second problem, stated by Helpman and Krugman, is that because the 
conjectural variation parameter lacks any grounding in maximizing behavior, 
exercises in comparative statics become questionable. Suppose that we have 
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fitted our conjectural variations model to international wheat markets with the 
aid of an estimated value of v that corresponds to neither the Cournot nor the 
Bertrand case. Now we try to ask how the outcome would have been different in 
the presence of some government policy- say an EEP program. What should be 
assumed about conjectural variations in the new equilibrium? Usually, it is 
assumed that v remains unchanged, even though there is no reason to presume 
that this should be the case. Actually, Paarlberg and Abbott (1986) have shown 
that conjectural variations do not stay constant over time. 
In the case of many empirical conjectural variation models, due to insuffi-
cient data, a calibration technique is used to do strategic trade policy analysis. 
Calibration methods start with a model containing general parameters that are to 
be replaced with specific values. In contrast to using multiple observations to 
estimate these parameter values econometrically, most parameter values are 
taken from external sources. These external sources may include previous econo-
metric work, engineering studies, and the analyst's judgment. Then the remain-
ing parameters, not drawn from external sources, are calibrated in a manner to 
reproduce some base period data. (For more about calibration/simulation mod-
els see Sheldon (1992) and Brander (1995).) 
Two well known examples on this type of conjectural variation models are 
Dixit (1988) and Baldwin and ICrugman (1988). Dixit uses his calibrated ver-
sion of the conjectural variations model to carry out some strategic trade policy 
experiments on the U.S. automobile industry. Baldwin and Krugman constructed 
a calibrated oligopoly model of the 16K RAM market to examine the effects of 
Japanese home market protection on market outcomes and welfare. 
3.3.1. Agricultural Trade Models 
Over the past 30 years there has been considerable interest in whether or not the 
world grain markets operate competitively, and if not, what type of market 
structure best describes the situation. Imperfect competition was introduced into 
agricultural trade modeling for the first time by McCalla (1966). In his theoreti-
cal analysis of price formation, the market structure of the wheat market was a 
cooperative duopoly comprised of Canada and the United States, with a fringe 
of competitive followers. Canada was postulated to be the price leader. Taplin 
(1969) applied the kinked demand curve approach to the same duopolistic wheat 
market structure. Nine years later Alouze et al. (1978) extended the theoretical 
model structure to a triopoly model with Australia added as a third member with 
market power. They also identified Canada as being the price leader. 
One problem with these models is that they are essentially theoretical mod-
els. Therefore, no empirical numerical support is provided. Also, the use of the 
kinked demand curve approach has been criticized because it tries to model 
dynamic price competition in a static framework (for more criticism of the 
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kinked demand curve story see Tirole (1988)). 
Generally, more acceptable inclusion of strategic interaction into the model 
requires the introduction of game theoretic analysis. The first attempts to do this 
in agricultural trade model were made by Karp and McCalla (1983), Paarlberg 
and Abbott (1986, 1987), Kolstad and Burris (1986), and Hillberg (1988). The 
last three were static models for world wheat trade, and the first one was a 
discrete-time dynamic game (difference game) applied to the world corn mar-
ket. 
Kolstad and Burris built a spatial equilibrium model in which producing 
country governments are Cournot quantity competitors who maximize profits 
and have the ability to price discriminate between domestic and foreign sales. 
For 1972-73 trade flows, they examine assumptions of 1) a United States-
Canada duopoly, 2) a U.S.-Canada-Australia triopoly, 3) a Japan-EEC duopsony, 
and 4) perfect competition. They find that the U.S.-Canadian duopoly was the 
most appropriate market structure with which to characterize the international 
wheat market in the early 1970s. 
Paarlberg and Abbott argued that the policy formation process is responsive 
to lobbying by domestic special interest groups and that the influences of ali 
groups may not he equal. They show that special interest groups' differing 
influences can account for differing responses among countries to a change in 
the international markets. By recognizing that policies are designed to redistrib- 
ute income among domestic political interest groups and among nations, policy 
formation can be made endogenous to ali countries. Paarlberg and Abbott used a 
conjectural variation model in which conjectures were endogenous. 
Other examples of static conjectural variation models for the international 
grain market are Thursby (1988), and Thursby and Thursby (1990). Thursby 
and Thursby (1990) used a calibration model to assess the competitive behavior 
of the Canadian Marketing Board and U.S. wheat exporting firms in their trade 
with Japan. Yamazaki et al. (1992) followed a procedure similar to Thursby and 
Thursby to examine the structure of the world soybean market. McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1991) developed a model to evaluate policy actions in the U.K. ferti-
lizer market. 
Hillberg (1988) constructed and integrated Nash bargaining game models 
with a quarterly spatial price equilibrium model to determine the Export En- 
hancement Program' s impact on the world wheat market. The first bargaining 
model characterized the determination of EEP sales to a targeted country as a 
negotiation between the Commodity Credit Corporation and the targeted coun- 
try over an EEP bonus. In the second bargaining model the exporting firms and 
targeted country negotiated over the EEP price level while simultaneously the 
exporting firm and the CCC negotiated over the level of the EEP bonus. 
Karp and McCalla (1983) were the first to introduce a dynamic game model 
for agricultural trade. They built a discrete-time dynamic game model for the 
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world corn market in which both the importing and exporting nations have 
potential market power. The information structure of each player was assumed 
to be a feedback information pattern. The functional forms in the game were 
linear-quadratic, meaning that players' (countries') objective function were quad-
ratic in the state and control variables, and state equations were linear in these 
variables. They studied strategic behavior of the United States (exporter), the 
European Community (as an importer) and Japan (importer) in the corn market. 
Since then, few dynamic, game theoretic models of agricultural trade have 
been built. The main contributors of these models are Karp and Perloff (1989, 
1993a-b). Ali the Karp-Perloff models are used to identify, estimate, and test the 
competitiveness of these markets. By using linear-quadratic dynamic oligopoly 
models they study two markets: rice and coffee export markets. Deodhar and 
Sheldon (1995) apply the same model structure to study market behavior in the 
banana export markets. None of these models try to do any policy analysis, even 
though Karp and McCalla (1983) state that difference games could be useful for 
policy analysis. One of the reasons for this is that dynamic game models have a 
tendency to become analytically intractable very easily. 
The first attempt, since Karp and McCalla (1983), to do trade policy analysis 
in a dynamic game setting was done by McNally (1993). In contrast to Karp and 
McCalla, she makes her model more realistic by adding a stage in which 
exporting firms compete in prices in addition to governments setting export 
subsidies or export taxes. Then she uses the model to carry out strategic trade 
policy analysis in the international wheat market. In her dynamic simulations 
she confirmed the results from the familiar static models, i.e., optimal export 
policy (a subsidy or tax) depends on the order of play. In the ex ante game, 
where governments are the first-movers, choosing an export policy level before 
firms negotiate a price, the optimal export policy is a tax. Alternatively, in the 
ex post game firms are the first-movers, negotiating a price before governments 
choose an export subsidy. In this game an export subsidy becomes the optimal 
policy for governments, because the firms negotiate prices to provoke a subsidy 
instead of a tax. However, no econometric estimations were used to find values 
for import demand function parameters. Rather, these values were derived from 
trade elasticities of previous studies of the world wheat market. 
3.4. Politics and Trade Policy 
A large political economy literature has examined possible explanations for 
prevailing trade policies. In this research, efficiency considerations have not 
played center stage. Many policies, such as export subsidies and voluntary 
export restraints, impose large burdens on society. Therefore, researchers looked 
for objectives of policy makers other than overall efficiency in order to explain 
them. The political economy literature emphasizes distributional considerations. 
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It views trade policy as a device for income transfers to preferred interest groups 
in society. Furthermore, it explains the desire of a policy maker to engage in this 
sort of costly transfer by means of political arguments in the policy maker's 
objective function (see Helpman (1995) for a review). 
Political economy explanations of trade policies are important. The political 
economy literature helps one to understand the structure of protection as well as 
major public policy debates. It would be impossible to understand such debates 
while ignoring political aspects. Quite often countries design their trade policies 
in a way that yields to pressure from special interest groups, and trade negotia-
tions in the international arena respond similarly. It is also apparent from casual 
observation of agricultural trade policy that governments respond to the income 
concerns of certain domestic groups, especially agricultural producers (and 
producers generally). 
Empirical work in this area has been done by Sarris and Freebairn (1983), 
Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), Oehmke and Yao (1990), Johnson et al. (1993), 
and Kennedy et al. (1996), for example. Ali of these studies used the policy 
preference function (PPF) (also called as criterion function) approach suggested 
by Rausser et al. (1982). In this approach the policymaker's objective function 
is given as the weighted sum of domestic special interest groups' welfares. 
Different numbers of special interest groups were used in these studies but they 
ali concluded that the weight on wheat (grain) producers exceeds one. 
Alston et al. (1993) used a political economy approach to show that export 
subsidies may be the least-cost means of making income transfers to producers 
in a world in which general taxation measures involve an excess burden. Fur-
thermore, their results showed that, everything else constant, changes in the 
marginal excess burden of government revenues8 (,u) did not have much impact 
on the optimal policy. The importance of arises from the fact that it is not 
zero. 
Note that there is an overlap with imperfect competition studies mentioned 
earlier. When strong special interest groups exist in the market, they can, by 
lobbying, make the government utilize its market power in the market such that 
it favors these special interest groups. The existence of export subsidies, for 
example, illustrates the producer bias in agricultural policy setting. 
This dissertation has a political economy aspect, as well. In the empirical 
model each government wishes to maximize domestic welfare which equals 
revenues from wheat exports less the cost of net transfers to the exporting firm. 
This objective function is consistent with Brander-Spencer framework in the 
sense that its weight on domestic consumer surplus is set to zero. However, we 
8  Marginal excess burden here means the marginal welfare cost of raising extra revenue from an 
existing distorting tax. 
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depart from the usual Brander-Spencer objective function in two ways. First, we 
attach to the value of subsidy payments a weight u which may exceed unity. 
This refiects the deadweight cost of raising taxes in the economy to finance 
export subsidy expenditures. Among others this approach has been used by 
Gruenspecht (1988), McNally (1993), Neary (1995) and Brainard and Martimort 
(1996) in their strategic trade policy analysis. Second, export revenues replace 
the usual exporting firm's profits as a term in the objective function. After 
studying the behavior of the EU and U.S. in the intemational wheat market and 
their criteria for assigning export subsidies, we think that replacing profits with 
export revenues in a govemment's objective function makes the model more 
consistent with what we observe in the real world (see Chapter II). 
3.5. Some Background on Switching Cost Theory 
Empirical games were briefly reviewed in the earlier section because we need to 
use a game-theoretical model to capture strategic interaction in the world wheat 
market. As a result, the fourth problematic assumption mentioned by Paarlberg 
(1984) can he relaxed. Recall also from Chapter II that an importing country 
cannot switch freely between suppliers when making purchase decisions. It 
faces costs of switching. These switching costs imply that current decisions 
have an effect on the future. Therefore, a dynamic modeling approach needs to 
he applied. The second assumption listed at the beginning of the chapter is 
relaxed. This section highlights some of the effects that the introduction of 
switching costs has on the model. 
In many markets buyers who have previously purchased from one seller 
incur costs when switching from that seller to one of its competitors. Therefore, 
these switching costs give each buyer a strong incentive to continue buying 
from the firm from which it has previously purchased, even if other firms are 
selling functionally identical products. The switching costs literature also sheds 
light on why managers often seem concemed with market share in addition to 
short run profits. Consumer switching costs give firms a degree of monopoly 
power over their repeat-purchasers, so a firm's current market share is an 
important determinant of its future profits. Given the pervasiveness of such 
costs, it is not surprising that there has been considerable effort to model and 
analyze this aspect of markets (von Weizäcker 1984, Klemperer 1987a-c, 1988, 
1989, 1992, Farrel and Shapiro 1988, Beggs and Klemperer 1992, Padilla 1992a-b, 
and Sapir and Sekkat 1995). For a comprehensive review of the switching cost 
literature see Klemperer (1995). 
Klemperer (1987a) points out three sources of switching costs. The first is 
transaction costs. Two banks may offer identical checking accounts, but there 
are some transaction costs in closing an account with one bank and opening 
another with a competitor. In the intemational wheat trade setting, one transac- 
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tion cost is the cost of negotiating a contract or agreement with a supplier. An 
importer's contracting costs with a new exporter are higher than contracting 
costs with a prior exporter. The second is learning costs. The learning required 
to use one brand may not be transferable to other brands of the same product, 
even though ali brands are functionally identical. For example, a number of 
computer manufacturers may make machines that are functionally identical. If a 
consumer has learned to use one firm's product line, and has invested in the 
appropriate software, he has a strong incentive to continue to buy computers 
from the same firm, and to buy software compatible with them. Also, there is 
more risk involved when buying from a new, unfamiliar supplier than when 
buying from an old familiar supplier. For example, in international wheat trade 
there is less uncertainty about variables like the quality of the wheat or the time 
that it takes to ship the wheat, when dealing with a familiar supplier. The third 
category is artificial switching costs. These costs arise as results of firms' 
actions. Examples of such actions include repeat-purchase coupons and fre-
quent-flyer programs that reward customers for repeated travel on the same 
airline, and so penalize brand-switchers. 
A very simple two-period duopoly model is used below to illustrate the 
effects of buyer's switching costs. The presentation follows Klemperer (1995). 
3.5.1. A Two-period Switching Cost Model 
When market share is valuable, there will be competition for it. In this two-
period model a (representative) consumer incurs no switching costs in the first 
period, but develops switching costs as a result of her first-period purchases. 
Therefore, firms have some monopoly power in the second (final) period. 
The general method for solving a two period model is first to solve for firms' 
optimal second-period behavior, and hence firms' second-period profits, for any 
given first-period sales or market shares (since first-period sales determine the 
size of the switching costs the representative consumer faces when planning to 
buy more from any other firm in the second period). That is, given the sizes of 
the switching costs and the nature of second-period competition, finn i's sec-
ond-period profits, rci2 , are determined as a function of its first-period sales (or 
market share), q I . 
In the second period the representative consumer has a switching cost s q1A  
when buying more than previously from the firm B, and a switching cost s q1B 
when buying more than before from the firm A9. Thus, in this second period 
"mature market" consumer's switching costs have already been built up, and the 
9 Note that s(q1 9 is assumed to be a increasing function of output (or market share), q1' because 
the more consumers buy from firm i the more dependent they become on firm i as a supplier. 
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firm who had the largest market share in the first period enjoys an advantage 
over the other firm due to the presence of switching costs. This is because the 
larger market share implies larger costs of switching to the other supplier. This 
result, that switching costs built up in the past generate current profits that 
depend on firms' previous market share, is very general. 
The above described the second period of the a two-period market in which 
second-period switching costs are created by first-period sales. Now we con-
sider the first period when consumers are not attached to any particular firm. 
With switching costs in the second period, firms will compete more aggres-
sively in the first period, because increased sales increase market share and so 
increase second period profits. 
In period 1, each firm i chooses its first-period strategic variable to maximize 
its total discounted profits 
(3.14) 	 V i = 7r' + 87-t-l2 (q 
taking its rival's first-period strategic variable as given. Here 7-t- are the firm's 
first-period profits, and 7-c; are the firm's second-period profits, which can be 
written as a function of the firm's first-period sales or market share q; , and are 
discounted by a factor 3. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that firms choose prices in period one.10 Maxi-
mizing with respect to first-period price, firm i's first-order condition for equi-
librium is 
(3.15) dzi 8 	 dql 0 = 	+  
dp; 	dq; dp; 
Now provided the firm's first-period sales (or market share) decreases in its 
first-period price, dq/c)p; < 0 , and the firm's second-period profits are in-
creasing in its first-period sales (or market share), dIrt2 aq > 0, then 
/dpil > 0. That is, pis lower than the price at which 	/491  = 011. 
This says that firms' first-period prices are lower than if they were simply 
maximizing first-period profits, because they are competing for market share 
that will be valuable to them in the future. 
1° Effects will be similar if the strategic variable were something other than price. 
11 It is assumed that r is quasiconcave in p,i and that the first-order condition specifies an 
equilibrium. 
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Three caveats should be noted regarding the discussion above. First, it is 
conceivable that greater sales (or market share) may hurt a firm if, by reducing 
its competitor's market share, it makes the competitor sufficiently more aggres-
sive. In this case arci2 d(1 < 0 , so firms compete less fiercely than they other-
wise would in the first period, in order to avoid gaining market share or avoid 
facing more aggressive competitors in the future. 
Second, the presence of switching costs in the second period means that the 
consumer's first-period purchase decisions depend on their expectations of 
second-period prices. Thus, the structure of first-period demand is also affected 
and is typically made less elastic by the presence of switching costs in the 
future. Thus, although equation (3.15) implies that firms charge lower first-
period prices than if they ignored the effect of switching costs on their second-
period profits, it is possible that first-period prices may still he higher than in an 
otherwise identical market without second-period switching costs (Klemperer 
1987b). 
Finally, the focus above has been on prices net of switching costs. If consum-
ers must pay a start-up cost in the first period when they buy from any firm, then 
the real cost (price plus any start-up or switching cost) paid by consumers may 
fall over time. 
Switching costs are intuitively appealing, and they exist to some degree in 
many markets. Chapter II provided some suggestive evidence on the existence 
of switching costs in international wheat trade. Such factors as guaranteed credit 
programs by exporting countries and government relationships were considered 
as two of the major factors effecting an importing country's decisions on to 
what extent to import wheat from each source. Both of these factors lock the 
importing country in to each supplier to some degree. Since it seems likely that 
switching costs exist in international wheat trade they need to he taken into 
account in our modeling framework, as well. Incorporation of these costs makes 
a dynamic modeling approach necessary. 
3.6. Conclusions 
Traditional agricultural trade models were reviewed and it was recognized that 
they required several problematic assumptions. Chapter II described the interna-
tional wheat market as a market where strategic interactions between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States, as well as between large exporting firms, are 
likely to exist. Game-theoretic methods, which allow us to take into account this 
aspect, have been used in the more recent agricultural trade modeling literature. 
The majority of these studies used static models in their analysis, however. 
Static models can provide useful summary statistics concerning outcomes of 
oligopolistic interaction, but they are really only a first step in the economist's 
attempt to understand the strategic behavior that appears in international wheat 
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trade. In practice, firms and governments are interacting repeatedly. With re-
peated interaction, governments must take into consideration not only the possi-
ble increase in current welfare but also the possibility of an export subsidy war 
and long-run losses when deciding whether to subsidize exports more now. 
Thus, a dynamic approach seems appropriate, but only a limited number of 
dynamic studies exist. 
One way to make strategic trade policy analysis dynamic is by introduction 
of switching costs into the model framework. This is an intuitively appealing 
approach and Chapter II showed that switching costs are likely to exist in the 
international wheat market. So far, this approach has not been employed in the 
agricultural trade literature. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE 
WITH SWITCHING COSTS — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The international wheat market is characterized by two main departures from 
perfect competition. First, large exporters have market power, and second, 
importing countries do not base their purchasing decisions solely on the price of 
the product. Other factors affecting importers' decisions include the quality of 
wheat, which varies between suppliers, and costs of switching from one ex-
porter to another. These switching costs might exist for several reasons. An 
importer incurs costs negotiating a contract or agreement with a supplier, and 
these transaction costs with a new exporter may be higher than with an existing 
exporter. Another category is learning costs. There is more risk involved when 
buying from a new, unfamiliar source than when buying from an existing 
supplier. There also might exist political costs of switching between exporters. 
One would expect products supplied by political allies to be viewed differently 
from others.1  
Since there is imperfect competition between exporters, the international 
wheat market can be modeled as a game in which exporters interact in a 
noncooperative manner. For example, the failure of GATT to eliminate export 
subsidies can be seen as a result of countries' making decisions based on their 
perceived self-interest, and not collaborating, which could have led to improved 
welfare of the world. A Prisoner's Dilemma- type situation occurs in which 
each country is worse off because all countries subsidize their exports heavily 
(Kennedy et al. (1994)). 
In Chapter III, traditional agricultural trade models were reviewed, and the 
conclusion was that none of the models was able to capture ali these characteris-
ties of the international wheat market satisfactorily. When modeling this kind of 
market the proper thing to do is to use noncooperative game theory as a tool, 
because it allows us to incorporate strategic interaction between large exporters 
in the analysis. In addition, it is important (and possible) to explicitly capture 
institutional factors (such as switching costs) affecting importers' purchasing 
decisions. 
The task of this chapter is to examine export policy using a differentiated 
product model of oligopolistic competition with switching costs. A switching 
cost model captures the idea that importing countries who have previously 
purchased from one exporter incur costs when switching from that exporter to 
one of its competitors. Therefore, these possible switching costs give each 
1 For more on different categories of switching costs see Klemperer (1995). 
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importer an incentive to continue buying from the supplier from which it has 
previously purchased, even if other exporting countries are selling functionally 
identical products. 
This chapter starts by presenting a two-period strategic trade policy model in 
which the introduction of switching costs into the economic model follows 
Sapir and Sekkat (1995). To (1994) applies a switching cost model in an 
international trade framework. However, he employs Klemperer's (1987b) al-
ternative method of introducing switching costs into the model. The motivation 
for choosing Sapir and Sekkat's approach instead of Klemperer's is that it is the 
more appropriate form for empirical implementation in the case of a parastatal 
grain marketing board as the buyer. 
Differences between these two approaches are elaborated later in this chap-
ter when the importing country's behavior is derived. The differences between 
our model and To's are: (i) our model explicitly includes switching costs; (ii) 
To's implementation of switching costs is a simplified version of Klemperer's 
whereas our model employs Sapir and Seldcat's approach; (iii) in our model 
firms incur nonzero marginal costs; (iv) in our model each government's objec-
tive is defined as export revenues less export subsidy expenditures instead of 
domestic firm's profits minus export subsidy expenditures; (v) our model as-
sumes naive instead of rational consumer expectations; and (vi) in contrast to 
To's model, which assumes Hotelling consumer demand, we derive a linear 
demand structure from a quasilinear utility function (Sing and Vives 1984). 
In the first section of this chapter a two-period model of oligopolistic compe-
tition with differentiated products and switching costs is constructed. The model 
is explained in detail to highlight the effects that the introduction of switching 
cost has on the behavior of exporting countries (both firms and governments). 
A two-period model might be appropriate where there is a natural beginning 
to the market and we wish to distinguish "early periods" from "later periods". 
However, in reality we very seldom have a first period in which no switching 
costs emerge. Furthermore, such a model does not tell us what to expect from 
competition over many periods. Will exporting countries' temptation to exploit 
their current share of the market lead to higher prices and lower subsidies than 
in the absence of switching costs, or will exporting countries desire to achieve 
larger market share lead to lower price and higher export subsidies? Thus, the 
two-period models may not he the most satisfactory for analyzing, among other 
things, the effects of policy shocks which vary over time (e.g., restrictions on 
export subsidies by GATT) or other shocks. Therefore, the second section of 
this chapter extends the two-period model of the first section into a more 
general finite-horizon multi-period model of competition in a market with switch-
ing costs. Other generalizations of this section include more general (though 
linear) import demand functions, asymmetric marginal costs and the introduc-
tion of opportunity costs of public funds to capture the fact that raising tax 
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revenues to cover export subsidy expenditures incurs administrative costs or 
creates distortions in other sectors of the economy. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the two-
period international wheat trade model with switching costs. That section analyzes 
how the second-period equilibrium depends on first-period market shares. K_now-
ing this second-period equilibrium allows us to solve for the first-period equilib-
rium, and hence.  the outcome of the whole game. Section 3 then presents a more 
general multiperiod model which in the later chapters will be applied to empiri-
cally analyze international wheat trade. 
4.1. A Two-period International Wheat Trade Model 
With Switching Cost 
This model will be limited to two exporters (e.g., United States and the Euro-
pean Union) and one importer (e.g., Morocco). In each exporting country there 
are two players: the government and the aggregate firm. In each period (t=1,2), 
the governments simultaneously choose export subsidies (taxes if negative), S/, 
to maximize domestic welfare. After that, firms in both exporting countries 
simultaneously choose prices, P/, to maximize profits. We look for a symmetric 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
First, we need to derive the importing country's behavior. In international 
wheat trade many importing country governments exclusively handle their for-
eign trade of wheat through parastatal agencies. This parastatal agency also 
decides how much of the wheat to buy from each origin. Therefore, this agency 
of the importing country can be seen as a single representative consumer. 
Although the parastatal agency handles an importing country's foreign trade of 
wheat, it is assumed to be small relative to the total international wheat market. 
Therefore, it does not have market power in the international wheat market2. 
In the first period, the importing country's demand for wheat from exporting 
country i is described by an import demand function M= 	, 
where i, k = US, EU, and i#1c. These import demands are derived from the im-
porting country's utility maximization problem. 
Following Singh and Vives (1984) the aggregate utility function is assumed 
to be quasilinear. Therefore the problem of preference maximization can be 
written as 
(4.1)
i 	k = 	 i mk) u1(0 , m 1 ,m )  1 ) VO 
u 
 lkm 1 	1 
2  This assumption on market power is appropriate for most of the importing countries (e.g., 
Morocco), but possibly not for ali (e.g., USSR in early 1980s). 
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such that Q0 + (P1' + 	+ (Pi i< + 	= income , 
where Q0 is aggregate consumption of a numeraire good, 	equals ali other 
costs, excluding the price charged by the exporter attached with the purchase of 
the product (i.e., transaction costs, learning costs, etc.), and U1 is a quadratic 
subutility function for the wheat sector defined by: 
(4.2) Ui (M: , Mlk = a (M; + 	)— (f3(M( )2 + f3(Mik )2 + 2yM: Mlk ) 
Then the import demand function for each exporting country's wheat can be 
generated by maximizing the representative consumer's (parastatal agency's) 
consumer surplus: CS, = 	 —(131k  + i-)111,k , where the last 
two terms are the costs for the parastatal agency of acquiring imports M: and 
M. The quadratic subutility function implies that ali import demand functions 
are linear in prices3. 
First-order conditions yield inverse demand functions of the form 
(4.3) 	 P = a — fi/Vi — y.M; — 
(4.4) pik 	_ /3mik _ 	_ 
where ali parameters are positive4 and 132 —y 2 > 0. Finally, the corresponding 
direct import demand functions used in our analysis are 
(4.5) 	 A / = a — b(Pl i + 	e(Pi k + 
(4.6) 	 M ik = a — b(Pl k + + e (I) + ) , 
	
13where a = 	, b = 2 	2  , e = n2 	2  and b> e. 13-Fy 	n 
3 Note that here the subutility function is defined so that it yields symmetric inverse demand 
functions, i.e., ai = ak = a and /3i = /3k = In the multiperiod model this symmetry assumption 
is relaxed. 
4 The goods are substitutes, independent, or complements according to whether y>0, y=0, or y<0, 
respectively. Wheats from different sources are generally substitutes, therefore y>0 is expected. 
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In the second period, switching costs have an effect on the importing coun-
try's behavior. This implies that costs for the parastatal agency of acquiring 
imports 11// and 114-  are defined differently. Now, ali the other costs, 'r, in-
clude costs which are diminished for the repeat-purchasers of the product. 
Therefore, the more the parastatal agency imports exporting country i's wheat 
in the first period, the smaller are ali the other costs due to buying the same 
exporter's product in the second period. Thus, dynamics are introduced into the 
model by assuming that ali other costs for buying good i are a decreasing 
function of previous purchases of good i, and can be stated as 
(4.7) 	 =—i711/1 
	
i = US , EU . 
Switching costs are therefore captured by the term nM: , where 17 is a positive 
parameter. It is assumed that n ,"the marginal switching cost", is small relative 
to parameters b and e.5 Larger values for n or M make costs of buying again 
from exporter i smaller, so the importing country is less willing to switch to 
exporter k's wheat. Thus, the cost of importing quantities 114- , and "14- , in the 
second period is defined by 
(4.8) 
	e2 m2i m2k 	(p2i Ti2 )m2i (p2k ,r2k 
where '1-'2 and r2k are given by equation (4.7).6 
In each period each firm incurs marginal cost c per unit and no fixed costs. It 
noncooperatively chooses a price to maximize discounted profits. The govern-
ments of the exporting countries maximize discounted welfare, measured as the 
5  This assumption is supported by our econometric estimation in Chapter V. 
6  An alternative approach to introducing switching costs into the model would be to apply the 
dynamic framework presented by Klemperer (1987b). In his spatial location model of product 
differentiation Klemperer divides second period consumers into three different fractions: new 
consumers, "switchers", and locked-in consumers. New consumers replace the first period 
consumers who left the market after the first period, and they have no ties to any particular 
exporting country. "Switchers" are a fraction of consumers that face the costs of switching, but 
they also can have changing tastes for underlying product characteristics which at least for 
some consumer's can outweigh their switching costs. The remaining fraction is comprised of 
the fully locked-in consumers for whom it is too costly to switch to another supplier (see 
Klemperer 1987b). The model's theoretical findings are similar to the model used in this study 
and some additional interesting comparative statics can be drawn. However, that approach is 
not applied here because it is less appropriate for empirical implementation to the case of a 
parastatal grain marketing board. 
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sum of discounted net export revenue. Firms and governments both have the 
same discount factor 6. 
The model is a finite four-stage game, where the stages in order of action are 
the first period simultaneous-move game of governments, then the first period 
simultaneous-move game of firms, then the second period simultaneous-move 
game of governments, and finally the second period simultaneous-move game 
of firms. 
Because the equilibrium concept is subgame perfection, analysis of the model 
begins with the last stage. The strategies in the last stage must specify a Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot price game of firms given any history. For each such 
assignment of Nash equilibria to the last (fourth) stage, the third-stage export 
subsidy game of governments is solved to form a two-stage Nash equilibrium 
for any history. Similarly, using backward induction the other two stages are 
solved to find a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the overall model. Thus, to 
solve our two-period model we start by solving for firms' (who are the last 
movers in the game) optimal second period behavior and hence firms' second-
period profits, for any given second-period export subsidies and for any given 
first-period export quantities. 
4.1.1. The Second Period 
First we derive the import demand functions for each exporting country's wheat 
in the second period. By maximizing the representative consumer's surplus, 
= U2 (M; , /1J )— c2 (Mi , M2k , with respect to 114- . and 11//,` we achieve 
the demand system 
(4.9)  
(4.10)  
where ali the parameters are positive and b > e> 0 7  . The subgame-perfect 
equilibrium can he now derived. 
7 Provided that quantities are positive, that is in the region 
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4.1.1.1. The Exporting Firm's Problem 
Firms choose their prices to maximize second-period profits given the second-
period subsidy levels chosen by the governments and given firms' imports from 
the first period. Firm i's second-period profits are 
(4.11) 
	
11" i2 = (P21 + S21 — c)M 
Substituting (4.9) into (4.11) and maximizing with respect to P21 we get the 
first-order condition for profit maximization.8 Using this we can solve for the 
best-response fimction of firm i 
(4.12) P2i (132k=1-{ -1-C-S2i 	4-511)21,' • 2b 	 b‘ 
The intersection of best-response functions for firms i and k gives second period 
prices as a function of the second period subsidies and first period imports: 
(4.13) 
= 
(4b 2 - e2 
r 
+ eXbc + a — (b — e))— 	+ eSfl 
+ (2b2  e2 )7734"; — 
 
  
A simple comparative statics exercise shows the standard result that country 
i's wheat price paid by the importer decreases as country i and/or country k 
increases its export subsidy. It can also be seen that an exporting country' s price 
is more strongly affected by its own export subsidy than its rival's subsidy. 
A more interesting comparative statics result is that country i's second pe-
riod price increases as its first-period market share increases.9 Therefore, firms 
may have an incentive to fight more fiercely over first period market share. 
Hence, market shares matter. Furthermore, the comparative statics show that the 
second period price either increases or decreases when switching costs increase, 
depending on the firm' s market share captured in the first period. A firm with a 
8 The second-order condition is satisfied, since -2b<0. 
9 Actually, country i's second-period price increases as its first-period exports increase. There-
fore, it is assumed in the text that larger exports always imply larger market share. 
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b r 
{(2b + eXa — 	— eXc + 2)) +(2b 2 — e 2 )(kSY 
4b ( 2 —e2)  
—be(S .  +77Mik )J, 
= (4.14) 
b e 
large first period market share °-1 	(2b — e)(b + e)) 
s relatively more inter- 
ested in exploiting its market share by charging a higher price and less inter-
ested in attracting an even larger share of the market than is its smaller rival, 
who charges a lower price to win back market share. (In addition, when n = 0 
this model is identical to a model without switching costs.) These results are 
similar to Klemperer (1987b). 
By substituting equation (4.13) into (4.9) we get the second-period wheat 
exports of country i as a function of export subsidies: 
and substituting (4.13) and (4.14) into (4.11) yields firm i's second-period 
profits: 
(4.15) 
b r 
If2b 	eXa — 	— 
—be(S: +7711/1,k )]2 
eXc + T- ))+ (2b2 — e2 )(S' + IM;) 
(4b2 
2 
—e2 ) 
We now move to the government's optimization problem in period two. 
4.1.1.2. The Exporting Government's Problem 
Government maximizes the country's second-period welfare by choosing its 
export subsidy given first period exports and expected firm behavior. Domestic 
welfare is measured here as total export revenue minus expenditures on export 
subsidies10: 
(4.16) 	 W2i =(i + 	— 	= P2i 
10 J is implicitly assumed here that the government places equal weight on the home firm's 
export revenue and govemment subsidy expenditures in evaluating social welfare. Following 
Gruenspecht (1988), Neary (1994) and Brainard and Martimort (1996) we relax this assump-
tion in the multiperiod model by introducing the opportunity cost of govemment funds into the 
model. 
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This welfare function is similar to one used in standard third-market models 
(Brander and Spencer 1985).11 However, we depart from the usual Brander-
Spencer objective function here by replacing the usual exporting firm' s profits 
as a first term in the objective function with export revenues. From a political 
economy literature perspective we can view this objective function as a policy 
preference function in which exporting firms' revenues and budgetary expenses 
of export subsidies are equally weighted and zero weight is given to consumers 
as a special interest group. After studying the behavior of the EU and U.S. in the 
international wheat market and their criteria for giving out export subsidies, we 
think that replacing profits with export revenues in a government's objective 
function makes the model more consistent with what we observe in the real 
world (see Chapter II). 
Substituting (4.13) and (4.14) into (4.16) and taking the first derivative with 
respect to S21 yields a first-order condition for maximum welfare. The first-order 
condition is then solved for S2i to get country i' s best-response function as: 
MSn= 	1 ,[b(2b + eX4b 2 — e 2 — 2be)c — e 2 (2b + eXa — (b — e)ti- ) 
4b 2 2.b 2 — 6.2 ) 
(4.17) 
+ e2(be(S2k +77M,k )—(2b 2 — e 2 )77114-;)]. 
Second-period equilibrium export subsidies are given by the intersection of the 
two best-response functions: 
(4.18) 
e
2 
= C 	  
b(4h2 e 2 — 2b e) 
(a 	eFt) 
e2{b(4b 2 — 3e2 )7K — e(2b 2 e 2 1W 1 
b[(4 b 2 2 _e2)2 —(2b e)2 
Substituting this into (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) allows second-period prices, 
exports and profits to he expressed as a function of first-period exports: 
(4.19) P = 2h 
	 b(4-b 2 — 3e 2 )1K — e(2b 2 — e 2 )77Mik [ a 	eft + 	  
(4b 2 e 2 — 2b e) (4b 2 — e2 + 2be) 
 
11111 a standard third-market model one firm from a domestic country and one firm from a 
foreign country compete only in a third market. 
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(2,b 2 e 2 ) 
(4.20) M = 	  
(4b2 — e2 — 2be) 
 
b(4b 2 — 3e2 )77M: — e(2,b2 _ e2)771 
a 	e)ti- + 	  
(4b 2 —e 2 + 2be) 
 
  
   
(4.21) zi2 = 	
(2b2 e2)2 	
[a 	e)Y- +
b(4b 2 — 3e2 )77Ä4-11 — e(2b 2 — e2 )77Mik -2 
b(4b2 — e2 — 2be) (4b 2 —e 2 + 2be) 
Comparative statics shows that prices and exports volumes as well as profits 
are increasing, and export subsidies are decreasing, in first period market share. 
From equation (4.18) it can be seen that the sign of S2i is ambiguous and 
cannot be determined without empirically analyzing the market. This differs 
from To's (1994) proposition, "in the second period both countries set export 
taxes", because the government's objective function in his model is different 
from the one used here. In To's model government maximizes domestic firm's 
profit level plus tax revenues. As we can see from equation (4.18) this generali-
zation is not possible in our model when firms have nonzero marginal costs, 
c > 0. However, it can be stated that, the smaller the wheat sector's marginal 
costs are, the more likely it is that an export tax (S2i < 0) will be the optimal 
policy. On the other hand if a country's wheat sector operates inefficiently (i.e., 
the firm's marginal costs are high) then a subsidy might become optimal (e.g., in 
EU). The sign of S2i depends also on values of /14r1i, Mi k and n. These param-
eterS' effects are: 
	
(25" 	dSi 	Si 
2 	 <0, 	2 > 0 , and 
(911///k 	ar/ 
< 0 if 
0 if 
> 0 if 
e(2b2 —e2 ) 
> 	  
(e+b)(4b2 —e2 —2be) 
e(2b2 —e2 ) 
Cr 1 — (e+b)(41,2 —e2 —2be)' 
e(2b 2 —e2 ) 
< 	  1 	(e+b)(4b2 — e2 —2be) 
  
where cs1 i is exporting country i's first-period market share in the importing 
country. 
Analogously, by using equations (4.13) and (4.19) we can examine when the 
second period prices are higher compared to the second-period prices of a model 
without intervention. This relationship is again ambiguous and depends on the 
values of parameters in the same fashion as did the sign of S2i. As an example, 
with larger first period exports it is more likely that an exporting firm charges a 
higher price and that an export tax is the optimal intervention policy for the 
government. 
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We can also compare a market with switching costs to a market without 
switching costs. In a symmetric equilibrium (which exists, as we see later), such 
that M1  = Mlk Y2M1, equations (4.18)-(4.21) can be written as: 
(4.18') S2 = S 	
e 2 
2k = c 
	
	  a (b e)Y.  +«b — e)171 1 d 1 ], 
b(4b2 — e2 — 2be\){  
2b  
(4.19') 	.P1 = P2k = 	
[ a 
	4 (b — t- + (b — e)iiM 1 ] 
(4b 2 - e2 — 2be) 
(2b2 — e2 ) 
{ (4.20') 	M = 
	 a (b e)Y- + (b — e)7 IM I ] 
(4b2 - e2 — 2be) 
(2b2 - e2')2  
(4.21') 	ir i2 = ic2k = 	 2 [a (b e)-i + (b. — e». II/11 12 
b(4b2 —e2 — 2b e) 
In a market without switching costs (that is n - 0), in equilibrium 
e2 
(4.22) 	A.Sf = S: = c 	 [a (b — e)til, 
b(4b2 — e2 — 2b e\) 
2h 
(4.23) 	-/3 = P k = 2 	(4b2 — e2 — 	) 2be
,[a (b 4], 
(2b2 — e2 ) 
(4.24) 	11//, = Nl: = 	  [a, 	(b — 
V1-b 2 - e2 — 2be\) 
(2b 2 - e2 )2 
(4.25) 	Zi2 = Ir 2k = 
b(4b2 —e2 — 2b e)
2 	 [a (b — 412 . 
By comparing equations (4.18')-(4.21') to equations (4.22)-(4.25) it can 
easily he seen that in the symmetric equilibrium the profits, prices and exports 
of both firms are higher, and export subsidies (export taxes) are lower (higher), 
in the second period of a market with switching costs than in a market without 
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switching costs. The reason is that each firm has an opportunity to raise price in 
the second period to exploit the consumers who initially bought its wheat. 
Switching costs reduce consumers' flexibility, and thereby reduce firms' 
elasticities of demand, leading to the less competitive outcomes — higher price 
with higher profits. Higher prices imply that lower export subsidies are needed 
in the second period. These results are consistent with the results of To (1994) 
and Klemperer (1987b)12. 
4.1.2. The First Period 
4.1.2.1. The Importing Country's Problem 
In the first period, the importing country has no ties to any particular exporting 
country. Each firm (exporting country) sets its price (export subsidy) while 
taking into account not only the effect on its first-period profitability (welfare), 
but also the effect on its first-period market share and hence second-period 
profitability (welfare). 
The form of importer expectations determines how market shares depend on 
first-period prices. For simplicity, we look at the case of "naive expectations", 
in which the importer does not take the second-period into account when mak-
ing first-period decisions. 
In this case first-period imports are determined as if there were no switching 
costs",I4: 
(4.26) 	 Pik = a — b(1 + + e(Pi k + 
4.1.2.2. The Exporting Firm's Problem 
In the first-period each firm aims to maximize its total discounted future profits 
by choosing first-period prices, given its government's choice of subsidies, and 
knowing how their first-period choice will affect decisions and profits in the 
future. Firm i's discounted profits are 	87ri2 , where ö is the discount 
factor of both firms and governments. Using (4.21) and (4.26) it follows that 
12  Klemperer's model is not an international trade model, but the effects on prices and profits of 
firms are essentially the same as here. 
13  This import demand function was derived at the beginning of the section (see equation (4.5)). 
14 Note that ali parameters are positive and b > e. 
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PI I' ) = (PI + ,S' — c)(a — (b — 4T- — bP,' +eP,k ) 
8(2b 2 — e 2 )2 b(4-b 2 — 3e2 )17 
	
(4.27) 	+ 	  L 	e)? + 	  
b(4b 2 — e 2 — 2be)
2 [a (b 	
(4b 2 —e 2 +2be) 
(, 	e 2b 2 — e2)77 ( (a — (b — e)-i —bP; + eP)ik a (b e)ti"—b.131k + e) (4b 2 — e2 +2be) 
dle 	 . 	28(2b2 — e2 )2  	= a (b e)r 2bPii + ePik +bc bS; [a (b e)ti- 
dPII b(4b 2 —e2 —2be)
2 
b(4b2 — 3e2 )77, 	 (\ 	e 2b 2 — eli/ 
+ 	 (a (b e) T- bPii + ePik )  
(4b2 — e2 +2be) 	 (4b2 — e2 +2be) 
\-1 ri(4b 4 —b 2e2 — e4 ) 
(a — (b — e)T- — bPik + ePii ).1 	  = 0. 
(4b2 — e2 +2be) 
The second-order condition for the firm's first-period problem is 
d2zi 	28172 (2b2 — e2 )2 (4b 4 — 
b2 e2 _ e)2 
	= 2b + 	 2 < 0 
(d/311 )2 	b(4b 2 e2 —2be)2 (4b2  e2 +2be) 	• 
This second-order condition does not hold for ali parameter values. The remain-
der of the chapter assumes that the second-order condition is satisfied, i.e., 
b 2 {(4b 2 e2 )2  — (2be)21
2 
 > 877 2 (2b 2 e2 )2 (4b4 — b 2 e2 e)2 
Using the first-order condition we can solve for the firm's best-response 
function: 
(4.28) 	(Plk )= A(a—(b— e)2)+BPik +E(c — S;) 
2 
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- - 
e 
	4(5772be(2b2 — e2 )2  (4b4 — b2e2 — e4 X3b2  _2e2 ) 
b [(4b 2 — e2 )2 — (2be)2 
 
] 
where A = 
1 	
2577(2b2 — e2 )2 (4b2 — e2 +2be)(4b4 — b 2 e2 — e4 )(1 + (b — e)ij) 
b{(4b2 — e2 )2 — (2be)2  r 
  - - 
2.5772 (2b2 — e2 )2 (4b4 —b2e2 _e4 )2 
2b 	  
b[(4b2 — e2 )2 — (2b 412 
- 
28712 (2b 2 — e2 )2 (4b 4 — b 2 e2 — e4 )2 
2b 	  
b[(4b2 — e2 )2 — (2be)2 12 
b 
2b 
	28712 (2b 2 — e2 )2 (4-b 4  — b 2e2 — e4 )2 
b[(4b2 — e2 )2 — (2,be)2 
 
] 
Note that the sign of B determines when the best-response functions are 
upward or downward sloping as functions of the other firm' s price. Following 
Bulow et al. (1985), competitors regard their actions as strategic complements 
when B>0 and strategic substitutes when B<0. With strategic complements 
firm i responds to aggressive play with more aggressive play. In price competi-
tion, this means that the firm i responds to firm k's lower price by lowering its 
price. With strategic substitutes firm i's optimal response to more aggressive 
play by firm k is to be less aggressive (i increases its price). 
A common presumption is that with price competition the goods (wheats) are 
strategic complements (B>0), but it can be seen from above that determination 
of whether goods are strategic substitutes or strategic complements cannot be 
made without empirically analyzing the market. The shape of the demand func-
tion is critical. 
Using the best-response functions, first-period prices can be solved as a 
function of export subsidies: 
- 
- 
- 
E = 
B= , and 
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(4.29) 	= 	1 [A(a 	e)'Z) +Ec 	 (1— B) 	 (1+ B)(S: BSik 
Closer examination of A and B shows that B < 1/2, and that A can he positive 
or negative. If A is negative then the exporting firm dumps its wheat in the first 
period in order to capture a larger market share. Therefore, dumping can be seen 
as a rational behavior of the exporting firm when there are switching costs in the 
market. 
Substituting (4.29) into the import demand function (equation (4.26)) we 
find the first-period equilibrium exports of country i: 
(4.30) 
 
+ 
1+B 
((b eB)S; —(e — bE)S 
  
Substituting (4.30) into (4.19) and (4.20) we get second-period prices and 
exports as a function of first-period export subsidies: 
(4.31) 
(4.32) 
M' 2 
2b — 
— e) — e(2b 2 — 
, 
(a 	— e)T- ) 
e)— e(2b 2 — 
(b — e)2 1117 
4b 2 — e2 — 2be) {[1+(b 
+ , 
e)1(1 1 	B 
Rbe4b 2 — 3e2 )(bB 
2 — e2 )(e—b13))5'1} 
(1) 	e)A J\  
1—B 
e2 )(b — e.B))S; 
e)2 c 
(1— B2 )(4b 2 — e2 
+ (b(4b 2 — 3e2 )(b 
(2b 2 — e2 ) 
+ 2be) 
— eB)+ e(2b 
[1 + (b — / 	 \ (4b 2 	e2 — 2be) 
Eri + 
e)7{1 
1—B 
Rb(4b 2 — 3e 2 )(bB— 
1—B 
)(b — eB))S; 
(
, 
1— B2 X4b 2 	+ 2be) 
+ (b(4b 2 — 3e2 )(b — eB)+ e(2b 2 — e2 )(e— bB))S,k1}. 
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4.1.23. The Exporting Government's Problem 
Governments maximize their countries' discounted welfare, given that they 
know how firms and the importing country will behave in the future. Country i's 
discounted welfare is 
(4.33) 	= 	+ 	— 	+6[(i — 	— 	= /14. + 81) 	, 
where the first term is the firm' s first period net revenue and the second tenn 
equals discounted second period net revenue. The first- and second-order condi-
tions for country i's problem are 
cwi .= 	E [(b eB)p,' — 
as; 	(1— B2) 
46b7<b(4b2 — 3e2 )(b — eB) + e(2b 2 - e2 Xe — bB)) 
	 11/1. 1=- 0 
(4b2  e 2 )2 — (2be)2 
and 
02 W' 	2E2  
(0s; )2 (1— B2)
2 [ (b eB) 
2öki1 2 (262 — e2 Xb(4b2 — 3e2 Xb — eB) + e(2b2 — e2 )(e — b13))2 
[(4b2  — e2 )2 — (2be)2 12 
Note that the country's second-order condition does not always hold, and it is 
more restrictive than the firm's second-order condition. It is assumed here that 
the second-order condition is satisfied, i.e., 
— eB)[(4b2 — e2 )2 — (2be)212 > 23b112 (2b2 — e2 ) 
(b(4b 2 - 3e2 Xb — eB) + e(2b2 — e2 Xe — bB))2 . 
Using the first-order conditions we can solve for first-period equilibrium 
expon subsidies. Since each government's best-response function is linear in 
the other government's expon subsidy it follows that the equilibrium is unique. 
Substituting the equilibrium subsidy levels into (4.29) and (4.30) yields first- 
period prices and expon volumes as functions of ö, c, 	a, b, and e. Also, first- 
period profits can be computed: 
< 0 . 
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A 	
(1— B)R4b 2 —e2 +2beX4b 2 — e2 —2be)2  — 45bri(2b 2 e 2 ) 
.5  
[(2b — e(1 + B))(4b2 —e2 + 2beX4b2 —e2 — 2ber — 43b712 
(1+ ri(b — e)X4b 4 — b 2 e 2 —e4 — 2beB(3b 2 _ 2e2 ))]  
e2 ) 
(2b2 
p j = pik 
— 
= 
e2 )(6 — 	(4b4 — b2 e 2 —e4 —2beB(3b 2 _ 2e2 ))]]  
[(4b 2 — e2 + 2be)(4b 2 —e 2 — 2beY — 4,5bn(2b 2 
[(2b — e(1 + B))(4b2 —e2 + 2be)(4b2 —e2 — 2be)2 — 481,772 
{1+ ri(b — e))(4b4 _ b 2 e2 _ e 4  — 2be.8(3b 2 — 2e2 
(262 — e2 Xb — e)2 (4b4 —b 2e2 — e4 —2bel3(3b 2 — 2e2 ))1 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
(a 	e)), 
(4.36) 
[(b — eBX4b2 —e2 + 2beX4b2 —e2 — 2be)2 + 45bri(2b2 _e2 ) 
[(2b — e(1 + B))(4b2 —e2 + 2beX4b 2 — e2 —2be)2 — 4(51,77 2 
-(b — eX4b4 — b 2e2 — e4 —2bel3(3b 2 _ 2e2))] 
(2b2 — e2 Xb — e)2 (4b4 — b 2e2 — e4 — 2beB(3b 2 _ 2e2))} 
A/11' = Af; = 
(a 
= 
(4.37) 
[A(a — — 	+ E — 	, 
where S1 * is defined by equation (4.34). 
Using these equations, several interesting observations can be made. From 
equation (4.34) it can be seen that the sign of (S1 1) is ambiguous and cannot be 
determined without empirically analyzing the market. However, it is intuitive 
that with larger values of switching costs (and with a larger discount factor) an 
export subsidy is more likely (i.e., 	> o, asr/86> 0).   That is, export 
subsidies are more likely to appear under parameter values which cause the 
customer base to be more locked-in during the second period. 
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Unfortunately, the analytical proof of this result is beyond our ability, and 
we were therefore forced to numerically approximate these comparative statics 
results.I5 Appendix A illustrates this numerical analysis. 
Since the importing country develops switching costs after making its initial 
purchases, the second-period prices and profits (and exporting countries' welfares) 
are higher and export subsidies are lower compared with prices, profits and 
subsidies in the first period. In the first period, firms compete for market share 
which is valuable later, and firms raise their prices in the second period to take 
advantage of the fact that their first-period customer has become partly locked 
in to them as suppliers. 
Finally, first-period prices and profits (and exporting countries' welfares) are 
lower and export subsidies are higher than in a market without switching costs. 
Since market share is more valuable to firms the higher are switching costs (i.e., 
d(drc'2 /dcsi )/9i/> 0), switching costs make firms compete more aggressively 
for market share in the first period than they would if they were simply maxi-
mizing first-period profits: dPi j  /dl/ < 0, d,r /dl] < 0 , and d,S' /dij> 0. 
The next step in this dissertation is to extend this two-period model to a 
multiperiod framework in which firms can alter prices and governments can 
alter export subsidies freely in any period. This multiperiod model is then used 
in the empirical analysis of the international wheat trade. 
4.2. Finite Period Dynamie International Wheat Trade Model 
with Switehing Costs 
In the previous section a two-period international trade model with switching 
costs was described and analyzed in detail. In the second period of that model, 
the exporting countries' ability to lock-in the importing country to some degree 
led to higher prices being charged by exporting firms' and to lower export 
subsidies set by exporting countries' governments than if there were no switch-
ing costs. In the first period, therefore, firms set lower prices and governments' 
announce larger subsidies than if there were no switching costs, in order to 
capture market share that will be valuable in the second period. 
15 We can derive the partioi derivatives, oSit / dri> 0, 8 / 88> 0, but signing them analytically 
has proven to he a very difficult task. Naturally, the use of numerical analysis is not a proof. 
However, the supportive conclusion of the numerical analysis is that for ali the parameter 
values tried the sign of partial derivatives are as expected. That is, we could not find a 
counterexample. The next paragraph states a few more interesting observations. Unfortunately, 
the same problem of proof applies to them as well, but similar supportive outcomes from the 
numerical analysis are achieved. 
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Such a model does not tell us what to expect from competition over many 
periods. Will exporting countries' temptation to exploit their current market 
share lead to higher prices and lower subsidies than in the absence of switching 
costs, or will exporting countries' desire to achieve larger market share lead to 
lower price and higher export subsidies? Furthermore, the purpose of the two 
period assumption is to extract theoretical results. Thus, two-period models may 
not be the most satisfactory for analyzing the effects of policy shocks (e.g., 
restrictions on export subsidies by GATT) or other shocks since in the real 
world we have more than two periods and since the "first period" is not usually 
without historical market shares and switching costs. This section, therefore, 
extends the two-period model of the previous section into a more general finite-
horizon multiperiod model of competition in a market with switching costs. 
Other generalizations employed in this section include more general (though 
linear) import demand functions. In addition, we relax the assumption made by 
many previous studies that the social cost of public funds is unity: an extra 
dollar earned in export revenues (or profits, depending on the objective func-
tion) by the home firm has the same social valuation as an extra dollar in 
subsidy payments forgone by the home government. This view implicitly as-
sumes that export subsidies have no distortionary effects on other sectors and 
that the opportunity cost of public funds is the amount spent. Such an approach 
does not take into account the welfare costs of distortions caused by collection 
of taxes elsewhere in the economy to finance government spending on export 
subsidies. Although the public finance literature does not fully agree on the size 
of this marginal deadweight cost of taxation, it is generally believed that such 
costs exist. Estimates for the U.S. economy are between 20 percent and 50 
percent (Ballard et al. 1985). Since the cost of public funds becomes a determi-
nant of the design of optimal export policy, we assume that governments maxi-
mize the domestic firm's export revenues less the cost of transfers to the firm.16 
Finally, in contrast to the two-period model, asymmetric non-zero marginal 
costs are allowed. 
In our finite-horizon dynamic model of international wheat trade, govern-
ments of exporting countries in each period set export subsidies to maximize 
their discounted future net revenues (home-firm revenues minus costs of the 
subsidy program), given the history of the game and expected behavior of the 
firms and the importing country in the future. Then in each period the exporting 
firms set their prices to maximize discounted future profits, given government 
subsidies and the history of the game. Because of switching costs, the importing 
country's behavior depends on history, in particular on previous purchases of 
16 Among others, Gruenspecht (1988), Neary (1991), McNally (1993), and Brainard and Martimort 
(1996) also investigate the impact of a costly public funds in models of strategic trade policy. 
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the good from a specific country. Therefore, governments' and firms' decisions 
in one period also have (predictable) effects into the future. 
The decisions of both firms and governments are appropriately analyzed as a 
difference game. We restrict ourselves to analyzing feedback Markovian strate-
gies (feedback state-space strategies) in which the past influences current deci-
sions only through its effect on a current state vector that summarizes the direct 
effect of the past on the current environment. We look for a Markov perfect 
(feedback) equilibrium, i.e. a profile of Markov strategies that yields a Nash 
equilibrium in every proper subgame. 
The other major strategy space, in addition to the feedback strategy space, 
commonly examined in the literature is the open-loop strategy space. However, 
open-loop strategies have the undesirable property that the associated equilibria 
may not be subgame perfect. The reasonableness and usefulness of our feedback 
restriction is discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Basically, this Markov 
restriction rules out other perfect equilibria in which strategies depend on as-
pects of history which do not directly influence the players' payoffs. 
The remainder of the section describes how the game is solved by backward 
induction. To begin the backward inductive solution for our finite-horizon dy-
namic game we start at period T, which is the final period of our specified time 
horizon. (At T+1 the game has ended.) 
4.2.1. Final Period (7) 
4.2.1.1. The Exporting Firm's Problem 
The firms in both exporting countries choose their prices to maximize terminal 
period profits given the terminal period export subsidy levels chosen by govern-
ments and given firms' exports from the period T-1, i.e. given the current state 
of the game. Firm i's final period profits are 
Max  
As in the two-period model, maximizing the objective function with respect 
to own price we get the best-response function of firm i. The intersection of 
best-response functions for firm i and k gives the final period prices, the current 
decision variables (also called the control vector), as a linear function of the 
current state: 
(4.38) pi 	K i0 	s i K i2 sk K i3 mi 	K i4 mk T T 	T T 	T T-1 	T T-1 
where K , j=0,1,2,3,4, are functions of import demand function parameters 
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mi = Di0 Dil si Di2 sk Di3 mi 	D4 mk T-1' 
b i 	+ eK k° T 
Dri3 = DT" 
(4.39) 
where DTi° = a i (b i e)2— 
DTi2 = 	Kri2 eKrki 
DTil = 	 eKTk2 
Dri4 rikDTi2 
and of marginal costs: 
2b k 	— e)t)+ e(a k — (bk — eM+2b i b k 	b k eC rk  
K i° =  
b k 	—eb k  
K" = 	 Ki2 = T  -4bibk —e 2 	T 	4b i b k — e2 
(2b i b k e2 )771 
4b i b k — e2 
Ki4 — il 
,k Ki2 
Tn T 
  
Substituting (4.38) and the same equation for firm k into import demand 
functions yields 
4b' b k —e2 
Firm behavior in period T is qualitatively the same as firm behavior in the 
second period of the two-period model (see the comparative statics results of 
that section). We are now ready to move to the government's optimization 
problem in the terminal period. 
4.2.1.2. The Exporting Government's Problem 
The exporting country's government maximizes the country's final period wel-
fare by setting an export subsidy given period T-1 exports (the current state in 
the govemments' problem) and the expected behavior of the firm. Recall from 
the two-period model that domestic welfare is measured by total export rev-
enues less expenditures on export subsidies: 
Max 	g7;. = (PTI + S )MTI — S. Mri = 
sr  
In this preceding analysis subsidy dollars and firms export revenue dollars 
have been treated as equivalent. As implied by the above welfare function the 
government is indifferent about pure transfers from the domestic treasury to the 
firm (or vice versa). In practice, however, each dollar spent by the government 
is raised through distortionary taxes (labor, capital, and excise taxes) and costs 
to society $(1+2.), where Ä>0. In other words, ideal lump-sum taxes (which 
would imply that 	are not available. Laffont and Tirole (1993) state an 
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important point that the shadow cost of public funds (Ä) is given by economy 
wide data and is independent of the regulation of the industry under considera-
tion as long as the latter is small relative to the economy. 
The measurement of shadow cost of public funds results from the theory of 
public finance and from the estimation of the elasticities of demand and supply 
for consumption, labor, and capital. A reasonable mean estimate for U.S. economy 
seems to be 2=0.3 (see Ballard et al. 1985). The shadow cost of public funds is 
likely to be higher in countries where tax collection is less efficient (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993). 
Taking the above aspect into account, we now write the ith government's 
welfare function as 
	
Max 	I/V7 = (P;: + STi )MiT  — ,u1STi Mr
sT 
 
where p.=1+2, is the opportunity cost of public funds. However, it is important 
keep in mind that this welfare function is still quite favorable towards the 
producer interest group since zero weight is given for consumer surplus. 
Substituting (4.38) and (4.39) into the government's objective function and 
taking the first derivative with respect to ST  yields a first-order condition for 
maximum welfare. The first-order condition is then solved for STi to get country 
i's best-response function. Similarly, the best-response function is solved for 
government k. Then computing the intersection of the best-response functions 
yields period T equilibrium export subsidies as a linear functions of the current 
state: 
(4.40) 	 r_ril 	H i2 AA-k T 	T 	T "T-1 	T "T-1' 
where HTU j=0,1,2, are functions of import demand function parameters, of 
opportunity cost of public funds parameters, and of marginal costs. 
Substituting (4.40) into (4.38), (4.39) and also into the objective functions of 
firms and governments allows final period equilibrium prices, exports, profits 
and welfares to be expressed as functions of the current state: 
(4.41) 1 i = Ei° + E il Mi + E i2 M k T T-1 T T-1' 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
mi Gio 	mi  +G2 mk T T T T-1 T T-1' 
ni mi mk = Bi0 Bil mi 	Bi2 M _1 + Bi3 mi )2 " T 	T-I , 	T-1 ) 	T 	T 	T-1 	T k T-1 ) 
Bi4 (M k )2 + Bi5 Mi M T T-I 	T T-1 T-1 
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and 
	
wi (mi mk )= ALIi0 Ail mi 	Ai2 Airk +43 (M , i T 	T-1 , 	T-1 	T 	T 	T I"T-1  
(4.44) 	 A i4 Ajk 	A 5 M1 mi mk T 	T-1 	' "T 	T-1 	T-1 
where E , G ,j=0,1,2, and 4 , B, 1=0,1,2,3,4,5 are also functions of import 
demand function parameters, of opportunity cost of public funds parameters and 
of marginal costs. 
4.2.2. Period t 
After solving for the equilibrium of the terminal period subgame we can move 
backward to solve for the equilibrium of the subgame consisting of the last two 
periods, T-1 and T. This procedure is same for any remaining subgame of our 
dynamic game, so we can show it for a general, tth, period, where te[1,T-1]. 
Note that when t=1 the subgame is the whole dynamic game itself. 
4.2.2.1. The Exporting Firm's Problem 
In the general tth period, each firm aims to maximize its total discounted future 
profits starting from period t by choosing period t prices given the current state 
and knowing how its choice in period t will affect decisions and profits in the 
future. Firm i's total future discounted profits are: 
(4.45) 
	
1T, = 	ölT,±1(m;, mtk ), 
in which its value function from period t+1, H, will depend on period t 
exports. Substitution of (4.43) into (4.45) gives us a following objective func-
tion for firm 
)2 
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Max = 13,1 + S; — C;)(a' —bi (13,1 + — 711 11/1:_i )± e(P fk +1-- 17 k Mtk-1)) 
+ (5.  (B ÷°1 + B +1 1 (a' — b' (P,' 	— M;_,)+ e(pk + — qk M," 1 )) 
+ .13:+21 (ak - bk (1:;k +2 - rik Mk 
)+ 
e(13,1 +-71'M:_1)) 
+ B; +31 (al —1)1 (P,' + — M;_i )+ e(P,k + 1- 71k Mtk-i))2 
B 1 (ak - b k (.12;k 	qk M fk_1)± e(P fl 	711  11/1;-1))2 
+ B 1 (a i 	+— i m i )+e(Pt k 	—77 1c Mtk-i)) 
.(ak _b" (] k + + 11k M 	e(P€1 + -77'M'_1 ))]  
 
Firm i's first-order condition is now17 
c9n- 
(4.46) 	
k 
s arl +1 	 dM, 	1=0 
dP` 	dM: dPt i dM fk 913/ 
Digressing for a moment from the solving procedure, we analyze the first-
order condition more closely. We obtain here a result consistent with Klemperer 
(1995). Provided that a lower current price raises the firm's current ex-
ports, dM: I dPt i < 0 , decreases rival firm's current exports, dildtk idPri > 0, 
and that the firm's future total discounted profits are increasing in its current 
exports, dllit+1 /dMti > 0 , and decreasing in rival firm's current exports, 
(Af +i 	<0 , then we have die, /dP,' > 0. That is, the firm prices are lower t 
than they would be if it ignored the fact that its current exports will be valuable 
in the future. However, as Klemperer (1995) points out, it is important to notice 
that this does not tell us whether the prices charged by the firms are higher or 
lower than in the absence of switching costs, because current demand is made 
more inelastic due to switching costs. In fact the firms are facing a trade-off 
between setting a high price to exploit their current market share or charging a 
low current price to build up the current market share and therefore increase 
future profits. Klemperer goes on to explain that we should expect prices to be 
generally higher than in the absence of switching costs. This interesting issue, 
17  Note that to satisfy the second-order condition of firm i's maximization problem the following 
condition must hold: —b' +6[8:+31 (b`)2 +B,(e)2 
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among other hypotheses, will be tested using our empirical simulation model in 
Chapter VI. 
Rearranging the first-order condition, we get the firm s best-response func-
tion. Similarly, from exporting firm k's optimization problem we get firm k's 
best-response function. The intersection point of the two firms' best-response 
functions gives equilibrium prices as a linear function of the current state (the 
same period export subsidies and previous period export volumes) 
(4.47) 
	pti = K:0 + K til s ti K ti2 s tk Kti3 m  _1 Kti4 m tk 
where K , j=0, 1,2,3,4, are functions of import demand function parameters, of 
opportunity cost of public funds parameters, of marginal costs, and of a discount 
factor. 
By substituting (4.47) and the same equation for firm k into the import 
demand function we achieve period t equilibrium exports of country i: 
(4.48) 	Ad: = D:o 	Dtiz stk + D:3 mq„.1 Dria M1, 
where Dti° = ai — (bi — 	—bi K ti° + eK , 	D 1 = —bi 	+ eKtk2 , 
D1i2 = _bi Kti2 eKtkl 
D:4 = —bi K:4 + eK,k3 —like  . 
D:3 = —bi K:3 + eK,k4 + 	, 
We have now completed the second stage of the period t solution process._So 
far, firms' price mies have been solved treating the export subsidies of both 
governrnents and previous period export volumes as exogenous to firms' profit 
maximization problem. To solve for govemments' export subsidy mies we need 
to look at the government's optimization problem. 
4.2.2.2. The Exporting Government's Problem 
Governments maximize their countries' discounted welfare starting from period t 
given previous period exports and given that they know how firms and the 
importing country will behave in the future. Country i's discounted welfare is 
(4.49) TV/ =w 
	
k)= (1); - (111 - 1)S;)M; 45W41 (mit , Mk ), 
or more explicitly for our demand structure, 
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Max 
s; 
= (Kit ° + KSit + K: 2s + K:3 M 1 Kit 4 Mtk_1 - 	- 1)Sit 
(D:0 4. DtilSti Dti2S1k + D:3 M i ± Dti4Mtk 
(5111:+01 	 Dti2Stk + D:3 	Dti4 M1) 
Ati+21 ( Dtk0 Dtklstk + Dk2Sf Dtk3 mtk 	Dtk4 mti_i ) 
Ati +31 (Dit 0 	 Dti2stk Dti3 m 1+ Dti4 mtk 1 )2  
Ati+41 ( Dtk0 ±Dtklstk Dtk2sti Dtk3 mtk 1+ Dtk4 m i )2  
Ati +51 (D:0 + Dtil sti Dti2stk Dti3 01_1+ D:4 mk 1 ) 
.(Dtk° +Dtkisik +Dtk2si, +Dtk 3 mtk_1 +Dtk 4 m 1 )]. 
Maximizing with respect to its period-t export subsidy (tax if negative), govern-
ment i's first-order condition is now18 
(4.50) 
dwit 
aS; 
dr/r/t-i  dM;  + dkr/t1+1  aMtk i_ (-) 
dMit dS; dMtk dS; 
   
Digressing again for a moment from the solving procedure, we analyze this 
first-order condition more closely. Provided that a higher current export subsidy 
raises the exporting country's current exports, aM,VaS: > 0, decreases rival 
country's current exports, d/14-,k /dSti < 0 , and that the country's future total 
discounted welfare is increasing in its current exports, dPVt i+/ /aM: > 0 , and 
decreasing in rival country' s current exports, dff/4/ /dMtk < 0 , then we have 
dwti /dS; < 0 . That is, the exporting country's government sets export subsi-
dies higher than it would if it ignored the fact that its current exports will be 
valuable in the future. However, Klemperer's point applies here as well. That is, 
this does not tell us whether the export subsidies set by the governments are 
higher or lower than in the absence of switching costs, because current demand 
is made more inelastic by the switching costs. If prices are expected to be 
18 Note that to satisfy the second-order condition of government i's maximization problem the 
following condition must hold: (1— p' + 1<",'')D;' + (5114:,.31 (D;')2 + 	(D2 )2 + A;« D,k2 ]< 0 . 
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generally higher than in the absence switching costs, then we would expect 
export subsidies to be generally lower than in the absence of switching costs. 
This hypothesis will also be tested in Chapter VI. 
Using first-order conditions for government i and government k and comput-
ing the intersection yields period t export subsidies (taxes if negative) as a linear 
function of the current state: 
(4.51) 51: 	11:0 Hil 1"1-1 
 Hi2 mk 
1 	t-1 ,  
where H , j=0,1,2, are functions of import demand function parameters, of 
opportunity cost of public funds parameters, of marginal costs, and of the 
discount factor. 
Substituting (4.51) into (4.47) and (4.48) yields general, tth, period prices 
and export volumes as linear functions of previous period export volumes: 
(4.52) 
where 
and 
(4.53) 
pti = E it o E 	+E 2 M 1 , t 	t-1 
Erio = Kit () 	Hrio Kti2 Htk0 	E ti 1 = Kti 1 Hti 1 + Kti 2 Htic 2 + K it 3 , 
Eti2 = KtilHti2 Ki2Hk1 vi4 
t 	t 
M it = 	+ 	+ Gti
2 Ai
t-1' m
rk 
where Gtio = Dtio 	Di2Hko 
	
G'
DilHil D i2 Hk2 D
3 ,  
G:2 = Dit 1H:2 Dit 2Htkl + D:4 
where E ,GTif  ,j=0,1,2, are functions of import demand function parameters, of 
opportunity cost of public funds parameters, of marginal costs, and of the 
discount factor. 
Finally, by substituting (4.52) and (4.53) into government i's objective func-
tion and firm i's objective function yields 
wti (mit 	 = AtiO 	Ati1 
1"1-1 	XXI 
Ai2 71,1-
t-1 1 f-11 
k 	A i3 	
t-1
2 	A;,( 	2 
-1  
(4.54) 
+ 	Mtk 
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+ B:' 	+ B:2 M, + 13:3 (0,_1 )2 + B:4 (M,k )2 
(4.55) 
+ B:5 
where ATi  and BTU j=0,1,2,3,4,5, are functions of import demand function 
parameters, of opportunity cost of public funds parameters, of marginal costs, 
and of the discount factor. 
This completes our solution procedure for a general, tth, period. By back-
ward induction we have solved the price rules for firm i and k as well as export 
subsidy rules for governments i and k. To get the solution for the whole dynamic 
game we need to repeat this procedure for the entire time horizon starting at 
period T and moving backwards to period /. After ali of the rules are found for 
each time period, the system is solved forward one period at a time given initial 
export volumes (Mo' and Mok) to find equilibrium paths of prices, subsidies, 
export volumes and other variables. from the rules found through backward 
induction. 
4.3. Conclusions 
This chapter developed a theoretical framework for international commodity 
trade in which switching costs are present and export subsidies (or taxes) are 
used as policy instruments by exporting countries. 
In the two-period model since an importing country develops switching costs 
after making its initial purchases, the second-period prices and profits (and 
exporting countries' welfares) are higher and export subsidies are lower when 
compared with prices, profits and subsidies in the first period. In the first period, 
firms compete for market share which is valuable later, and firms raise their 
prices in the second period to take advantage of the fact that their first-period 
customer has become partly locked in to them as suppliers. Furthermore, first-
period prices and profits (and exporting countries' welfares) are lower and 
export subsidies are higher than in a market without switching costs. Since 
market share is more valuable to firms the higher are switching costs, switching 
costs make firms compete more aggressively for market share in the first period 
than they would if they were simply maximizing first-period profits. 
In the second section of this chapter the two-period model was extended to a 
multiperiod model in which firms can alter prices and governments can alter 
export subsidies freely in any period. This difference game should provide us a 
plausible model for evaluating the effects of export promotions. It is used in the 
subsequent empirical analysis of international wheat trade in Chapter VI. 
80 
CHAPTER V 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF 
BEHAVIORAL EQUATIONS 
In the empirical case study of this dissertation we use the conceptual framework 
in Chapter IV to analyze competition between EU and U.S. wheat in Morocco. 
One way to proceed from the conceptual framework to subsequent empirical 
models would be to use trade elasticities from previous studies to derive needed 
parameter values for the importing country's import demand functions by ex-
porter (source) (as done by McNally). However, the use of elasticities from 
earlier studies has been criticized by many (e.g. Sheldon 1992) because in many 
cases assumptions in previous research do not fit well the conceptual framework 
employedl. As Dixit (1988) points out, it would be a great improvement to have 
the demand parameters estimated by systematic econometrics, instead of cali-
brating them. Thus, to ensure consistency between the theoretical model and 
subsequent empirical models, this study re-estimates Moroccan import demand 
functions for EU and U.S. wheat utilizing a structure that corresponds to the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter IV. Another reason for econometric 
estimation is to analyze the statistical significance of switching cost parameters 
in order to validate our new agricultural trade modeling approach. 
Data limitations require that one small modification of the theoretical model 
is needed before it can be applied empirically. Recall that the import demand 
fimction for exporting country i's wheat at time t is: 
(5.1)  
where i,k= EU, U.S. and i equals ali other costs, excluding the price charged 
by the exporter, associated with the purchase of the product (i.e., transactions 
costs, leaming costs, etc.). Switching costs are captured by the terms 
and ri k M1,  where /Ii and nk are marginal switching cost parameters. The 
idea of switching costs is that larger values for if or Af:_1 make costs of 
purchasing again from exporter i smaller, so the importing country is less will-
ing to switch to exporter k's wheat. 
1  For example, McCorriston and Sheldon (1991), in their simulation model of the UK fertilizer 
industry used an external estimate of the elasticity of demand based on empirical work con-
ducted in the 1960s and an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between domestically 
produced fertilizers and imports based on an Australian estimate. 
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The empirical problem with equation (5.1) is that reliable proxies for turn 
out to be extremely difficult to obtain. On the other hand, 	only causes an 
equal size, additional cost to buy both EU and U.S. wheat, as shown in equation 
(5.1). Therefore, it can be seen just as an equally sized specific tax on both EU 
and U.S. wheat that shifts import demand functions either inward or outward. 
Hence, with no changes in the qualitative results of Chapter IV, we can rewrite 
import demand functions as: 
(5.2) 	M = z _b'(1' _ 	1 )4_ e( pt k _ ri k m tk 1 ) 
where z = a — — e)t . Data required to estimate import demand functions of 
this form are available. Therefore, these modified forms of import demand 
functions are estimated in this chapter and applied in the empirical simulation 
models found in the next chapter. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The following section offers a descrip-
tion of the data set used in the estimation. The estimation methodology section 
then presents an overview of the Hecicman two-step method which addresses the 
fact that the continuous dependent variable only takes a limited range of val-
ues.2 Its application to the problem of estimating import demand for wheat is 
described next. In the final section, estimated Moroccan import demand func-
tions for EU and U.S. wheat are analyzed. 
5.1. Description of Data 
Estimation of the values of the coefficients of both import demand functions 
requires data on variables in the model. Our study differs from most earlier 
studies that estimate behavioral equations in international wheat trade in that we 
use monthly data instead of armual data. Monthly data are preferred because 
strategic interaction between players in the market happens on a transaction by 
transaction basis. One important goal of this research is to capture that behavior. 
Use of annual data would conceal much of the strategic interaction occurring in 
this market. 
Data needs for import demand function estimation consist of imported wheat 
quantities from the EU and U.S. to Morocco and corresponding wheat import 
prices paid by Morocco. The price data and the quantity data in regularly 
published sources, such as World Grain Statistics, do not match these data 
needs directly. Therefore, manipulation of the data is required. 
2 In our problem wheat imports by source are always nonnegative. 
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Data on monthly wheat export volumes for the U.S. can be found in Foreign 
Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS), published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. As far as we know, a similar publication for EU does not 
exist. 
World Grain Statistics (formerly World Wheat Statistics) of the International 
Grain Council (IGC) is probably the best data source on international wheat 
trade. Trade data are based on monthly reports provided by grain exporting 
countries, including the U.S. and member states of the EU, among others. With 
the cooperation by IGC, we were able to access their most recent monthly trade 
flow data. Time series cover exports of EU and U.S. wheat to Morocco for 47 
months from July 1992 to May 1996. This export volume data is shown in 
Figure 5.1 below as well as in Appendix B. 
The wheat prices of interest here are those paid by Morocco at the Moroccan 
border. Since this data on import prices is not readily available, we derived 
proxies for import prices as follows. IGC, in World Grain Statistics, publishes 
average monthly export price quotations (fob) for EU wheat and U.S. wheats. 
For EU wheat only one monthly fob-price is given. This price is net of export 
refunds, and is that established by open market tenders for export to various 
specifled zones. For the U.S. wheat fob-prices are published for several U.S. 
ports and wheat varieties. Prices for no. 2 hard winter wheat and no. 2 soft red 
winter wheat at the Gulf port are used in this research, since mainly winter 
wheat varieties are exported to Morocco, and since the majority of winter 
wheats (approximately 80 percent during 1984/85-1993/94) are exported through 
the U.S. Gulf port (IGC). 
A difference between published EU and U.S. prices is that the first one is net 
of export refunds while the latter is given before subtraction of EEP bonuses. 
World Grain Statistics reports monthly time series on EEP bonuses for common 
US exports 
EC exports 
Jul-92 	Apr-93 
	
Jan-94 	Oct-94 
	
Jul-95 
	
Apr-96 
Month 
Figure 5.1. Monthly Wheat Exports From EU and U.S. to Morocco. 
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wheat, but they only show the lowest and the highest EEP-bonus for each month 
to ali destinations (combined). USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
press releases are a better source on EEP-bonuses, since they provide data on 
awarded bonuses by destination and wheat type (USDA). This information was 
used to calculate fob-prices for the U.S. wheat (exported to Morocco) net of 
EEP bonuses. 
Since wheat prices needed for the estimation of import demand functions are 
the prices paid by Morocco at the Moroccan border, the fob prices net of export 
subsidies need to be further modified. Transportation charges are added to fob 
prices to achieve the price data used in the estimation. Mid-month average 
freight rates for heavy grain3  on selected routes are also published in World 
Grain Statistics. Freight rates for routes EU to Casablanca and U.S. Gulf to 
Casablanca are added as transportation costs to obtain imported wheat prices. 
This data is shown in Figure 5.2 as well as in Appendix B.4 
Descriptive statistics for this data are presented in Table 5.1. On average the 
monthly imports of EU and U.S. wheat have been very similar, imports of U.S. 
wheat being just 1.7 percent larger. However, considerable variation between 
different months has occurred. Likewise, prices have been very close to each 
other. The average price for EU wheat has been somewhat higher than the 
average U.S. wheat price (1.3 percent higher). Furthermore, the correlation 
between these two prices has been high (0.88) supporting the fact that exporting 
firms as well as govemments of exporting countries follow closely each others 
moves in this market. 
240 
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Figure 5.2. Monthly Prices Paid by Morocco for EU and U.S. Wheat. 
3 Wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans. 
4  Note that U.S. prices for five months out of the 47 months in our sample are not available. This 
is because no average fob price and/or freight rate information were available for those months. 
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Table 5.1. Descrzptive Statistics for the Data Used in the Analysis. 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Imports of U.S. wheat (1000 tons) 88.598 74.378 0.0000 274.41 
Imports of EU wheat (1000 tons) 87.118 72.362 0.0000 217.96 
Import price of U.S. wheat (US$/ton) 153.36 45.998 94.891 263.00 
Import price of EU wheat (US$/ton) 155.36 45.853 99.250 268.58 
5.2. Estimation Methodology 
The use of monthly instead of annual data has an effect on which estimation 
method to employ. When working with annual data a researcher very seldom 
has to deal with zero values of imports (the dependent variable). However, with 
monthly data it is quite common to have months in which no imports were made 
from a particular source. By looking at wheat import data for Morocco (in 
Appendix B), it can be seen that during 11 out of 47 months no U.S. wheat was 
imported to Morocco. For 8 months, EU wheat imports were zero. 
This type of data is called censored data (i.e., data that is limited to nonnegative 
values) (Greene 1993). The distortion in the data results from the fact that 
during several months Morocco did not purchase any wheat from either the EU 
or the U.S. A possible explanation for imports of EU and U.S. wheats not being 
positive in every month, is that purchases by Morocco are not made until the 
"desire" to buy the wheat in question exceeds a certain level. However, we 
cannot observe desires, only import volumes, and those are nonzero only if the 
wheats are purchased. Negative imports, corresponding to various levels of 
desire below the threshold level, cannot be observed, and ali months with no 
purchases are recorded as showing zero imports. No distinction is made be-
tween months during which Morocco was very close to buying the particular 
wheat in question and those during which it had very little desire to do so. This 
type of data calls for the use of a Tobit model. 
Tobit models refer to regression models in which the range of the dependent 
variable is constrained in some way. In economics, such a model was first 
suggested in a pioneering work by Tobin (1958). He analyzed household ex-
penditure on durable goods using a regression model which specifically took 
account of the fact that expenditure (the dependent variable of his regression 
model) cannot be negative. Tobin called his model the "model of limited de-
pendent variables". Because he related his study to the literature on probit 
analysis, it, and its various generalizations, are known popularly among econo-
mists as Tobit models. These models are also known as censored regression 
models. 
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In general, we can formulate such a censored regression model as 
(5.3) 	 Yr = 
if x, 16+ut >0 
0 	otherwise 
x fi+u„  
where y, is limited dependent variable, x is a set of explanatory variables and 
u'N(0,o-2) is the error term. The use of ordinary least squares (OLS) for such 
models results in biased and inconsistent estimates. 
To see the problem of using OLS with truncated data i.e., ignoring the zero 
observations, we write out the expectation of the observed values of yt condi-
tional on the fact that yt > 0: 
(5.4) 	 E[y, yr > 0]= x, )6+ E(u, 	>o). 
If the conditional expectation of the error term is zero, there is no problem and 
OLS provides an unbiased estimator for /3. Unfortunately, this is not the case. If 
the ur  are independent and normally distributed random variables, with mean 
zero and variance o-2, then the mean of the truncated error term is 
(5.5) 	Etu, > (1= 4ut iu, > —x, fij= 
where /1, = 	fi/o-j/c1)(x, fi/o-) is so called inverse Mills ratio (Greene 
1993), and 00 and 0:130 are the standard normal probability density function 
and cumulative distribution function evaluated at x t fi/0") . Consequently, the 
regression function can be written 
(5.6) 	 E[y, yr  
The problem with OLS is that it omits the second term on the right-hand side of 
(5.6), leading to the inconsistent and biased estimator of It can also be shown 
that applying OLS to ali observations (including the zero observations) is an 
unsatisfactory procedure and does not lead to a consistent estimator of J3 
(Judge et al. 1988). 
To estimate the parameter values for our import demand function consist-
ently we need to apply a censored-regression model which takes into account 
the censored sample problem. It is possible to estimate models of this type by 
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maximum likelihood methods, but this approach is often quite cumbersome. A 
number of consistent alternatives to maximum likelihood estimation have been 
proposed. A procedure due to Heckman (1979) has been the most commonly 
used (e.g. Heien and Wessels 1990, Byrne et al. 1996). A modified Heckman's 
two-step approach is adopted in this study, as wel1.5  
The estimation procedure of the traditional single equation Hedman ap-
proach involves two steps for the treatment of sample selection bias of the OLS 
estimation. Heckman correctly defines this bias as an omitted variable (or 
specification error) problem and shows that it is possible to estimate the vari-
able () t) that OLS estimation procedure omits. This is done in the first step of 
the Heckman procedure by utilizing a probit model, where the dependent vari-
able is one or zero depending on whether y1  is positive or zero. This provides a 
consistent estimator of f3/ a, which can be used to provide a consistent estima- 
tor of x t fi/o-  and the inverse Mills ratio. Then, in the second step of the two-
step procedure the consistent estimator of Åt is inserted into equation (5.6) in 
place of Åt  and least squares estimation is applied to that equation. The param-
eter value estimates produced by this process are consistent and asymptotically 
normally distributed. 
The traditional Hedman two-step method omits zero observations of the 
dependent variable for the second step. Amemiya (1974) generalized the Heckman 
approach to include ali observations in the second step by developing a measure 
of the inverse Mills ratio for the zero observations, that is, 
Åt = 	tcr)A1 —11(x :Pia)) . Lee (1978) further extended the Amemiya 
two-step censored regression model to a simultaneous-equation model. Heien 
and Wessels (1990) applied this approach using ali the observations at both 
steps to estimate a system of equations for a group of food commodities. Our 
application is similar to the Heien and Wessels approach. 
In the first stage of our estimation procedure the decision to import (or not to 
import) is modeled as a dichotomous choice problem 
f(Psi ,P,k 	vt , 
5  Note that the modified Heckman's two-step approach as an estimation procedure has not been 
without criticism either. For example, Arndt et al. (1997) argue that while the modified 
Heckman's two-step estimator treats econometric problems associated with censored depend-
ent variables, it is not fully consistent with economic theory. They claim that this technique 
may yield biased parameter estimates because the estimator relies upon market prices instead of 
reservation prices for non-consumed goods. 
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where 17 is 1 if imports of exporting country i's wheat are positive and 0 if 
Morocco does not import that wheat. This probit equation, that determines the 
probability that Morocco will buy exporting country i's wheat, is estimated by 
maximum-likelihood estimation. Using the parameter estimates of the probit 
model, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated. 
The inverse Mills ratio for each wheat is then used as a regressor in the 
second stage regression. Therefore, the import demand functions to be esti-
mated are 
m tus = zus ±bus pius bus 17 us musi eus pi EU eUS 7/EU M'vUS 	e 
(5.8) 	EU 	EU 	EU EU 	EU EU EU 	EU US 	EU US 	 EU EU M 	= Z +b .r; +b 	M, +e P, +e 	M+v 2, +6 EU, . 
The restriction from economic theory imposed on this system of equations is 
that cross-price effects across equations are restricted to be the same (i.e., eus = 
The disturbances in these two equations at a given time (i.e., etus , tEU ) are 
likely to reflect some common unmeasurable or omitted factors, and hence 
could be correlated. When this contemporaneous correlation exists, the appro-
priate joint estimation technique is seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
(SUR). In addition, it is clear that the equations in (5.8) are intrinsically nonlinear 
in their coefficients. Therefore, in the second step these import demand equa-
tions are estimated as a system of nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression 
(NSUR) equations, each having the same set of regressors, except for the 
inverse Mills ratios, that differ by commodity. 
5.3. Estimates of the Import Demand Functions 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the empirical results achieved using the 
two-step estimation process described above implemented using the SHAZAM 
econometrics package. The parameter estimates for import demand equations 
(5.8) are shown in Table 5.2. For comparison, the demand system was also 
estimated by NSUR when the inverse Mills ratios are not included (that is, 
ignoring the censored sample problem). These parameter estimates are given in 
the last two columns of Table 5.2.6 The price elasticities are also shown in Table 
5.2. 
6  NSUR estimation was conducted by using both the data consisting of only positive import 
observations and the data which included the zero observation as well. Only the results of 
NSUR that did not include zero observations are provided in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Censored-regression Method and Uncensored-regression Method 
Parameter Estimates of the Moroccan Import Demand System. 
Censored-regression method* Uncensored-regression method** 
Parameter U.S. Wheat EU Wheat U.S. Wheat EU Wheat 
Intercept 1.6388 1.2916 1.0661 1.9923 
(4.2175) (4.0066) (2.9556) (4.3198) 
bus -1.3274 -0.9838 
(3.2714) (1.7121) 
bEu - -0.90633 - -1.0713 
(2.6246) (1.8647) 
eUS 0.81646 0.6566 
(2.2552) (1.2619) 
eEU 0.81646 0.6566 
(2.2552) (1.2619) 
nUS 0.35373 0.35373 0.5127 0.5127 
(1.9532) (1.9532) (1.2677) (1.2677) 
nEU 0.26385 0.26385 0.0709 0.0709 
(1.4300) (1.4300) (0.4357) (0.4357) 
vUS -0.70446 
(3.3988) 
vEU -0.86685 
(3.1649) 
R2 0.6169 0.3127 0.5359 0.2740 
Own-price elasticity 
at means -2.29781 -1.61625 -1.49712 -1.62876 
Cross-price elasticity 
at means 1.43167 1.43730 1.04396 0.95527 
* Hedman procedure for a system of import demand equations. 
**Nonlinear SUR procedure for a system of import demand equations. 
Note: The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are the t ratios. t ratios of 1.645 or 
larger indicate that an estimate is significant at 10 percent level. Therefore, the only estimate in 
the censored regression model that is not significant at the 10 percent level is TI EU. 
The inverse Mills ratios are significant for each import demand equation, 
indicating that inconsistent estimates would have resulted if the import demand 
equations had been estimated without taking into account the decision to import 
(or not import) wheat from each exporting country. The comparison between 
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the two estimation techniques also shows that with the censored model we get 
an improvement in the goodness of fit statistic, R2. 
In the censored model, own-price elasticities as well as cross-price elasticities 
are clearly elastic. In comparison, price elasticities of the uncensored model are 
less elastic, with the only exception being the own-price elasticity for the EU7. 
The elasticity results of the censored-regression model seem plausible even 
though numerous previous studies, reviewed by Gardiner and Dixit (1986), have 
shown that short-run import demand elasticities for U.S. wheat have been in-
elastic, with the average estimate being around 0.6-0.7.8 One reason for our 
differing results is that our study uses monthly data instead of annual (some-
times quarterly) data commonly used in previous studies. 
The importing country's wheat imports, controlled often by parastatal agency, 
are usually planned for one crop year at a time. Needs of wheat imports for a 
year are calculated and then this required amount of wheat is imported at some 
time during the year. In the estimation with annual data, each import volume 
observation corresponds to a planned (needed) amount that the parastatal agency 
has to import that crop year, despite the fact that average price of the imported 
wheat for the year might be unusually high. Therefore, inelastic price elasticity 
estimates with annual data are not surprising. 
Within each year, the parastatal agency tries to import the planned total 
amount of wheat as economically as possible. Weekly and monthly prices may 
have large impacts on when wheat import transactions are made during each 
year. The use of monthly data allows us to capture better this more price 
sensitive behavior of the importing country. Thus, much more elastic price 
elasticity estimates were expected. 
Ali the parameter estimates of import demand equations have correct signs in 
the censored-regression model. The own-price effect on U.S. wheat imports is 
greater than the own-price effect on imports of EU wheat, meaning that Mo-
rocco responds more strongly to U.S. price changes than to EU price changes. 
Although EU wheat and U.S. wheat are differentiated products, the large cross-
price effects illustrate the close substitutability between these two wheats. 
7  An even bigger contrast between the elasticity results occur when censored-regression model is 
compared to uncensored model which uses zero observations as well. Own-price elasticities of 
this uncensored model are very inelastic and the elasticity for EU wheat is incorrectly signed. 
Furthermore, cross-price elasticities are nearly perfectly inelastic. 
8  In their estimation of import demand elasticities previous studies used a variety of methods, 
which included direct econometric estimation and analytical methods like Delphi method. 
Although differing methods yielded substantially different results, almost ali of them resulted 
in inelastic price elasticities. See Abbott (1988) for more on econometric and economic issues 
related to estimation of agricultural import demand elasticities. 
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Economic theory demands that the cross-price effects across equations are 
equal. The null hypothesis Ho: eus = eFu (= e) was tested and could not be 
rejected. This cross-price effect is smaller than both own-price effects. There- 
fore, another restriction of economic theory is satisfied: bus b UE 	e2 > 0 Fi_ 
nally, marginal switching cost parameters, nus and riEU are small relative to 
own- and cross-price coefficients as expected. 
When switching from the uncensored-regression method to the censored-
regression method, considerable improvement occurs in the significance levels 
of parameter estimates. In the censored model, ali but one parameter estimate 
are clearly significant at the 10 percent level. The parameter which is not quite 
significant at the 10 percent level is riEU • 
One reason for this result may he the data used in the estimation. For U.S. 
wheat exports to Morocco, the World Grain Statistics data were combined with 
detailed EEP-bonus data (distinguishing export subsidies to Morocco) when the 
import prices paid by Morocco were derived. On the other hand, for EU wheat 
exports to Morocco no additional information was used (i.e., we do not know 
Morocco specific export restitutions). World Grain Statistics data provides an 
fob export price for EU wheat (net of export refunds) that is the average price to 
ali destinations. This data deficiency on the EU side may he related to the fact 
that, in general, significance levels of the parameter estimates for the import 
demand equation for EU wheat are consistently lower than significance levels 
of the parameter estimates for the import demand equation for U.S. wheat. This 
data deficiency might also help to explain the lower R2 for the EU wheat 
equation. 
Finally, Chapter IV presented a new agricultural trade modeling approach in 
which the theory of switching costs was added to the conceptual framework. In 
the light of the above econometric parameter estimates, the inclusion of switch- 
ing cost parameters into the empirical model of the Moroccan wheat import 
market appears to he valid. The switching cost parameter estimates also suggest 
that costs of switching away from U.S. wheat are larger than costs of switching 
away from EU wheat, meaning that somehow U.S. is able to lock in Morocco 
more tightly to itself than the EU is able to do. This result is consistent with 
Wilson et al. (1987), who found that the U.S. as an wheat exporter seems to 
enjoy greater brand loyalty than the EEC. 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter presents the econometrically estimated Moroccan import demand 
equations for EU and U.S. wheat. The method used to obtain the parameter 
estimates of the import demand equations is a censored-regression estimation 
method. Existence of months with zero import volumes (the dependent variable) 
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in the data make it necessary to use the censored model. Comparison of the 
censored and uncensored models shows that considerable improvement in the 
estimation results are obtained when the censored-regression method is used. In 
particular, the method used is the modified Heckman's two-step method applied 
in a fashion similar to Heien and Wessels (1990). 
The estimation results are consistent with the restrictions that the conceptual 
framework developed in Chapter IV imposes on the import demand functions. 
The signs of the parameter estimates are as expected and statistical significance 
levels of these estimates are generally good. 
A comparison of the own-price and cross-price elasticities calculated in this 
study with those of previous studies indicate some differences. Not surprisingly, 
more elastic estimates are found in this study than in the previous work. One 
important reason for this outcome is that this study uses monthly data instead of 
the more commonly used annual data. Import volumes of wheat needed for each 
crop year are planned ahead of time and a parastatal agency must import the 
required amount, despite the fact that average price of the imported wheat for 
the year might be unusually high. Therefore, relatively inelastic price elasticity 
estimates with annual data are not surprising. 
However, within each year the parastatal agency attempts to import the 
planned total amount of wheat as economically as possible. Therefore, weekly 
and monthly prices have a large impact on when wheat import transactions are 
made during each year. More elastic price elasticity estimates resulted in this 
study, because the monthly data reflected this more price sensitive behavior of 
the importing country. 
Finally, econometric estimations of this chapter support our new agricultural 
trade modeling approach in which impacts of switching costs are taken into 
account. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL MODEL SOLUTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the model developed in the 
preceding chapters can be used to analyze export policies of governments as 
well as price setting behavior of exporting firms when strategic interaction 
among players and switching costs between goods in the market are present. To 
accomplish this task, several analyses are performed and results are compared to 
a base solution (which corresponds roughly to the pre-GATT situation). The 
scenarios are divided in three broad groups. 
The first group analyzes the effects that changes in key parameter values 
have on the behaviors of exporting firms and exporting countries. In particular, 
effects of switching costs and of opportunity costs of public funds are studied. 
In addition, effects of different degrees of product differentiation, of different 
marginal costs and of asymmetries in parameter values are analyzed. 
The second group of scenarios illustrates how altemative institutional ar-
rangements (game structures) at the country level change the levels of export 
subsidies (or taxes), prices, export volumes, and the payoffs for four players: the 
European Union, the United States, the EU wheat exporting firm, and the U.S. 
wheat exporting firm. A free trade scenario and the outcomes when either EU or 
U.S. unilaterally reforms by eliminating its export subsidies are considered. 
Collusive behavior by EU and U.S. govemments is also examined. Two issues 
are examined regarding the Uruguay Round GATT agreement. The first looks at 
the effects of the final GATT outcome by imposing subsidy expenditure limits. 
The second issue analyzes how the welfare effects of new GATT agreement 
differ when effects of CAP reform are taken into account. 
In the last group of scenarios altemative firm behaviors are examined to 
illustrate effects that different levels of firm market power have on the market 
outcomes. A cartel of exporting firms when govemments are subsidizing is 
examined, as well as the case in which firms are perfectly competitive. In 
addition, timing in players' decisions affects the degree of market power that 
eaCh player has. Two scenarios, one in which exporting firms are the first 
movers, and another one in which exporting firms and exporting countries' 
govemments set their strategies simultaneously, are presented to study effects of 
playing order. 
The chapter begins with general discussion of the structure of the empirical 
model. Then the solution technique for the model is explained. The base solu-
tion is shown next and it is compared with actual trade data. Thereafter, the 
results of the different scenarios described above are presented and discussed. 
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6.1. Model Structure 
This section briefly presents some additional elements of the model structure 
not mentioned in the previous chapters. The four major players in the model are 
the government of European Union, the government of the United States, an 
aggregate firm exporting EU wheat and an aggregate firm exporting U.S. wheat. 
The importing country is Morocco. 
It is important to keep in mind that this model is a so called third-market 
model in which exporting countries (the EU and U.S.) and their exporting firms 
compete only in a single third market (Morocco). This simplification is useful to 
allow the strategic effects of certain policy shocks to be seen in pure form. 
However, domestic wheat production, stocks and consumption of exporting 
countries are not included in the model. So, one way to describe the settings 
under which the model operates is based on the surplus disposal concept. That 
is, both exporting countries hold very large amounts of wheat that needs to be 
either exported or stored, and magnitudes of wheat exported to one importing 
country do not provide much of relief to the overall pressure to export. So, 
under these circumstances, when the government of each exporting country is 
awarding export subsidies to enhance wheat exports to the importing country, 
one reasonable form of its objective function would seem to be to maximize 
export revenues less costs of export subsidies. However, when impacts of policy 
shocks that may cause considerable changes in domestic production, stocks and/ 
or consumption of exporting countries are analyzed, welfare effects of the 
model should be analyzed with care since those changes in domestic production, 
stocks and consumption are not captured by the model. 
In reality, more than one exporting firm operates in each exporting country. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that marginal costs (producer price + 
transportation costs) within each country are constant and equal across wheat 
exporting firms. This very common assumption of constant marginal costs 
makes it possible to aggregate across exporting firms to represent the industry 
behavior with an aggregate firm, i.e. industry output is the sum of individual 
outputs (Appelbaum 1982). Thus, an aggregate exporting firm is used to repre-
sent industry behavior in each exporting country. McNally (1993) states that 
constant marginal costs also imply that exporting firms are price takers when 
buying wheat. This is in agreement with real market behavior. There are many 
buyers of domestic wheat in both the EU and U.S., making the domestic market 
structure very close to perfect competition on the buying side, while on the 
export selling side there are relatively few international sellers that may have 
some market power. 
However, one recognized caveat of this aggregate firm approach is that the 
exporting firm stage is described as a duopoly, which assigns too much mo-
nopoly power to the firms, leading to higher prices. The reason for retaining the 
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duopoly assumption is that an introduction of several exporting firms would 
substantially complicate the model structure, and could make it intractable. 
Effects of assigning too much market power to the firms are discussed in the 
base solution section as well as in the section that examines different firm 
behaviors. 
The only differences between the theoretical model described in Chapter IV 
and the empirical model used in this chapter exist in the presentation of import 
demand. Due to data limitations, estimated import demand functions used in the 
empirical model have somewhat different forms compared to theoretical import 
demand function.1  
Determination of simulation solutions for our empirical international wheat 
trade models requires setting values of model parameters. In Chapter V param-
eter values of import demand functions were estimated. In addition to these 
parameters another set of parameters need to be established. 
The monthly U.S. domestic farm price for winter wheat, as given by the 
USDA-NASS electronic database, is used as a basis for deriving the marginal 
cost parameter for the U.S. exporting firm (ctus ). To get a proxy for the 
marginal cost in Morocco, monthly freight rates for the route U.S. Gulf-Casa-
blanca, as given by World Grain Statistics, are added to the domestic U.S. farm 
price. If the cost of moving wheat from interior locations to U.S. Gulf export 
facilities is low relative to the value of the wheat and remains fixed within a 
month, then it might be argued that a domestic farm price plus a freight rate may 
approximate marginal cost for the U.S. wheat exporting firm. Similarly, the 
marginal cost of the EU wheat exporting firm, (c, ), is proxied by a combina-
tion of a producer selling price and a freight rate. The EU farm selling prices of 
wheat were obtained from Eurostat's Agricultural Prices 5b publication and 
freight rates for the route EU-Casablanca were taken from World Grain Statis-
tics. Marginal costs from July 1992 to May 1996 are shown in Appendix B. 
The parameter representing the opportunity cost of public funds in the U.S., 
pus , is drawn from the public finance literature. Ballard et al. (1985) showed 
that an additional dollar to the U.S. government (to be used to finance export 
subsidies, for example) causes a deadweight loss in the range of 17 to 56 cents, 
with the exact value depending on the labor supply and saving elasticities. In 
most of our simulations we use what they suggested to be a reasonable mean 
estimate of the opportunity cost of public funds in the U.S. economy, that is 
us = 1.332. This says that additional welfare cost of public funds is 33.2 
percent. 
1  This modification was already discussed in detail in Chapter V and therefore will not be 
repeated here. 
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Corresponding studies for the EU on marginal welfare costs of taxation do 
not exist. However, Ballard et al. mention that the opportunity cost of public 
funds is likely to be higher in countries where tax levels are higher. Since tax 
rates are in general higher in EU countries than they are in the U.S., we should 
expect jl EU to be at least as large as pus . Without better knowledge of the EU 
side, we assume in the base case that fius = it EU 
Finally, the value of discount factor parameter 8 used by both exporting 
firms and governments is 0.99, implying an annual interest rate of about 12.8 
percent.2 
6.2. Solution Technique 
In our finite period dynamic model of international wheat trade, governments of 
exporting countries in each period set export subsidies to maximize their dis-
counted future welfare given the history of the game and expected behavior of 
the firms and the importing country in the future. Then in each period the 
exporting firms set their prices to maximize discounted future profits given 
government subsidies and the history of the game. Because of switching costs, 
the importing country's behavior depends on history, in particular on previous 
purchases of the good from a specific country. Therefore, governments' and 
firms' decisions in one period also have (predictable) effects into the future. 
Since in each period the optimal actions of governments' and firms' (play-
ers) are affected by all future optimal actions, we need to know what those 
future actions will be. The reason for examining a finite period model is that we 
need to have a terminal period in which we can determine the optimal final 
actions of players as linear functions of state. Note that when the finite number 
of periods modeled is large, the effect of excluded future periods becomes 
minuscule through discounting. By backward induction we then determine the 
optimal actions of players as functions of state for all remaining future periods. 
In Chapter IV the algebra of the multiperiod model representing this decision 
process is explained. Equations (4.51)-(4.55) give us the equilibrium export 
subsidies (taxes if negative), prices, export volumes, governments' welfares, 
and firms' profits as functions of state for every time period t. 
In order to compute the Markov perfect equilibrium of the empirical model 
we first need to solve for the values of the parameters for equations (4.47), 
(4.48), and (4.51)-(4.55) in each period given the current state. To do this, we 
start in the final period T. In the final period values of the parameters can be 
stated as functions of estimated parameters of the import demand functions, of 
marginal costs, and of the opportunity cost of public funds, all of which are 
assumed known. Knowing values of the parameters in equations (4.47), (4.48), 
2  The following simulation results are largely insensitive to different values of the discount rate. 
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and (4.51)-(4.55), when t = T, we move to the period T-1. In a manner similar to 
the final period, we can write values of period T-1 parameters as functions of 
parameters of the import demand functions, of marginal costs, of opportunity 
cost of public funds, of discount factor, and of now known final (T) period 
parameters. This procedure can he repeated for ali the remaining T-2 (earlier) 
periods to determine the values of parameters Atin , B;" , 13," , 	, G7, 	, 
and K"," (j = 1,2,3, m = 1,2,3,4, and n = 1,2,3,4,5) in each period. Now equa-
tions (4.51)-(4.55) are determined as function of current state only. 
After we have determined players' optimal actions as functions of state for 
ali the time periods, we can calculate the equilibrium solutions of our model by 
solving forward one period at a time. Note that as we solved for players' optimal 
actions as functions of state, the states for periods 2 to T were unknown. How-
ever, in the first period governments' (initial) state, that is export volumes at 
period 0, are given by data. Therefore, starting from the first period, the equilib-
rium values for export subsidies, prices, export volumes, firms' profits, and 
governments' welfares can he easily determined because they are functions of 
already determined parameters and the initial state. Then we can move forward 
to period 2 and solve for the equilibrium because we now have required infor-
mation on the values of different parameters and on the current state (i.e., on the 
previous period export volumes). This same procedure is then repeated one 
period at a time for ali of the remaining time periods to achieve the Markov 
perfect equilibrium of this dynamic international wheat trade model. The code 
that implements the above procedure can he found in Appendix C. 
6.3. Base Solution 
This section analyzes base solutions of the empirical model. Since switching 
costs imply the decision making process is dynamic in nature, the section first 
examines the dynamics of the model (that is, how players' actions change 
during the studied time horizon). After that the model' s base solutions are 
compared with actual data. 
In order to better see the dynamics of the model, marginal costs of each 
exporting firm are held constant through time. The fixed marginal costs are 
$130 per ton for the U.S. wheat exporting firm and $190 per ton for the EU 
wheat exporting firm. The initial period export volumes are taken from histori-
cal data. Initial U.S. wheat exports are 89,000 tons and initial EU wheat exports 
are 87,000 tons. 
The results for time horizon of 21 time periods are shown in Table 6.1. In the 
middle periods, the model converges to its steady state. At the begirming,and at 
the end of the time horizon, familiar effects from the two-period model of 
switching costs arise. At the beginning, the EU side, with more than its steady-
state share of the Moroccan wheat market, subsidizes its exports less and sells at 
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Table 6.1. Base Solution of the Empirical Model When Marginal Costs are Held 
Constant Over Time. 
time 
U.S. Exports EU Exports 
metric tons 	metric tons 
U.S. Price 
$/ton 
EU Price 
$/ton 
U.S. Subsidy EU Subsidy 
$/ton 	$/ton 
1 130223.5 84316.3 156.45 185.17 39.33 77.05 
2 120838.0 82423.2 143.85 181.15 45.16 78.90 
3 134951.3 82419.1 162.76 181.43 36.41 78.78 
4 136947.0 81734.3 165.42 180.09 35.18 79.41 
5 137253.9 81588.9 165.83 179.80 34.99 79.54 
6 137302.5 81563.6 165.89 179.75 34.96 79.57 
7 137310.3 81559.5 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
8 137311.6 81558.8 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
9 137311.8 81558.7 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
10 137311.8 81558.7 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
11 137311.8 81558.7 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
12 137311.8 81558.7 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
13 137311.8 81558.7 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
14 137311.6 81558.8 165.90 179.74 34.95 79.57 
15 137310.8 81559.3 165.91 179.74 34.95 79.57 
16 137307.2 81561.6 165.91 179.74 34.95 79.57 
17 137290.1 81571.1 165.92 179.74 34.95 79.57 
18 137204.8 81611.0 166.00 179.78 34.91 79.55 
19 136753.4 81761.1 166.50 180.10 34.69 79.39 
20 134173.4 82130.8 170.14 183.15 33.28 78.20 
21 118084.8 79902.6 199.80 213.25 19.16 64.91 
higher price to exploit its current market share. Thus, the EU is losing market 
share, but it sells more than its steady-state exports until converging to steady 
state. In contrast, the U.S. exporting firm and government first behave more 
aggressively in order to gain more market share that can be exploited later on. 
The U.S. government awards higher export subsidies than the steady-state sub-
sidy level and the U.S. exporting firm charges a lower price than in the steady 
state until converging to steady state. 
During last periods of the dynamic game the "second-period effect" of the 
two-period model can he recognized. The exporting countries become relatively 
more interested in exploiting their current market share and less interested in 
increasing their market share. Therefore, both exporting countries monotonically 
decrease their export subsidies while exporting firms increase their prices. 
The steady state describes the most common situation occurring in the real 
world. In every steady-state period the government and the exporting firm of 
each exporting country must balance between two incentives. The first incentive 
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is for the government to subsidize a small amount and for the firm to charge a 
high price in order to exploit their current market share. This is balanced against 
the incentive to award a high export subsidy and set a low current price in order 
to build up current market share and so increase the government' s future wel-
fare and the firm's future profits. Later in this chapter we analyze more impacts 
of switching costs on the model' s solutions. 
The second purpose of this section is to compare the model's results with 
actual data. To do this observed marginal costs that vary from month to month 
are used, instead of flxed marginal costs that were used when the dynamics of 
the model was studied. The presented base solution of the model is for the 
period July 1992 through June 1993, reflecting the situation before CAP reform 
and the Uruguay Round GATT agreement.3 Alternative base scenarios are also 
discussed. Table 6.2 shows average monthly results of the base solution for 
export volumes, prices, and export subsidies together with corresponding aver-
ages of actual data. Comparisons to alternative scenarios are also presented in 
this table. 
In general, the model' s base solution is reasonably consistent with actual 
data. On average the United States has been a larger wheat exporter to Morocco 
than the European Union. The price of exported U.S. wheat has been somewhat 
lower than the price of EU wheat. One reason for differing prices is that EU 
Table 6.2. Comparison of Actual Values Versus Model Solutions for Average 
Monthly Export Volumes, Prices, and Export Subsidies During Time Period 
July 1992 through June 1993. 
U.S. Exports 
	 EU 	U.S. 	EU 	U.S. 	EU 	U.S. 
	
Exports Exports price 	price subsidy subsidy 
1000 tons 1000 tons US$/ton US$/ton US$/ton US$/ton 
Actual 	 141 	79 	126 	146 	31 	108 
Base Solution 	 139 	79 	169 	184 	39 	111 
Perfectly* Competitive 
Firms 	 182 	81 	107 	113 	29 	116 
Ex Post** 101 	66 	238 	270 	476 	562 
* This is an altemative scenario in which exporting firms have no market power. They are 
perfectly competitive, setting their prices equal to their marginal costs. 
**This is an altemative scenario in which timing in decisions have reverse order. Exporting firms 
set their prices before governments make their decisions on how much to subsidize those 
exports. 
3  CAP reform was agreed upon in 1992, but the reform measures did not become effective before 
July 1, 1993, the start of the marketing year 1993/94 (Toepfer 1995). 
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wheat and U.S. wheat are differentiated products. Positive export subsidies are 
used by both exporting countries' governments. Furthermore, considerably higher 
export subsidies have been used to export EU wheat than U.S. wheat, since on 
average internal wheat support prices in the EU have been higher than in the 
U.S . 
The model's predictions of export volumes are quite good. The predicted 
level of average EU export volume to Morocco fits almost exactly to the 
observed value with error of only 0.06 percent (51 tons). The prediction error 
for average U.S. wheat exports is larger, but still very small. The model predicts 
average U.S. exports as 139 thousand tons, when it is actually 141 thousand tons 
(underestimated by 2 percent). Average export subsidies predicted by the model 
overestimate observed average export subsidies. In the case of U.S. the actual 
average export subsidy is approximately $31 per ton. However, the model 
predicts a higher $39 per ton subsidy. Similarly, the model overestimates the 
average export subsidy on EU wheat. The error in this case is 3 percent ($3 per 
ton).4 
The empirical model does not perform as well at predicting prices paid by 
Morocco. The model' s prediction of the average price paid by Morocco on U.S. 
wheat is 34 percent ($43 per ton) higher than the observed average price, and 
the price of the EU wheat is overestimated by 26 percent ($38 per ton). How-
ever, this result is not surprising and can be explained by the assumption that the 
model makes on firm level competition. The model assumes that one exporting 
firm exports wheat from each exporting country. That is, a duopoly structure is 
assumed at the firm stage of each period. In reality, it is more than one firm that 
exports EU wheat as well as U.S. wheat. Therefore, the base solution exagger-
ates the level of market power that exporting firms have, implying higher prices 
and somewhat smaller (or about the same) export volumes than what we ob-
serve in actual data. 
This issue of firm level market power can be further examined with the case 
where firms are perfectly competitive (price takers) and set their prices equal to 
their marginal cost. Table 6.2 shows average monthly results of this scenario for 
export volumes, prices, and export subsidies. 
In the absence of firm level monopoly power prices paid by Morocco are 
much lower than in the base solution and trade volumes have increased. What is 
more interesting is that prices are also lower than the observed prices, and 
4  Naturally, the base solution is unable to fully capture observed behavior. It is important to keep 
in mind that this is not a calibration model. Therefore, the base solution should not be confused 
with the so called benchmarking in which a model is calibrated such that it reproduces exactly 
the actual data. Our model uses econometrically estimated parameter values, resulting in values 
of endogenous variables that are reasonably close, but should not be expected to exactly match 
observed values of those variables. 
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export volumes are larger than actual exports of EU and U.S. wheat. Therefore, 
these results suggest that international wheat exporting firms are not just price 
takers in the Moroccan wheat market. On the other hand, the level of market 
power that they exercise is not as high as in the duopoly structure of the base 
solution. However, an introduction of several exporting firms would substan-
tially complicate the model structure, and could make it intractable. Therefore, 
the duopoly assumption is retained even though it exaggerates the degree of 
firm market power. 
Another matter that has impact on the firm level market power is timing in 
decisions. In our analysis so far, governments are assumed to move before firms 
in each period. However, the wheat export subsidy program in the U.S. and in 
the EU that allows firms to bid for export subsidies seems to suggest the reverse 
order. Exporting firms negotiate a price in the importing country first and then 
request a subsidy from the government. In this sense, the subsidy is given ex 
post. Since in this so called ex post game, firms are the first-movers (Stackelberg 
leaders in each period), they have even more market power than in the game 
where governments are the first-movers. With the duopoly assumption the re-
sults of this model are even further away from real world observations. The last 
row of Table 6.2 presents the results of the ex post game. 
It is clear that the ex post model greatly exaggerates the level of market 
power that exporting firms have. The model suggests prices that are almost 
twice as high as the actual prices. Exports volumes are obviously lower than 
what is observed, and the levels of export subsidies that they extract from the 
governments are empirically unacceptable. Since the empirical model with ex 
ante (governments moving first) structure of the game performs much better 
(because it captures better the degree of monopoly power that exporting firms 
have in the Moroccan wheat market), we use it in our analyses instead of the ex 
post game. It is also important to notice that if the firms behave perfectly 
competitively, then the order of decisions becomes irrelevant since firms always 
set their prices equal to their marginal costs. In the latter part of this chapter we 
further analyze effects of alternative firm level behavior on the model' s solu-
tions. 
6.3.1. Difficulties in Predicting Long Time Horizon Behavior 
The model's results over a longer time horizon are studied next. Month-to-
month results for the time period August 1992 through May 1996 are shown in 
Table 6.3. Effects of the MacSharry CAP reform on the base solution can he 
seen. During the first year after CAP reform (crop year 1993/94) EU support 
prices were cut almost by 20 percent. This reduction in support prices meant 
that lower per unit export subsidies for EU wheat exports were needed. The 
drop in the EU export subsidy level since July 1993 can be seen in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Base Solution of the Empirical Model: August 1992 to May 1996. 
month 
U.S. Exports 
metric tons 
EU Exports 
metric tons 
U.S. Price 
$/ton 
EU Price U.S. Subsidy EU Subsidy 
$/ton 	$/ton 	$/ton 
Aug-92 131113.6 82210.1 158.15 189.03 41.45 99.50 
Sep-92 121531.5 79774.9 146.71 186.65 51.67 109.75 
Oct-92 135810.3 79286.3 166.32 187.18 44.50 114.20 
Nov-92 137989.5 78867.3 168.32 184.77 40.00 109.09 
Dec-92 138022.5 78283.1 169.93 186.05 44.39 116.93 
Jan-93 137832.2 78144.2 170.47 186.53 46.78 119.39 
Feb-93 137714.0 78169.7 170.57 186.61 48.86 119.15 
Mar-93 138541.3 77983.1 169.41 185.82 42.83 116.82 
Apr-93 139538.8 77086.9 169.38 186.47 39.02 124.67 
May-93 140303.9 76692.7 169.04 186.05 34.29 128.06 
Jun-93 140317.4 77841.5 167.54 183.08 25.49 118.91 
Jul-93 137460.9 83443.7 163.85 173.87 27.17 52.17 
Aug-93 136732.8 84118.2 163.04 174.78 28.04 49.25 
Sep-93 136569.9 83511.2 163.98 176.71 31.15 58.91 
Oct-93 136217.9 83171.9 165.04 177.93 34.70 65.24 
Nov-93 135317.2 83360.5 166.15 178.74 41.66 65.99 
Dec-93 134791.2 83155.2 167.03 180.10 48.24 69.26 
Jan-94 135717.5 81560.1 167.70 182.58 47.28 87.52 
Feb-94 136739.1 81162.0 166.91 181.59 40.95 86.69 
Mar-94 137428.4 80687.3 166.83 181.61 37.80 89.83 
Apr-94 137731.3 80491.4 166.86 181.51 37.15 89.96 
May-94 138224.8 79806.6 167.18 182.40 35.64 97.68 
Jun-94 138187.3 79849.4 167.35 182.17 35.61 99.66 
Jul-94 137697.4 81937.0 164.99 177.77 29.20 72.11 
Aug-94 136562.4 82377.0 166.06 178.95 36.35 71.95 
Sep-94 135474.1 81968.1 168.12 181.74 46.66 82.64 
Oct-94 134666.2 81534.6 169.76 183.93 55.58 92.25 
Nov-94 134705.3 81474.7 169.50 183.91 54.75 92.53 
Dec-94 134800.1 81430.8 169.42 183.86 54.46 92.35 
Jan-95 135084.1 81133.0 169.43 184.15 51.92 98.11 
Feb-95 134282.9 83091.0 167.90 180.44 51.16 72.42 
Mar-95 134244.5 82698.2 168.28 181.99 52.93 79.05 
Apr-95 134537.9 82142.6 168.62 182.82 52.13 84.09 
May-95 134286.0 81100.5 170.73 185.63 57.53 102.43 
Jun-95 132799.8 82750.2 170.64 183.54 61.19 87.36 
Jul-95 130564.2 84836.2 170.72 182.21 70.71 69.80 
Aug-95 129490.9 85751.5 170.35 182.13 73.71 62.90 
Sep-95 128744.6 85664.8 171.36 183.72 79.47 67.88 
Oct-95 128119.4 85367.6 172.61 185.39 85.98 74.60 
Nov-95 127934.1 85079.7 173.14 186.30 87.97 79.68 
Dec-95 127585.8 85269.9 173.37 186.29 90.72 78.10 
Jan-96 127828.8 85133.6 173.04 186.31 87.90 79.69 
Feb-96 127384.0 85530.2 173.28 185.96 89.71 76.13 
Mar-96 126683.2 85772.0 173.94 186.54 89.71 76.18 
Apr-96 123114.5 86257.0 178.98 190.83 98.14 76.83 
May-96 107490.1 83406.4 208.45 221.79 97.51 65.32 
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The problems with the model's predictions arise during the last two years of 
the horizon. This is best seen from export subsidy levels that the model predicts. 
Very high subsidy levels are predicted for both EU and U.S. wheat exports. 
However, this is far from the actual, quite extraordinary situation in the world 
wheat market that occurred during the crop years 1994/95 and 1995/96. Domes-
tic consumption of wheat in the EU and the U.S. was growing faster than 
domestic production of wheat. Wheat stocks were decreasing fast, especially in 
the EU.5 Therefore, the EU's (and U.S. 's) needs to export wheat surpluses were 
much smaller than before. Furthermore, some other major wheat exporting 
countries were experiencing below-normal harvests. Meanwhile, overall de-
mand for grains continued to increase, reflecting robust economic growth in 
many countries, especially in Asia. The reduced supply and the strengthened 
demand in the international wheat market sharply increased the world market 
price of wheat. In fact, the world price of wheat increased so much that in 1995/ 
96 the United States did not award any EEP bonuses for wheat exports. The EU 
even ended up taxing its wheat exports in the process of stabilizing domestic 
support prices. 
One of the reasons why the empirical model was not able to capture this 
actual development in the market is because domestic wheat production, stocks 
and consumption of exporting countries are not explicitly included in our model. 
This means that, for example, effects of CAP reform on EU's domestic wheat 
production and consumption (and therefore, on exports) are not taken into 
consideration. 
Another reason is the objective function chosen in this study. The objective 
function of each government is assumed to be total discounted future export 
revenues less the cost of subsidizing those exports. The objective functions are 
assumed to have this same structure in each time period. Opportunity costs of 
public funds are assumed fixed over time. However, in reality values in the 
governments' objective function are changing over time. Lobbying power of 
different special interest groups may not stay the same. Farmers' ability as a 
special interest group to provide pressure on countries' trade policy decisions 
has been decreasing over time, more so in the U.S. than in the EU. 
The enormous budgetary costs of CAP have been a major problem for the 
EU. In later years, pressures on the EU budget and hence on the CAP have 
further increased because the EU member states are required to reduce their 
public expenditure in order to satisfy the Maastricht criteria for European Mon-
etary Union. In fact, in July 1996, EU flnance ministers decided on a "zero-
growth" EU budget in 1997, which meant leaving EAGGF budget approxi-
mately unchanged as compared with 1996 (Tracy 1996). Although this limit 
5 In 1992/93 the wheat stock level in the EU was 24.1 million tons, but in 1995/96 the level had 
dropped to only 10.6 million tons (USDA). 
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could prove difficult to respect, it seems that the marginal costs of public funds 
in the EU have increased over time, but how much is difficult to say. 
Similarly in the U.S., budgetary issues regarding the level and variability of 
Federal expenditures for farm programs were central to 1996 farm legislation 
discussions. Increased concern over the Federal budget deficit strengthened 
pressure for agricultural policy reforms (Young and Westcott 1996), indicating 
changes in the government's objectives. These changes in the governments' 
objective functions are not captured by our empirical model, and so limit the 
model' s ability to describe long term actual behaviors when such changes are 
taking place in the market. 
This section has described the dynamic behavior in the empirical model. A 
comparison of the base solution and actual values of the endogenous variables 
has also been made. Given the model's errors in prediction, it is useful next to 
explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in key parameter values. Finally, 
even though the ultimate judgment of the validity of the model is subjective, the 
author believes that the model's performance is sufficient (when its limitations 
are understood) to he used for export policy analysis and for studying different 
strategic behaviors in international wheat trade. The remainder of this chapter 
concentrates on doing that. 
6.4. Analysis of Changes in the Economie Environment 
Models were solved for several different time horizons, with the number of 
periods varying from two to 84. The results in the following tables are for a time 
horizon of 21 periods. For each scenario, however, only the minimum number 
of time periods needed to illustrate effects of economic environment changes 
are shown. In the first table, in which effects of switching costs are analyzed, 
three values for each variable in each scenario are presented. This is done to 
highlight switching costs' dynamic effects at the beginning and at end of the 
analyzed time range. The first values describe players behavior at the beginning 
of the dynamic game. During the intermediate time periods the model reaches a 
steady state. This is what the second value describes.6 Finally, the final period 
values show players behaviors at the end of the dynamic game. Thereafter, only 
the steady-state values are generally presented for each scenario. 
In addition, to better see the effects in each scenario, exporting firm's mar-
ginal costs, that are constant through time periods, are used again instead of 
actual marginal costs that vary between time periods. The fixed marginal costs 
6 For welfare and profits variables, steady state values are replaced by middle period values. 
These values describe the total discounted future welfare of an exporting country and the total 
discounted future profits of an exporting firm at the middle period (period 11). 
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are $130 per ton for U.S. wheat exporting firm and $190 per ton for EU wheat 
exporting firm. As before, initial period exports are taken from historical data. 
6.4.1. Analysis of Changes in the Key Parameter Values 
6.4.1.1. Switching Costs 
The first scenarios explore the consequences of switching costs. To perform this 
analysis, three different values of switching cost parameters are used: estimated 
values, no switching costs, and larger switching costs.7 Econometrically esti-
mated values of Chapter V were used in our base solution. A comparison 
between these different scenarios for the United States and for the European 
Union is shown in Table 6.4. 
The dynamic model with switching costs converges to the steady state in the 
middle periods. The time that it takes for the model to converge to the steady 
state depends on how large switching costs are. If no switching costs are a 
present, then the steady state is reached immediately. With econometrically 
estimated parameter values of marginal switching costs it took 11 months to 
converge to the steady state. Under a large switching cost scenario, 20 months 
were required before the steady state was reached. 
When switching costs are present the United States competes more aggres-
sively in the early periods of the game than in the steady state to gain market 
share in the Moroccan wheat market. The aggressive behavior of the U.S. 
exporting firm is shown by the lower price that it charges in the early periods. 
The aggressive behavior of the U.S. government is shown by the larger per unit 
export subsidy. At the final stages of the studied time horizon the United States 
then exploits its current market share. The exporting firm charges a higher price 
than in the steady state, which implies that a smaller export subsidy by the 
government is needed. 
Larger switching costs make these effects even stronger, as can be seen from 
the last column of Table 6.4. At the beginning the exporting firm competes even 
more fiercely in prices and the government implements larger subsidies. At the 
end the market share is tightly locked-in to the U.S., allowing the U.S. govern-
ment to set an export tax and the exporting firm to charge a very high price.8 
Although behaviors of the players at the beginning and at the end of the time 
range are important theoretical issues, the steady state is the most empirically 
relevant solution to study. In each steady-state time period the U.S. faces a 
7 The larger switching cost values for each wheat equal two times the econometrically estimated 
values. 
8 Note that in reality the final period never really occurs. 
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Table 6.4. Impact of Switching Costs on the United States and the European 
Union. 
Base solution No switching 
costs 
Large switching 
costs 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
first period 156.45 177.86 86.79 
steady state 165.90 177.86 150.65 
final period 199.80 177.86 253.50 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
first period 130.22 102.61 202.46 
steady state 137.31 102.61 267.27 
final period 118.08 102.61 155.97 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
first period 39.33 29.44 72.12 
steady state 34.95 29.44 44.40 
final period 19.16 29.44 -6.00 
U.S. welfare (million dollars) 
401.64 328.15 653.03 first period 
middle period 223.39 180.50 382.48 
final period 22.84 17.25 39.85 
U.S. firm's profits (million dollars) 
first period 184.48 150.91 312.43 
middle period 102.65 83.01 183.37 
final period 10.50 7.93 18.33 
EU price ($/ton) 
first period 185.17 214.11 132.42 
steady state 179.74 214.11 85.07 
final period 213.25 214.11 192.55 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
first period 84.32 80.32 70.49 
steady state 81.56 80.32 39.64 
final period 79.90 80.32 69.93 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
first period 77.05 64.51 104.03 
steady state 79.57 64.51 124.93 
final period 64.91 64.51 74.61 
EU welfare (million dollars) 
first period 241.80 294.48 54.21 
middle period 133.86 161.98 32.75 
final period 15.32 15.48 11.73 
EU firm's profits (million dollars) 
first period 109.43 135.43 25.02 
middle period 60.64 74.49 15.01 
final period 7.04 7.12 5.40 
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tradeoff situation in which it can either exploit its current market share with 
higher price and lower export subsidy or compete for larger market share with a 
lower price and higher subsidy. Thus, it describes the most common real world 
market situation under which players are making their decisions on prices and 
export subsidies. The different scenarios of the dynamic model are, therefore, 
most conveniently compared using steady-state values. 
Following Klemperer (1995), two main effects of switching costs on prices 
can be stated. First, to some degree an importing country has been locked-in to 
exporting countries. Therefore, if exporting firms cared only about their current 
profits, they would exploit their current market share by charging a higher price 
than in the absence of switching costs. On the other hand, exporting countries 
recognize that a lower price today increases future profits by increasing market 
share. Beggs and Klemperer (1992), by using a theoretical multi-period switch-
ing cost model, state that we should expect firms' incentives to exploit current 
market share to dominate their incentives to increase market share that would be 
exploited later, leading to higher prices in markets with switching costs than in 
markets without switching costs. They state effects that speak in favor of their 
claim. First, discounting (ö < /) reduces the importance of the desire to attract 
more market share relative to the desire to exploit current market share. Second, 
if one exporting firm increases its price today, its rival will gain market share 
today and so, may raise price tomorrow. Thus, each exporting firm has an 
incentive to price high today, to make its rival less aggressive tomorrow. Third, 
in their model buyers recognize that a lower price today is an indication of a 
higher price tomorrow, because a firm that sets a lower price today will obtain a 
larger market share and will generally set a higher price tomorrow. Therefore, 
buyers will be less attracted by a current low price than if there were no 
switching costs in the market. In international trade, if prices are expected to be 
higher, then we usually would expect export subsidies to be lower than in the 
absence of switching costs. 
These claims can be tested by comparing the no switching cost scenario to 
the base solution. In contrast to presumption of Beggs and Klemperer, the U.S. 
wheat price paid by Morocco decreases from $177.86 per ton to $165.90 per ton 
when switching costs are introduced. The export subsidy set by the U.S. govern-
ment rises from $29.44 per ton to $34.95 per ton. This higher export subsidy 
lowers the price of U.S. wheat, and makes U.S. wheat more attractive to Mo-
rocco. Therefore, U.S. exports increase from 102.61 thousand tons to 137.31 
thousand tons. 
Incentives to increase market share that would be exploited later dominate in 
this model. The results are not sensitive to the level of discounting. A discount 
rate as large as 0.65 (equals to annual interest rate of 176 percent) still results in 
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lower steady-state prices than in the absence of switching costs.9 In contrast to 
Beggs and Klemperer, this model assumes that an importing country makes its 
purchase decisions for the current period without regard to the future (i.e., the 
importing country is myopic). In addition, while Beggs and Klemperer proposi-
tion is for the case of symmetric marginal costs, we allow asymmetric marginal 
costs .1° 
The total discounted future welfare of the U.S. is higher when switching 
costs are taken into account, and the U.S. exporting firm' s profits are higher, as 
well. This is because the estimated value of marginal switching cost parameter 
for U.S. wheat (rius ) is larger than the estimated value of marginal switching 
cost parameter for EU wheat (riEu), meaning that the U.S. is able to lock in 
Morocco more tightly to itself than the EU is able to do. In addition, the U.S., as 
the low cost producer of wheat, is able to consistently hold a larger market share 
in Moroccan wheat imports than the EU. This further enhances the difficulty to 
switch away fi-om U.S. wheat to EU wheat. 
From the trade policy perspective it is clear that when analyzing a market in 
which switching costs are present, the ignorance of switching costs can lead to 
considerable errors. Per period export subsidy expenditures for the U.S. in the 
base solution are 4.8 million dollars. Without switching costs expenditures are 
only 3.02 million dollars, that is 37 percent too small. For example, the United 
States introduced the EEP program in 1985 to gain market share in the world 
wheat market. If the USDA did not take into account switching costs in its 
calculations, our results suggest that in the market like the Moroccan wheat 
market costs from the EEP bonuses for the budget of the U.S. government 
would be clearly underestimated. 
Impacts of switching costs on the European Union are also shown in Table 
6.4. Again, the presumption of Beggs and Klemperer is rejected. If the switch- 
ing costs are not taken into consideration, the EU price is 19 percent higher than 
in the base solution and the export subsidy is 19 percent lower. Therefore, with 
switching costs the EU (as well as the U.S.) compete harder on the Moroccan 
wheat market, resulting in lower prices for Morocco. This again leads to in-
creased export volumes by the EU. 
However, the small increase in EU exports (1.5 percent) under the base 
solution is not able to compensate for the effects of lower price and higher 
subsidy. Therefore, with switching costs EU's welfare is decreased by 18 per-
cent. Similarly, profits of the EU exporting firm are decreased by 19 percent. 
9  In the scenario with no discounting (5 = /) changes in the results were very small. 
10 In our model switching costs are also allowed to differ between two wheats. Asymmetry in 
switching costs makes it possible to examine situations in which one exporting country is able 
to lock in a buyer more tightly to itself than the other exporting country is able to do. 
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One reason for the EU side being worse off in the base solution is because of 
asymmetry in switching costs. Econometric estimations suggested that it is more 
difficult to switch away from U.S. wheat than from EU wheat. 
In the scenario with large switching costs the estimated marginal switching 
cost parameters are doubled. Since this estimated parameter value for the U.S. 
was larger than for the EU to begin with, after doubling them the difference is 
even larger. Therefore, this scenario describes the fact that if the costs of 
switching to EU wheat are increased by more than costs of switching to U.S. 
wheat, then even though the EU is subsidizing its exports more than in the base 
solution and the EU exporting firm is charging lower price than in the base 
solution, EU is only able to export much smaller quantities to Morocco. The 
negative impacts on welfare and exporting firm profits are naturally larger than 
before. 
Since the exporting country and the exporting firm clearly benefit from the 
increased costs of switching to rival's wheat, then an important question to ask 
is how switching costs arise. Because of these benefits, exporting countries 
certainly have incentives to exercise trade policies that would help to create 
switching costs. While some kinds of switching costs, e.g. transaction costs, 
may be unavoidable, other kinds of switching costs can be seen as the result of 
deliberate exporting country actions. Exporting countries' guaranteed credit 
programs may be seen as one way to create switching costs. If switching costs 
created by, for example, a GMS-103 loan increase future welfare to the U.S. 
more than any current costs to the U.S. of creating them, then such a loan should 
be guaranteed to Morocco. 
Finally, market shares are commonly used measures of export performance 
(Gehlhar and Vollrath 1997). Our model of Moroccan wheat import market 
where switching costs seem to exist can provide some insight for this impor-
tance attached to market shares by exporting countries. If an exporting country 
is able to increase its market share, this creates additional costs for the import-
ing country (Morocco) to switch away from that exporting country's wheat in 
the future. Each exporting country and each exporting firm realize this. There-
fore, their behaviors are not just driven by maximization of current period 
welfare (exporting country) and profits (exporting firm), but also by the interest 
to increase current market share which would improve future welfare of that 
exporting country and future profits of the exporting firm. Hence, the notion of 
switching costs in the market provides an intuitive explanation why exporting 
countries and firms are often concerned with market share in addition to short 
run welfare and profits, respectively. 
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6.4.1.2. Opportunity Costs of Public Funds 
Taxes introduce distortions in the allocation of resources. Increasing attention 
has been given to the significance of the welfare cost of taxation in the analysis 
of public expenditure programs. If the financing of expenditure programs in-
volves a welfare cost, then this cost should be considered part of the opportunity 
cost of expenditure programs. Put briefly, when the EU spends $100 on export 
refunds, the opportunity cost is $100 plus the additional welfare loss involved in 
acquiring the funds. Thus, the export refunds are efficient only if their benefits 
exceed the direct tax costs by an amount at least as large as the additional 
welfare cost of the funds. 
In the literature on public finance estimates for the additional welfare cost of 
public funds range from 17 percent to 56 percent of additional tax revenue 
raised. In the base solution the value that we used for opportunity (or marginal) 
cost of public funds is 1.332 (i.e., the additional welfare cost is 33.2 percent), 
and it is the same for both exporting countries. 
In our analysis we now compare the base solution to two other scenarios. 
One alternative scenario ignores the additional welfare cost of public funds and 
the other one assumes that they are very large, that is 56 percent (i.e., the upper 
bound in empirical estimations for the U.S. economy). 
The simulation results for two alternative scenarios are compared to base 
values in Table 6.5. If opportunity cost of a dollar of government spending is 
only one dollar, then the per unit export subsidy paid by the U.S. government is 
almost three-times as large as in the base solution. Because of the large export 
subsidy the U.S. exporting firm ends up exporting 21 percent more wheat with a 
price that is 36 percent lower than in the base solution. The exporting firm's 
total discounted future profits are greatly improved. The lower selling price is 
more than offset by the increased exports and a larger export subsidy. 
The U.S. government (as well as the EU government) is more willing to use 
large export subsidies as a policy tool when no marginal excess burden of public 
funds exists. Therefore, the two superpowers engage themselves in an even 
more severe subsidy war when fighting over market shares. This much larger 
use of subsidies decreases the total discounted future welfare of each exporting 
country, regardless of which value of opportunity cost of public funds is used to 
compare welfares. 
The EU government awards export refunds that are over 50 percent higher 
than the price paid by Morocco on that subsidized wheat. The heavy subsidy 
allows the EU exporting firm to charge a lower price than its U.S. counterpart, 
but this surprisingly increases EU exports less than U.S. exports (only by 17 
percent). The reasons are that switching costs favor the U.S. more than the EU 
and that the own-price elasticity for U.S. wheat is larger than the own-price 
elasticity for EU wheat. However, the total discounted future profits of the EU 
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Table 6.5. Impacts of Changes in Opportunity Costs of Public Funds on the 
European Union and the United States. 
Base 
Solution 
No additional 
welfare cost of 
public funds 
High additional 
welfare cost of 
public funds 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 165.90 106.59 188.82 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 137.31 165.58 126.83 
U.S. expon subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 34.95 99.80 8.89 
U.S. welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 401.64 334.76 442.07 
U.S. firm's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 184.48 240.04 162.84 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 179.74 105.41 208.64 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 81.56 95.72 75.70 
EU expon subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 79.57 158.94 47.43 
EU welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 241.80 196.96 265.99 
EU finn's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 109.43 139.17 96.59 
exporting firm are still increased through larger export refunds. In the case of 
high marginal cost of public funds both exporting countries award export subsi-
dies more conservatively than in the base solution. This implies that higher 
prices are charged by exporting firms and export volumes are smaller. Since 
attractiveness of export subsidies as a policy tool is diminished, exporting 
countries do not get involved in as tough a subsidy war game. Therefore, total 
discounted welfares of these countries increase. However, exporting firms are 
worse off, since effects of reduced exports and export subsidies on firms profits 
are greater than effects of increased prices. 
6.4.1.3. Marginal Costs 
Two basic elements that establish the wheat exporting firms' marginal costs are 
domestic producer price of wheat and transportation costs. The MacSharry CAP 
reform reduced intemal support prices in the EU by 30 percent. This section 
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analyzes the impacts of this EU internal price reduction on wheat trade to 
Morocco by lowering the marginal cost of the EU exporting firm by 30 percent. 
Another issue analyzed here is a zero marginal cost assumption. To (1994), 
who was the first to introduce switching costs into the international trade frame-
work, in his theoretical two-period model assumed that marginal costs for each 
exporting firm are zero. By comparing the scenario with zero marginal costs to 
the base solution, we show how this empirically unrealistic assumption changes 
the results in our model. 
Table 6.6 shows the adjustments in wheat trade to Morocco following the 
reduction in EU support prices. As a result of this reduction, a major decrease 
occurs in the level of export subsidy that the EU government sets. To cut back in 
export subsidy expenditures the EU awards a per unit subsidy which is 59 
percent smaller than the subsidy awarded before the reform. 
It is usually expected that if domestic prices are decreased, then export 
subsidies would be lower and export prices higher than before. However, this is 
Table 6.6. Impacts of Changes in Marginal Costs of Exporting Firms on the 
European Union and the United States. 
Base 
Solution 
CAP reform; 
marginal cost 
of EU firm 
reduced by 30 % 
Zero 
marginal 
costs 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 179.74 173.68 147.29 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 81.56 86.58 90.74 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 79.57 32.9 -70.17 
EU welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 241.80 271.90 298.89 
EU firm's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 109.43 123.05 135.27 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 165.90 162.69 141.26 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 137.31 134.00 145.29 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 34.95 36.46 -66.29 
U.S. welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 401.64 382.86 449.65 
U.S. firm's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 184.48 175.86 206.54 
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only partially true here. Although the EU government greatly decreases its 
subsidy level, it still provides a subsidy that keeps EU wheat competitive 
against U.S. wheat in the Moroccan market. In fact, the combination of export 
subsidy (even though lower than before) and lower marginal cost makes it 
possible for the EU exporting firm to charge a three percent lower price than 
before the reform. The lower price then allows the EU to capture some of the 
market share from the U.S. Therefore, the European Union as well as its export-
ing firm benefit more from wheat trade to Morocco after the reform than before 
it. Total discounted welfare of the EU and total discounted profits of the EU 
firm from wheat exports to Morocco are both increased by 12 percent in this 
scenario. 
The impacts of the reduction in EU support prices on the United States might 
be surprising to some readers. The U.S. exporting firm is now actually facing 
more severe price competition from its EU rival in the Moroccan wheat market. 
The U.S. firm is, therefore, forced to lower its export price. This lower price 
means that the U.S. government has to provide larger EEP-bonuses for the 
exporting firm to keep U.S. wheat competitive in the import market. However, 
the reduction in the U.S. wheat price is still less than in the EU wheat price. 
Therefore, the U.S. loses only a small portion of its market share.11 Since the 
price and exports of U.S. wheat are decreased and export subsidy expenditures 
are increased, it is clear that reduction in support prices of the EU makes the 
U.S. benefit less from its wheat trade to Morocco. Also, the total discounted 
profits of the U.S. exporting firm are lower.12 
The last column of Table 6.6 shows the simulation results with zero marginal 
costs for both the EU and U.S. The important thing to notice is that export 
policies have changed. Instead of subsidizing wheat exports, governments are 
now taxing their exports. Therefore, levels of marginal costs are playing a 
significant role in export policy choice. 
II The results appear to be consistent with actual data. Actual data showed that the average 
monthly subsidy for EU wheat was reduced from $108 per ton in 1992/93 to $77 per ton in 
1993/94, while the average monthly subsidy for U.S. wheat exports to Morocco was increased 
from $31 per ton in 1992/93 to $37 per ton in 1993/94. Observed prices paid by Morocco for 
EU wheat and U.S. wheat were reduced: average monthly price for EU wheat from $146 per 
ton in 1992/93 to 114 per ton in 1993/94 and average monthly price for U.S. wheat from $126 
per ton in 1992/93 to 102 per ton in 1993/94. Furthermore, EU wheat exports to Morocco 
increased from 79 thousand tons in 1992/93 to 95 thousand tons in 1993/94, while U.S. wheat 
exports to Morocco decreased from 141 thousand tons in 1992/93 to 101 thousand tons in 
1993/94. 
12 Recall that our analysis does not capture the effects that CAP reform has on domestic wheat 
production and consumption in the EU. If the need for exports are greatly reduced through the 
reform's effects on EU's production and consumption, then exporting countries behaviors in 
international wheat market might be different. 
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In his model, To (1994) used a standard Brander-Spencer framework in 
which an objective function for the exporting country's government is profits of 
that country's exporting firm less export subsidy expenditures.13 With that 
model he was able to state that exporting firms always set export taxes in the 
second period and this result was independent of marginal costs. If we apply the 
standard Brander-Spencer form of government objective function to our empiri-
cal dynamic model we get results that are consistent with To's results. In every 
steady-state period each exporting country is using an export tax as the optimal 
trade policy, and this outcome is independent of marginal cost levels.14 It seems 
that our model, in which export subsidies can be realized as a trade policy 
option, is better suited to describing real world phenomena of international 
wheat trade. 
6.4.1.4. Product Differentiation 
Estimations in Chapter V showed that EU wheat and U.S. wheat are imperfect 
substitutes in the Moroccan wheat market. This section illustrates the effects of 
changes in the level of product differentiation on the behaviors of the U.S. and 
the EU in wheat trade to Morocco. In the base solution the product differentia-
tion index equals approximately 0.55. For comparison two alternative scenarios 
show the results when product differentiation is either lower or higher than in 
the base solution. In the highly differentiated product case the index value is 
0.4, and in the low product differentiation case, in which EU wheat and U.S. 
wheat are closer substitutes, the index value equals 0.65.15 
13 Recall that in our model the objective function of a government is export revenue less export 
subsidy expenditures, where the additional welfare cost of public funds is taken into account. 
14 When our model is solved with Brander-Spencer objective functions, export taxes set by the 
U.S. and the EU are $24.12 per ton and $17.42 per ton, respectively. With zero marginal costs 
export taxes set by the U.S. and the EU are $30.20 per ton and $31.06 per ton, respectively, 
and if we double the base values of marginal costs then the U.S. sets an $18.04 export tax and 
the EU sets a $3.77 export tax. If marginal costs become so high that negative exports from the 
EU and/or the U.S. are optimal, then a subsidy would become optimal. But in this case the EU 
and/år the U.S. would not be an exporter anymore. It would be importing wheat from Morocco 
and the subsidy would be an import subsidy. 
15 To measure the degree of product differentiation, recall from Chapter V that the demand 
structure used in the empirical model is 
(6.1) 	 M  
where i #k and i = U.S. , EU. In order to get inverse demand functions, we invert the system 
given in (6.1). The inverse demand functions are 
(6.2)  
where a' = ib k ±zk ewbib k 	 bk I (bi bk _ e2 ) and y = 	b 	e2 ) for i # k 
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The simulation results of these three scenarios are presented in Table 6.7. It 
is clear that an increase in product differentiation gives more market power to 
the exporting side by loosening up price competition among exporting firms and 
export subsidy competition between governments. In the case of high product 
differentiation both exporting firms are charging higher prices and both export-
ing country governments are providing lower export subsidies than in the base 
solution. The low substitutability between wheats implies also that considerable 
increases in price do not lower export volumes much. For example, the price of 
exported EU wheat increases 26 percent, and export volume is basically un-
changed (decreases by 0.13 percent). 
Table 6.7. Impacts of Changes in the Level of Product Differentiation on the 
European Union and the United States. 
Base 
Solution 
Low product 
differentiation 
High product 
differentiation 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 165.90 140.22 200.32 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 137.31 151.03 125.63 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 34.95 44.44 25.52 
U.S. welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 401.64 358.95 456.98 
U.S. firm's profits (million dollars) 
184.48 156.40 228.33 total discounted future profits 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 179.74 143.72 226.51 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 81.56 79.77 81.45 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 79.57 94.32 64.78 
EU welfare (million dollars) 
241.80 176.08 320.13 total discounted future profits 
EU firm's profits (million dollars) 
109.43 75.35 158.29 total discounted future profits 
and i = U.S., EU. Varian (1992) states that in general, 72Afilfik ) can be used as an index of 
product differentiation. When this term is one, the goods are perfect substitutes, and when it is 
zero, markets of these two goods are independent. Thus, values that the index can have range 
from zero to one. 
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Higher prices paid by Morocco and lower export subsidy levels together 
with moderately lower exports make exporting countries better off. Total dis-
counted profits of exporting firms are also increased. Thus, the results are 
consistent with static theoretical Bertrand (as well as Cournot) games with 
product differentiation, which say that the profits of firms increase when prod-
ucts become more differentiated (Shy 1995). It is also interesting to notice that 
the EU side benefits more from increased product differentiation. The total 
discounted future welfare of EU increases by 32 percent, while the correspond-
ing change in the U.S. is 14 percent. Similarly, the EU exporting firm receives a 
larger increase in its total profits. One of the reasons for this outcome is found 
from the more inelastic import demands for both wheats in the highly differenti-
ated products case than in the base solution. The reduction in the own-price 
elasticity of EU wheat is larger (6.2 percent) than the reduction in the own-price 
elasticity of U.S. wheat (1.9 percent). So, when the level of competition against 
the U.S. wheat is lowered through product differentiation, the EU exporting 
firm increases its price more relative to the U.S. firm. The higher price level 
then allows the EU govemment to decrease its very large export subsidy expen-
ditures more than the U.S. counterpart. Thus, the EU side benefits from higher 
product differentiation more than the U.S. side. 
When EU wheat and U.S. wheat become increasingly substitutable, it fol-
lows that there is increased price competitiveness through increased subsidies. 
The prices are lower and draw closer together. Total imports of wheat to 
Morocco are increased, but imports of EU wheat are actually reduced. The U.S., 
as a low cost producer, is able to capture larger market share at an expense of 
the EU when competition is more fierce. 
6.4.1.5. Asymmetries in Parameters 
The empirical model of the Moroccan wheat market is asymmetric and that 
asymmetry affects players' equilibrium strategies in the market. This section 
examines the effects of asymmetries on model outcomes. The three asymmetries 
to be studied are the asymmetry in exporting firms' marginal costs (Ctus ctEu), 
the asymmetry in marginal switching costs (nus # ) and the asymmetry in 
own-price effects on wheat imports (bus 
First, in order to study effects of asymmetries we need to create a fully 
symmetric model as a basis for comparison. The new parameter values of 
import demand functions and of marginal costs used to construct the fully 
symmetric model are shown in Table 6.8. These symmetric parameter values are 
derived from the estimated parameter values by taking the mean of estimated 
16  Own-price effects are the parameter values in our estimated, linear import demand functions 
(1)1) and while closely related to, should not be confused with own-price elasticities. 
bEU).16 
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Table 6.8. Parameter Values of Import Demand Functions and of Marginal 
Costs Used in the Symmetric and Asymmetric Models. 
Own-price 	Cross-price 	Marginal 	Exporting 
effect effect 	switching cost firms' marginal 
costs 
Symmetric b = 1.117 e= 0.816 17 = 0.309 Ct = 160 
U.S. bus = 1.327 e= 0.816 nus = 0.354 ctus = 130  
EU bEu = 0.906 e = 0.816 nuu = 0.264 CtEu = 190 
U.S. and EU values. The last two rows of the same table presents parameter 
values used in asymmetric scenarios (and subsequent scenarios of this thesis). 
The results of the fully symmetric model are derived and compared with 
three other scenarios, each of which illustrates a situation in which one of the 
three asymmetries is introduced into the otherwise symmetric model. Results of 
these four model outcomes are shown in Table 6.9. 
The first asymmetry analyzed is that between marginal costs of two export-
ing firms. The U.S. exporting firm is the low-cost exporter ($130 per ton) 
compared to the EU firm ($190 per ton). Differences between results of a fully 
symmetric model and results of an otherwise identical model, except that mar-
ginal costs for U.S. firm are lower than for the EU firm, are discussed in order to 
see the effects of marginal cost asymmetry. 
Relatively lower marginal cost makes U.S. wheat more competitive in the 
importing country. The U.S. exporting firm charges a lower price and also a 
smaller export subsidy is needed from the U.S. government to export U.S. wheat 
than in the symmetric case. The change in the wheat price, however, is very 
small relative to the change in the U.S. marginal cost. Since U.S. government 
(as a leader) has more market power than the U.S. firm (as a follower), most of 
the effects of lower U.S. marginal cost can be seen as a reduction of export 
subsidies. The somewhat lower price enables the U.S. to capture a larger share 
of the importing country's wheat market. Both the U.S. exporting firm and U.S. 
government are better off in the asymmetric case, with higher profits and wel-
fare than in the symmetric case. The effects of marginal cost asymmetry on the 
EU side are opposite to U.S. effects, since EU marginal costs are higher, making 
EU government and the EU firm worse off when compared with the fully 
symmetric case. 
The second asymmetry in our empirical model is between costs of switching. 
It is more difficult for the Morocco to switch away from U.S. wheat than from 
EU wheat. That is, the estimated marginal switching cost parameter for U.S. 
wheat is larger than for EU wheat (nus  = 0.354; nEu = 0.264). Comparison 
between a fully symmetric model and an otherwise identical model, except that 
117 
Table 6.9. Impacts of Asymmetries on Model Outcomes. 
Symmetric Marginal Marginal Own-price 
case 	cost 	switching cost 	effect 
asymmetry asymmetry asymmetry 
CtUS = 130 rius = 0.354 bus = 1.327 
C/'= 190 riEu =o264 bEu = 0.906 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 
U.S. welfare ($million) 
total discounted future welfare 
U.S. firm's profits (million) 
total discounted future profits 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 
EU welfare (million) 
total discounted future welfare 
EU firm's profits (million) 
total discounted future profits 
170.05 168.97 169.44 168.65 
105.20 110.37 107.90 127.04 
59.23 33.72 59.73 59.48 
167.55 184.18 170.70 199.74 
77.29 84.96 78.99 91.47 
170.05 171.12 170.53 177.73 
105.20 100.02 102.61 86.30 
59.23 84.75 58.80 54.65 
167.55 151.70 164.42 146.64 
77.29 69.98 75.61 66.62 
the marginal switching cost for U.S. wheat is larger than for EU wheat, shows 
that higher costs of switching away from U.S. wheat make the U.S. compete 
more aggressively in the importing market. This means that the U.S. exporting 
firm charges a lower price and the U.S. goverrunent awards a higher expon 
subsidy than in the fully symmetric model. The lower price makes U.S. wheat 
more attractive to Morocco, leading to increased U.S. wheat exports to Mo-
rocco. These increased exports more than compensate for the effects of lower 
price and higher subsidy, making the U.S. govemment benefit more from wheat 
trade to Morocco. Similarly, profits of the U.S. exporting firm are increased 
from the symmetric model level. 
The asymmetry in marginal switching costs makes it easier to switch away 
from EU wheat. Therefore, the EU is less willing to compete over market shares 
than in the symmetric case. It behaves less aggressively, with higher prices and 
lower subsidies than before, resulting in decreased export volumes of EU wheat. 
Both EU govemment and the exporting finn are worse off in this asymmetric 
case. 
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The third asymmetry is between own-price effects on wheat imports. Imports 
of U.S. wheat appear to be more sensitive to own-price changes than imports of 
EU wheat (bus = 1.327; bEu = 0.906). We compare a fully symmetric model and 
an otherwise identical model, except that the own-price effect for U.S. wheat is 
larger than for EU wheat. 
Since in the asymmetric case a decrease in U.S. wheat price results in a 
larger increase in U.S. wheat exports than in the fully symmetric case, the U.S. 
competes more aggressively in the importing market. A lower price is set by the 
U.S. exporting firm and a higher subsidy is awarded by the U.S. govemment, 
leading to increased exports of U.S. wheat to the importing country. Again, both 
U.S. govemment and the exporting firm are better off, as can be seen from 
Table 6.9. On the other hand, a decrease in the EU wheat price, due to asymme-
try, would now have a smaller impact on EU wheat exports than in the fully 
symmetric case. Therefore, the EU firm and the EU govemment adopt less 
aggressive pricing and export subsidy strategies than in the symmetric case. 
That is, the EU exporting firm sets its price higher than before, and smaller 
export subsidies are awarded by the EU govemment to sell wheat to the import-
ing country. However, decreased export volumes in the asymmetric case makes 
the EU govemment and the EU exporting firm benefit less from their wheat 
trade to Morocco. 
Ali three asymmetries in our empirical model affect in the same way prices, 
exports, exporting firms' profits, and govemments' welfares. They lower EU 
exports, U.S. price, the EU exporting firm's profits and EU government's wel-
fare. They increase U.S. exports, EU price, the U.S. exporting firm's profits as 
well as the U.S. government's welfare. 
Effects of asymmetries on export subsidies are more complex. Asymmetries 
in own-price effects and marginal switching costs decrease the EU export sub-
sidy and increase the U.S. subsidy, but the asymmetry in marginal costs of 
exporting firms has an opposite impact on export subsidies. 
As a fmal task of this section we illustrate the relative importance of each 
asymmetry. This is done by using an elasticity type, unit free measure to 
describe effects of each asymmetry on prices, export volumes, export subsidies, 
welfares, and profits. This measure is the difference in relative changes in a 
variable of interest (e.g., price) divided by the difference in relative changes in a 
parameter value of interest (e.g., own-price effect).17 The results are presented 
in Table 6.10. 
17  Using steady-state values of the symmetric and asymmetric models, the unit free measure 
describing, for example, the impact of asymmetry in own-price effects on price difference is 
given by [(pAt's.  — 	— 	— Ps,V11.1[2(eb)lb], where 	is the steady-state price of ex- 
porting country i's wheat in the asymmetric model Ps , is the steady state price of the symmet-
ric model, and eli = (b" — b' )/2 is the deviation from the symmetric parameter value of 
own-price effect, b. 
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Table 6.10. Impacts* of Asymmetries on Price, Exports, Export Subsidy, Welfare, 
and Profits. 
Asymmetry in Asymmetry in Asymmetry in 
marginal cost marginal switching own-price 
costs 	effects 
Impact on price difference -0.0337 -0.0220 -0.1416 
Impact on exports difference 0.2622 0.1728 1.0273 
Impact on export subsidy difference -2.2975 0.0539 0.2163 
Impact on welfare difference 0.5168 0.1288 0.8407 
Impact on profits difference 0.5168 0.1501 0.8528 
*Impact indicates the difference in percentage changes in a variable of interest divided by 
difference in percentage changes in a parameter value of interest for U.S. variable less EU 
variable. 
The asymmetry between own-price effects appears to have the most signifi-
cant impact on wheat export volumes, prices, welfares, and profits. This is 
saying that with a similarly sized percentage deviation in marginal costs, in 
marginal switching costs or in own-price effects from the fully syrrunetric case, 
it is changes in own-price effects that are causing the largest changes in export 
volumes, prices, welfares, and profits. Export subsidies, however, are infiu-
enced most by asymmetry between exporting firms' marginal costs, if a simi-
larly sized percentage deviation in marginal costs, in marginal switching costs 
or in own-price effects from the fully symmetric case occurs. Furthermore, the 
impact of this marginal cost asymmetry on export subsidies is in the opposite 
direction of the impacts of the other two asymmetries on export subsidies. This 
means that in a model in which ali three asymmetries are present, the impacts of 
the asymmetry between marginal costs are diminished by the counter effects of 
the two other asymmetries. 
In order to see if effects of the marginal cost asymmetry on export subsidies 
dominates effects of the other two asymmetries in our empirical model that 
includes ali three asymmetries, the numbers in the third row of Table 6.10 need 
to be properly adjusted. This is because the percentage deviations from the 
symmetric parameter values are not the same for every asymmetry in the empiri-
cal model. In fact, in case of marginal costs, the percentage change in marginal 
costs parameter values is 0.375 (= 2 (AC't )/C, ), in the case of marginal switch-
ing cost asymmetry the corresponding percentage change is 0.291 (= 2 (A77)/77), 
and for the asymmetry in own-price effects this percentage change is 0.377 
(= 2 (6,b)/b ). So, in order to compare impacts of the three asymmetries on 
export subsidies in our empirical model we need to multiply the numbers in 
Table 6.10 by corresponding weights given above. This procedure yields the 
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following impacts on export subsidies for each asymmetry: for asymmetry in 
marginal costs it is -0.862; for asymmetry in marginal switching costs it is 
0.016; and for asymmetry in own-price effects it is 0.082. Thus, impact of the 
marginal cost asymmetry clearly dominates impacts of the other two asymmetries 
on export subsidies in the empirical model, implying lower export subsidies for 
U.S. wheat and higher export subsidies for EU wheat than in the case of 
symmetric model. 
Finally, in this chapter several different scenarios are explored using our 
asymmetric empirical model. When these scenarios are examined, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the effects of model asymmetries. This section has shown 
that the model's asymmetries benefit the U.S., but not the EU. They make the 
U.S. price more aggressively than the EU, leading to larger U.S. market share in 
the Moroccan wheat market. In addition, the U.S., due to asymmetries, can 
capture this larger market share while subsidizing its wheat exports less than the 
EU. So, in general asymmetries allow the U.S. govemment and the U.S. export-
ing firm to benefit more from wheat trade with Morocco than their EU counter-
parts do. 
6.4.2. Trade Policy Analysis 
Export subsidies were not eliminated by Uruguay Round GATT agreement. 
Rather, no new subsidies may be introduced, and EU and U.S. export subsidies 
are subject to both financial and quantitative constraints. Initially, the United 
States proposed total elimination of ali agricultural subsidies, and especially 
explicit export subsidies, so many took the outcome of the GATT as disappoint-
ing. From the game theory perspective, GATT could have taken the players out 
of their prisoner's dilemma and permitted improved welfare of the world. But 
the major players — the U.S. and the EU — have market power in trade, and this 
together with their domestic income redistribution goals mean that trade inter-
vention may indeed be rational when players are looking only at their self-
interest. The situation prior to the Uruguay Round agreement reflected this 
situation. The existence of a trade intervention reflected market power in trade, 
and export subsidies rather than export taxes reflected the producer bias of trade 
policy. 
6.4.2.1. Effects of Alternative Institutional Arrangements 
In this section altemative institutional arrangements, and hence potential GATT 
outcomes, are analyzed. The presumption here is that World Trade Organization 
(WTO) sets the rules for trade, and hence the institutional arrangement. Under 
each structure the EU and the U.S. and their wheat exporting firms will set their 
strategies in their self-interest. The base solution corresponds to the pre-GATT 
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situation. Unilateral reform scenarios refer to cases in which only the reformer 
eliminates its export subsidy program. In the GATT outcome scenario the 
export subsidy of EU wheat is limited to 51 percent of the pre-GATT level 
found in the base solution, and the export subsidy of U.S. wheat is limited to 43 
percent of the pre-GATT solution.I8 A cartel scenario illustrates the collusive 
behavior of exporting countries. The EU government and the U.S. government 
set their export subsidies (taxes if negative) to maximize their joint welfare. 
Finally, the sixth scenario presents a free trade outcome. Simulation results are 
shown in Table 6.11. 
6.4.2.1.1. Unilateral Reform 
If the EU unilaterally eliminates its export subsidies, then the price of exported 
EU wheat is increased by 24 percent. This higher EU wheat price makes it 
possible for the U.S. to increase its wheat price, as well. However, only a 13 
percent increase occurs in the price of U.S. wheat. The reason is that the U.S. 
continues an aggressive export subsidy policy in order to win as much market 
share as possible from the EU. In fact, the U.S. actually subsidizes its wheat 
exports to Morocco slightly more than in the base solution. Consequently, U.S. 
wheat exports are increased by 23 percent and the EU is able to export only half 
as much as before. The welfare of the U.S. is clearly improved, but the largest 
benefits are obtained by the U.S. exporting firm, whose total discounted profits 
are increased by nearly 60 percent. On the other hand, the EU welfare is reduced 
by 27 percent, and the wheat exporting firm of the EU faces a substantial (75 
percent) reduction in its level of profits. 
When the U.S. unilaterally eliminates its export subsidies then the qualita-
tive results of the previous paragraph are reversed. However, since the U.S. is 
the low cost producer of wheat and costs of switching away from U.S. wheat are 
higher, negative effects of subsidy elimination on the U.S. welfare and the U.S. 
firm's profits are considerably smaller than the effects on the EU in the previous 
scenario. 
6.4.2.1.2. GATT Outcome 
The actual GATT outcome, a 49 percent reduction in the EU export subsidy and 
57 percent reduction in the U.S. export subsidy, results in small increases 
(relative to the export subsidy reductions) in wheat prices. The $19.92 per ton 
18 In general, reductions in export subsidies are mentioned to be 36 percent for both EU and U.S. 
wheat. However, when the front-loading provision is taken into account, the reduction for EU 
wheat is 49 percent and for U.S. wheat it is 57 percent of the 1991/92 base case level (see 
footnote 11 in Chapter II). 
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Table 6.11. Impacts of Different Institutional Arrangements on the European 
Union and the United States. 
Base Unilateral Unilateral GATT Covernment Free 
Solution reform reform outcome cartel trade 
by EU by U.S. 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 	165.90 186.92 180.95 174.01 269.15 191.71 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 	137.31 168.92 105.30 147.63 109.97 154.31 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 	 34.95 36.44 0 15.03 -93.06 0 
U.S. welfare ($million) 
total discounted 
future vvelfare 	401.64 554.74 363.39 470.99 618.25 555.51 
U.S. firm's profits (million) 
295.66 103.70 166.51 96.00 180.40 
total discounted 
future profits 	184.48 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 	179.74 223.47 188.21 195.83 318.26 224.32 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 	 81.56 40.01 99.77 67.18 37.72 49.69 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 	 79.57 0 91.44 40.58 -102.31 0 
EU welfare (million) 
176.61 301.49 237.89 261.00 219.07 
total discounted 
future welfare 	241.80 
EU firm's profits (million) 
total discounted 
future profits 	109.43 27.69 170.01 62.05 20.70 35.30 
reduction in the U.S. export subsidy implies only $8.11 per ton higher price for 
U.S. wheat. Although the EU subsidy is decreased as much as $38.99 per ton, 
the increase in the EU wheat price is only $16.09 per ton. The EU exports less 
wheat to Morocco, but exports of U.S. wheat are larger than in the base solution. 
One reason for this outcome arises from switching costs. First, when switch-
ing costs exist in the market, the EU and the U.S. are playing more aggressive 
strategies (charging lower prices) in order to capture market share than if 
switching costs were not present. To show that this is the case we analyzed the 
GATT outcome in the model without switching costs. Results show that price 
increases would have been larger, with the U.S. wheat price increasing by 
$12.63 per ton and EU wheat price increasing by $17.66 per ton. Second, in our 
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empirical model, costs of switching away from U.S. wheat are greater than costs 
of switching away from EU wheat. Therefore, the U.S. price is not increased as 
much as the EU price, because the U.S. is relatively more interested in gaining 
market share than the EU. Thus, the U.S. ends up exporting more than in the 
pre-GATT situation. The model in which switching costs are not taken into 
account shows both exporting countries are exporting smaller amounts than in 
the pre-GATT situation. 
Another factor leading to a smaller increase in the U.S. price than in the EU 
price is the way the export subsidy constraints of GATT are introduced. For EU 
wheat, the export subsidy is set to be 49 percent lower than in the base solution, 
and for U.S. wheat, the export subsidy is set to be 57 percent lower than in the 
base solution. However, the base solution values of export subsidies differ in 
absolute values (the base subsidy for EU wheat is $79.57, while the base 
subsidy for U.S. wheat is $34.95). This means that in the GATT outcome 
scenario the firm exporting EU wheat receives $38.99 smaller subsidy for each 
exported ton of wheat than in the base solution. For the firm exporting U.S. 
wheat, however, the reduction in subsidy is only $19.92 per ton. Therefore, the 
pressure created by GATT-constraints to increase price in EU wheat is larger 
than in U.S. wheat. 
6.4.2.1.3. Cartel of Exporting Countries 
The govemment cartel scenario assumes the policymakers for the European 
Union and the United States agree to adopt export policies consistent with joint 
welfare maximization. This type of institutional arrangement allows the export-
ing countries' govemments to capture almost ali of the market power. In coop-
eration they are able to set very high export taxes to extract rents from exporting 
firms. This leads to much higher prices paid by Morocco on both wheats and so, 
greatly decreased total wheat imports by Morocco. 
The exporting firms, together with the importing country, are the big losers 
in this scenario. Prices are higher, but more than 30 percent of those prices go to 
govemments through export taxes. So, the actual price (price — export tax) 
received by the U.S. exporting firm for its wheat is 12 percent lower than in the 
base solution. Similarly, the exporting firm of the EU faces a price that is now 
17 percent below the base solution price. When these lower prices are combined 
with much reduced export volumes, it is clear that exporting firms are worse off. 
Total discounted future profits of the U.S. firm are just 52 percent of the base 
solution profits. On the EU side, the govemment captures most of the rents 
since the EU exporting firm's profits are decreased by 81 percent. 
Welfares of both exporting countries are increased under the cartel arrange-
ment. Again, the effects of different levels of switching costs cause the U.S. to 
benefit more than the EU. The U.S. welfare is increased by 54 percent, but EU 
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welfare is increased by just 8 percent. Since joint welfare is 37 percent higher 
than in the base solution, some possible side payments within the cartel would 
need to take place. Although, the cartel greatly improves the welfares of the 
exporting countries, its appearance is not very likely. Joint setting of subsidies 
by the EU and the U.S. and possible explicit side payments are probably GATT-
illegal, or at least politically incorrect. 
6.4.2.1.4. Free Trade 
The final scenario illustrates the case when no government intervention is 
present. These free trade results are intuitively clear. Prices paid by Morocco on 
EU wheat and U.S. wheat are higher than in the base solution, because effects of 
export subsidies have disappeared. Due to higher marginal costs the EU has 
subsidized its wheat exports more than the U.S. did in the base solution. There-
fore, the elimination of these subsidies in free trade implies a larger increase in 
the price of EU wheat (25 percent) than in the price of U.S. wheat (16 percent). 
This change in relative prices means that the U.S. exporting firm is able to 
increase wheat exports by 12 percent, but wheat exports by the EU exporting 
firm are reduced by 39 percent. 
The welfare of the U.S. is substantially increased from the base solution, 
since larger amounts of wheat exports are incorporated with higher prices and 
with zero export subsidy expenditures. However, for the EU the considerable 
drop in export volumes outweighs positive effects of higher price and of savings 
in subsidy expenditure, resulting in a lower level of EU welfare. At the export-
ing firm level, the elimination of subsidies means that total prices received by 
the firms are decreased. Profits of the EU exporting firm drop by as much as 68 
percent. For the U.S. wheat exporting firm, however, profits are only two 
percent lower, due to increased export volumes to Morocco. 
6.4.2.1.5. The Link Betvveen CAP Reform and the GATT Agreement 
As a final task in this section welfare effects of alternative institutional arrange-
ments are compared. For the reader's convenience, the welfare results are pre-
sented in Table 6.12. Unilateral reform scenarios describe well the problematic 
situation that exists in the international wheat market, since unilateral reform is 
always the worst case for the country that reforms. 
In this problematic situation such a reform is the best outcome for the 
country that retains its subsidies. If we consider cartel between governments as 
an illegal arrangement, then unilateral reform by the U.S. is the best outcome for 
the EU and unilateral reform by the EU is approximately tied as the best 
arrangement for U.S. welfare. 
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Table 6.12. Welfare of the EU and the U.S. Under Alternative Institutional 
Arrangements. 
EU welfare 
million dollars 
U.S. welfare 
million dollars 
Base Solution 241.80 401.64 
Unilateral reform by EU 176.61 554.74 
Unilateral reform by U.S. 301.49 363.39 
Free trade 219.07 555.51 
GATT outcome 237.89 470.99 
The improvement of U.S. welfare under free trade explains well its initial 
willingness to fully eliminate export subsidies. In fact, the level of U.S. welfare 
in free trade is practically the same as in the case when EU unilaterally elimi-
nates its export subsidies. However, for the EU only the case in which it 
unilaterally reforms export subsidies results in a worse outcome than under free 
trade. The qualitative effects of the actual GATT outcome are the same as in 
free trade, but smaller in magnitude. 
A question that arises is why did the EU agree to reduce its export subsidies 
when effects are welfare reducing? The crucial factor so far ignored in our 
analysis is the MacSharry CAP reform, which lowered marginal costs of the EU 
exporting firm by 30 percent. Recall that the one of the results of CAP reform 
scenario was that the EU considerably decreased its export subsidies, but the 
subsidy set by the U.S. was actually slightly increased. In fact, it was shown that 
as a result of CAP reform the export subsidy set by the U.S. ($36.46 per ton) 
increased enough to exceed the export subsidy set by the EU ($32.90 per ton) 
(see Table 6.6). 
When we now analyze effects of export subsidy constraints (set by the 
GATT agreement) in these circumstances, very different results arise. Compari-
sons are made between the pre-GATT scenario and the GATT outcome scenario 
after CAP reform has already occurred. 
The GATT agreement requires that export subsidies are reduced by 49 
percent and 57 percent for EU wheat and U.S. wheat, respectively, from their 
base levels, where the base levels are the subsidies at the time before CAP 
reform (our base solution). Therefore, the GATT upper bound for the export 
subsidy of U.S. wheat is $15.03 per ton (0.43 times $34.95 per ton), and the 
upper bound for the export subsidy of EU wheat is $40.58 per ton (0.51 times 
$79.57 per ton). After CAP reform the pre-GATT equilibrium export subsidies 
were $36.46 per ton for U.S. wheat and $32.90 per ton for EU wheat. Therefore, 
it seems that only the GATT constraint for U.S. wheat is binding. To see if the 
upper bound on EU wheat has any effect on the behavior of the EU (or the 
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we study a case in which the EU sets its subsidy (while ignoring the 
GATT upper bound on EU wheat) to maximize its discounted future welfare 
given that the export subsidy for U.S. wheat is fixed to the binding GATT upper 
bound. Exporting firms set their prices as before. The outcome of this scenario 
shows that the export subsidy of EU wheat would have been $49.01 per ton, 
implying that the GATT upper bound on EU wheat is also binding. For U.S. 
wheat, the GATT constraint is clearly binding since, given that EU subsidizes at 
its GATT upper bound, the unconstrained U.S. export subsidy would have been 
$53.81 per ton, in contrast to $15.03 per ton allowed by the agreement. There-
fore, the scenario that illustrates the actual GATT outcome has upper bounds 
binding for both countries19. 
Table 6.13 shows the effects of GATT agreement on wheat trade to Morocco 
when impacts of the CAP reform are also taken into account. As was noticed, 
the upper bound on the export subsidy is much more restrictive for U.S. wheat 
than it is for EU wheat. In fact, the EU exporting firm receives higher subsidies 
than before the GATT agreement. The higher subsidy allows the EU firm to 
behave more aggressively. This enhances price competition between exporting 
firms, so much that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, no price increase occurs. In 
contrast, the U.S. wheat price falls from $162.69 per ton to $161.25 per ton, and 
the EU wheat price falls from $173.68 per ton to $163.96 per ton. 
Since a larger cut occurs in the price of EU wheat than in the price of U.S. 
wheat, the EU is able to capture substantial market share from the U.S. in the 
Moroccan market. EU exports, therefore, increase from 86.58 thousand tons to 
103.56 thousand tons, and U.S. exports are reduced from 134.00 thousand tons 
to 115.73 thousand tons. 
In the case of EU wheat, the large increase in export volumes to Morocco 
outweigh the reduction in price and increase in export subsidy expenditures, 
improving welfare of the EU. Thus, these simulation results are consistent with 
the notion that the CAP reform was an important element in the process to reach 
GATT agreement in export subsidy reductions. 
19  Note that in the early years of the GATT implementation period upper bounds have not been 
binding. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this can be explained by changes in the govern-
ments' objectives to be more concerned about budgetary costs of farm programs. In addition, 
global grain production between 1993/94 and 1995/96 remained lower than its 1992 peak, 
with some of the major exporters experiencing below-normal crops. Meanwhile, demand for 
grains continued to increase, reflecting robust economic growth in many countries, especially 
in Asia. For three consecutive years, global wheat consumption surpassed production, result-
ing in the lowest grain stocks in 20 years. World wheat prices increased sharply to unusually 
high levels, and so there has not been the need for export subsidies during the first GATT 
implementation years. The scenario presented in the text assumes that final GATT upper 
bounds are binding at the end of the implementation period. 
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Table 6.13. Impacts of Uruguay Round GATT Agreement on the European 
Union and the United States When the MacSharry CAP Reform is Taken Into 
Account 
Base solution After CAP 
reform 
GATT Outcome 
with CAP reform 
165.90 162.69 161.25 
137.31 134.00 115.73 
34.95 36.46 15.03 
401.64 382.86 344.77 
184.48 175.86 104.20 
179.74 173.68 163.96 
81.56 86.58 103.56 
79.57 32.9 40.58 
241.80 271.90 299.04 
109.43 123.05 143.14 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 
U.S. welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future welfare 
U.S. firm's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 
EU welfare (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 
EU firm's profits (million dollars) 
total discounted future profits 
6.4.3. Effects of Firm Behavior 
Chapter II provided some evidence on the imperfectly competitive nature of 
wheat exporting firms. The wheat export industry was described as at least 
moderately concentrated, and large exporting firms may have some degree of 
market power. However, the magnitude of the exporting firms' market power is 
quite small, and it is exporting countries governments instead of firms that 
exercise the greatest power on the market. 
The base solution of our empirical model is constructed in such a way that 
two wheat exporting firms, one from each exporting country, play a price setting 
duopoly game. Since the market power that exporting firms exercise in interna-
tional wheat trade is said to be quite small, it is possible that the duopolistic 
modeling framework might assign too much market power to exporting firms. 
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to analyze how the different degrees of 
market power of exporting firms affect market outcomes. Four alternative sce- 
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narios are compared with the base solution. One scenario examines perfectly 
competitive behavior of firms. The second scenario illustrates the case in which 
a cartel of two exporting firms maximize their joint profits. The last two sce-
narios describe how timing in decisions affect on market agents' market power. 
Simulation results are shown in Table 6.14. 
6.4.3.1. Perfectly Competitive Firms 
In the case of perfectly competitive firms it is assumed that competition be-
tween firms that export EU wheat drives the price of exported EU wheat down 
to firms' marginal cost. Similarly, the U.S. firms set their prices equal to U.S. 
marginal cost. Therefore, firms are making zero profits, as can be seen from 
Table 6.14. 
Since the influence that exporting firms in the base solution had on prices is 
gone, Morocco is buying more wheat at much lower prices. The price of U.S. 
wheat ($165.9 per ton in the base solution) falls to $103.83 per ton when firms 
Table 6.14. Impacts of Different Levels of Firm Market Power on the European 
Union and the United States. 
Base 
Solution 
Perfectly 
competitive 
firms 
Firm 
cartel 
Ex post 
game 
Simul-
taneous 
move game 
U.S. price ($/ton) 
steady state 165.90 103.83 181.86 236.27 123.19 
U.S. exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 137.31 178.60 137.61 100.58 163.68 
U.S. export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 34.95 26.17 232.68 469.41 79.48 
U.S. welfare ($million) 
total discounted future welfare 401.64 322.85 273.09 153.49 300.72 
U.S. firm's profits (million) 
total discounted future profits 184.48 0.00 736.25 1098.68 225.77 
EU price ($/ton) 
steady state 179.74 106.84 203.04 266.58 128.72 
EU exports (1000 tons) 
steady state 81.56 86.11 70.81 67.56 86.48 
EU export subsidy ($/ton) 
steady state 79.57 83.16 344.12 544.47 126.41 
EU welfare (million) 
total discounted future welfare 241.80 136.58 124.09 110.98 147.71 
EU firm's profits (million) 
total discounted future profits 109.43 0.00 484.08 802.76 110.89 
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are perfectly competitive. The reduction in the EU wheat price is 3 percent 
larger than the U.S. price. One reason for the larger change in the EU wheat 
price is switching costs. Since the market power of exporting firms over the 
buyer does not exist anymore, effects of switching costs on governments behaviors 
are strengthened. Costs of switching away from U.S. wheat are higher than costs 
of switching away from EU wheat. Another reason is that import demand for 
U.S. wheat is more sensitive to own-price changes than import demand for EU 
wheat. This means that if the price of U.S. wheat and EU wheat are lowered by 
the same amount imports of U.S. wheat to Morocco increase more than imports 
of EU wheat. Therefore, the U.S. is able to capture a larger portion of the market 
than in the base solution. The U.S. is able to do this even though its export 
subsidy is $8.78 per ton less than in the base solution. In contrast, the EU has to 
subsidize its wheat exports more in order to prevent too large a drop in its 
market share. The export subsidy of EU wheat rises from $79.57 per ton to 
$83.16 per ton.20  However, while the EU loses some market share it is still able 
to export more than in the base solution, because of the large reduction in the 
price level. 
Both exporting countries are worse off with perfectly competitive firms. For 
the EU, this is easily seen: much lower price together with somewhat higher 
export volumes decrease export revenues. This is combined with increased 
export subsidy expenditures. Thus, EU welfare is reduced by 44 percent. For the 
U.S., export subsidy expenditures are decreased. However, the low price re-
duces export revenues despite increased export volumes. This reduction in 
export revenues exceeds the positive effect of savings in subsidy expenditures, 
leading to the smaller U.S. welfare than in the base solution. 
6.4.3.2. Firm Cartel 
In the case of a firm cartel, wheat exporting firms are maximizing their joint 
profits. The formation of the cartel results in a smaller volume of EU wheat 
exports — from 81.56 to 70.81 thousand tons — and a higher price received for 
those exports — from $179.74 per ton to $203.04 per ton. The price of U.S. 
wheat is increased as well, but not to the same extent as the price of EU wheat. 
So, both prices that Morocco faces now are higher than in the base solution, 
leading to the smaller amount of total wheat imports. Since U.S. wheat now 
costs less relative to EU wheat, Morocco switches to purchase a larger portion 
of its wheat imports from the U.S.. Therefore, even though Morocco imports 
less wheat in total, the amount of U.S. wheat imported is basically the same as 
(in fact, slightly higher than) in the base solution. 
20 In the model without switching costs both exporting countries clearly reduce their level of 
export subsidies. 
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The effect of the formation of the wheat exporting cartel on export subsidies 
is substantial. Compared to the base solution, exporting firms now have much 
more market power. By cooperating they are able to extract massive export 
subsidies from both exporting countries. The U.S. government awards subsidies 
that are almost seven times as high as before, and the EU provides export 
subsidies that are more than four times as large as in the base solution. Natu- 
rally, with export subsidies of this magnitude governments are worse-off. 
From the cartel members point of view considerable improvement has oc-
curred. A relatively small decrease in total exports is companied by large 
increases in prices and enormous increases in export subsidies received from the 
governments of exporting countries. Profits of the U.S. firm are approximately 
four times the base solution profits, and for the EU firm profits are over four 
times as high as in the base case. However, the formation of a cartel is prohib-
ited by antitrust laws of both the EU and the U.S. Therefore, the exporting firm 
cartel is unlikely to occur unless a form of tacit collusion takes place. In 
addition, it would not be possible for political reasons to maintain such high 
export subsidies. 
Welfare levels of exporting countries in the first three scenarios are com-
pared. Both exporting countries benefit the most in the base solution. If the 
imperfectly competitive market structure at the firm level is fully eliminated, 
then exporting countries are worse off. This is because in the base case export-
ing firms with some degree of market power were able charge a higher price, 
benefiting their governments as well. However, in the cartel scenario exporting 
firms' market power is maximized, and this enables them to extract very large 
export subsidies from governments, making governments again worse off. There-
fore, it seems that some degree of firm level market power is good for the 
exporting country's welfare, but in contrast, the worst case for the exporting 
country's welfare occurs when too much market power is given to the exporting 
firms. 
6.4.3.3. Order of Play 
6.4.3.3.1. Ex Post Game 
Another matter effecting firm level market power is timing in decisions. In most 
of our analysis so far;governments are assumed to move before firms in each 
period21. However, the wheat export subsidy program in the U.S. and in the EU 
that allows firms to bid for export subsidies seems to suggest the reverse order. 
Exporting firms negotiate a price in the importing country first and then request 
a subsidy from their government. In this sense, the subsidy is given ex post. 
21  This timing issue was also discussed in the base solution section of this chapter. 
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Since in this so called ex post game, firms are the first-movers (Stackelberg 
leaders in each period), they have even more market power than in the game 
where governments are the first-movers (ex ante game). 
With the help of a simplified theoretical one-period model (without switch-
ing costs) it is shown in Appendix D that export subsidies, prices paid by an 
importing country, and profits of exporting firms are higher in an ex post game 
than an ex ante game. Export volumes and exporting country welfares, on the 
other hand, were shown to be lower than in the ex ante game. Results of our 
empirical multi-period switching cost model are consistent with these results. 
As Stackelberg leaders, the exporting firms' positions in the market are very 
strong. They are charging much higher prices than in the base solution. Price 
paid by Morocco on U.S. wheat is 42 percent higher and the EU wheat price is 
48 percent than in the base solution. In addition, exporting firms are able to 
extract enormous export subsidies from their governments. The export subsidy 
of U.S. wheat is more than twice as high as the subsidy level of the ex ante game 
in which firms behave collusively. On the EU side, the exports subsidy is 58 
percent higher than in the ex ante game with a firm cartel. 
Naturally, high price levels imply a reduction in Moroccan wheat imports. 
U.S. wheat exports to Morocco are 36.73 thousand tons (27 percent) smaller 
than in the base case, and EU exports are reduced by 14 thousand tons (17 
percent). From the exporting countries point of view, very large export subsidy 
expenditures clearly outweigh the increases in export revenues. Therefore, ex-
porting countries are worse off in the ex post scenario than in the base solution. 
Obviously, the benefits are captured by the exporting firms. This can be seen 
from profits levels that are six and seven times as large as in the base solution 
for the U.S. firm and the EU firm, respectively. 
Earlier in this chapter it was shown that the ex post model greatly exagger-
ates the level of market power that exporting firms have. In comparison with 
actual data, the ex post model suggested prices that were almost twice as high as 
actual prices. Exports volumes were lower than what is observed, and the levels 
of export subsidies that they extract from the governments were empirically 
unacceptable. Since the empirical model with ex ante (governments moving 
first) structure of the game performed much better, we have used it in our 
analyses instead of the ex post game. It is also important to keep in mind that if 
the firms behave perfectly competitively, then the order of decisions becomes 
irrelevant, since firms always set their prices equal to their marginal cost. 
6.4.3.3.2. Simultaneous Move Game 
In our base solution game, exporting countries' governments were first-movers, 
and in the ex post game they were followers. In order to complete the discussion 
on order of play, the final scenario explores a game in which no one is a leader 
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(or follower). That is, in each period exporting countries' governments and 
exporting firms set their strategic variables (export subsidies and prices) simul- 
taneously. 
In the preceding section it was shown that the ex post game's ability to 
describe observed behavior in the Moroccan wheat market was much worse 
than the base solutions' ability. In this section we examine how market agents' 
behaviors differ under this third alternative institutional arrangement (i.e., a 
simultaneous move game structure) and how well this game structure performs 
in describing observed behavior in comparison with the previous two game 
structures. 
Since in the simultaneous move game exporting countries' governments are 
no longer leaders, they have less market power than in the base solution (ex ante 
game). This means that both U.S. government and EU government award larger 
export subsidies than in the base solution. The export subsidy of U.S. wheat is 
increased from $34.95 per ton to $79.48 per ton while the export subsidy of EU 
wheat is increased from $79.57 per ton to $126.41 per ton. Exporting firms' 
market power, on the other hand, has changed very little from the base solution. 
Therefore, the additional export subsidies that exporting firms now receive from 
their governments are mostly transferred to wheat prices. The price paid by 
Morocco on U.S. wheat is $42.71 per ton lower in the simultaneous move game 
than in the base solution and the reduction in the EU wheat price is $51.02 per 
ton. These lower prices imply that Morocco is able to buy more of both wheats. 
However, a much larger increase occurs in exports of U.S. wheat (19 percent 
increase) than in exports of EU wheat (6 percent increase). This is because 
Moroccan import demand for U.S. wheat is more sensitive to own-price changes 
than is Moroccan import demand for EU wheat. 
Both exporting countries' governments are worse off under the simultaneous 
move game scenario than in the base solution. Although wheat exports to 
Morocco are increased, the considerably lower prices reduce export revenues 
for both exporting countries. In addition, much higher export subsidy expendi-
tures take place. Wheat exporting firms, on the other hand, are able to capture 
larger profits than in the base solution. This is because they are exporting larger 
amounts of wheat with approximately the same total price (price paid by Mo-
rocco + export subsidy) as in the base solution. The increase in the U.S. firm's 
profits (22.4 percent) is larger than the increase in the EU firm's profits (1.3 
percent) because exports of U.S. wheat are increased more than exports of EU 
wheat. 
When simultaneous move game is compared with ex post game it can be 
seen that simultaneous move game provides results which are much closer to 
actual behavior. However, the base solution (ex ante game) outcome is still 
preferred over the simultaneous move outcome, as it captures more accurately 
observed behavior. 
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6.5. Conclusions 
Several tasks were accomplished in this chapter. Additions and modifications 
needed to make the previously created theoretical framework empirically appli-
cable were presented. The chapter provided the base solution of the empirical 
model, whose predicted values of the endogenous variables were compared to 
actual values (Table 6.2). Finally, the empirical model was used to analyze 
effects of changes in the economic environment. 
On average, model solutions were consistent with observed data. However, 
prediction errors occurred because domestic production and consumption of 
wheat in the exporting countries were not included in the model. Therefore, 
effects of changes in the domestic production and consumption levels on trading 
behavior were not captured by this empirical model. Another reason why pre-
diction errors arose is because the model assumed that the governments' objec-
tive functions have the same structure in each time period. However, in reality 
values in the govemments' objective function are changing over time. Since 
such changes in the govemments' objective functions are not captured by the 
empirical model, it limits the model's ability to describe long term actual 
behaviors when such changes take place in the market. 
When effects of changes in the economic environment were analyzed, it was 
first shown that switching costs caused the EU and the U.S. to compete more 
aggressively. Higher export subsidies were awarded by exporting countries and 
lower prices were set by exporting firms than in the absence of switching costs. 
Exporting countries' incentives to increase market share dominated their incen-
tives to exploit current market share, and so led to lower prices and higher 
export subsidies in markets with switching costs than in markets without switch-
ing costs. Hence, the introduction of switching costs to the modeling framework 
provided an intuitively appealing explanation why market share is often empha-
sized as a goal and a measure of successful export performance. 
On the other hand, the opportunity cost of public funds had an opposite 
effect on U.S. wheat and EU wheat exports. When the opportunity cost of public 
funds was increased, attractiveness of export subsidies as a trade policy tool was 
reduced. Thus, exporting countries are less willing to get involved in a tough 
subsidy war when the opportunity cost of public funds is high. 
Analysis of altemative institutional arrangements showed that noncoopera-
tive behavior of the EU and the U.S. has resulted in a problematic situation in 
which unilateral elimination of the export subsidy program is always the worst 
scenario for the country that eliminates its subsidies. The results also provided 
some insight for the often suggested link between the MacSharry CAP reform 
and actual GATT agreement. Without the CAP reform, constraints on export 
subsidies set by GATT would have been welfare reducing for the EU (in its 
wheat trade to Morocco). However, CAP reform resulted in a large decrease in 
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marginal costs of EU wheat exporting firms, and so, made EU wheat more 
competitive in the Moroccan wheat market. Consequently, GATT restrictions in 
export subsidies became less binding on the optimal behavior of the EU. There-
fore, these results were consistent with the notion that CAP reform was an 
important element in the process of reaching GATT agreement in export sub-
sidy reductions. 
The last set of scenarios studied the effects that firm level market power has 
on behaviors of the EU and the U.S. It was shown to he important for both the 
EU and the U.S. to he able to prevent formation of an exporting firm level 
cartel. In cooperation exporting firms can (in theory) extract very large export 
subsidies from the governments of exporting countries, making the exporting 
countries worse off. However, some degree of firm level market power seems to 
he welfare improving for the exporting countries, since with market power 
exporting firms are able charge higher price for their wheat than in the case of 
perfectly competitive firms. When this positive effect of higher price received 
for the exported wheat exceeds the negative effect of exporting firm extracting 
higher export subsidies from the government, then exporting countries should 
prefer an imperfectly competitive firm level market structure over a perfectly 
competitive market stru.cture. 
When timing in decisions was reversed (from ex ante game to ex post game), 
exporting firms position became very strong in the market. As Stackelberg 
leaders, they were simultaneously able to charge high wheat prices and extract 
very large export subsidies at the expense of the importing country and of 
exporting countries' governments. When the comparison between ex post game 
results and actual data was made, it was clear that the ex post model greatly 
exaggerated the level of market power that exporting firms have. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUM1VIARY, CONCLUSIONS, SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The European Union and the United States were described as two noncoopera-
tively behaving "super-powers" in the intemational wheat market, whose ac-
tions in the market have an influence on each other's agricultural policies as 
well as on world market prices. The most significant strategic variable for these 
countries has been an export subsidy, refiecting the producer bias of trade 
policy. Subsidized exports of EU and U.S. wheat are sold abroad by large 
exporting firms, and some evidence was provided that firm level price competi-
tion is oligopolistic (imperfect) in nature. 
Another important aspect of intemational wheat trade is the behavior of an 
importing country. Several factors affect an importing country's purchasing 
decisions. The price of the product is an obvious, and often the most important, 
factor. However, in reality it is very seldom observed that an importing country 
purchases all of its wheat imports from the least expensive supplier, as is 
suggested by traditional spatial equilibrium models. Another factor affecting an 
importing country's decision to buy wheat is the quality of wheat. For example, 
qualitative characteristics of EU wheat and U.S. wheat are different, requiring a 
model of product differentiation to be used when market behavior is studied. 
One general group of factors that also affects an importing country' s pur-
chasing decisions is called switching costs. These costs of switching from one 
wheat exporter to another, which are home by the importing country, might 
exist for many reasons. An importer incurs costs when negotiating a contract or 
agreement with a supplier, and these transactions costs with a new exporter may 
be higher than with an existing exporter. 
Another category is leaming costs. There is more risk involved when buying 
from a new, unfamiliar source than when buying from an existing supplier. 
There also might exist political costs of switching between exporters. One 
would expect products supplied by political allies to be viewed differently from 
others. In addition, guaranteed credit programs and govemment relationships 
can induce switching costs. 
Armington-type trade models have been developed to account for features 
that differentiate commodities according to country of origin. These models 
exhibit much smoother changes in trade shares than the traditional spatial equi-
librium model, and account more adequately for observed trade flows than the 
traditional spatial equilibrium model. However, one problem with Armington-
type trade models is that they are static models in which the differentiation 
between wheat suppliers is captured using a constant elasticity of substitution 
parameter. Effects of switching costs, on the other hand, are dynamic in nature, 
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and in order to capture those effects a dynamic modeling framework is needed. 
Agricultural trade modeling literature was reviewed in Chapter III. It was 
recognized that game-theoretical methods, which allow us to incorporate strate-
gic interactions between players in the market, have been used in the more 
recent literature (e.g., Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), Thursby and Thursby (1990)). 
However, the majority of these studies used static models in their analysis, even 
though in practice, firms and governments are interacting repeatedly. The most 
commonly used approach has been conjectural variations, which has been criti-
cized (e.g., Tirole 1988) as an ad hoc way to model dynamic features in a static 
framework. In order to introduce switching costs into the conceptual framework 
an explicitly dynamic modeling approach becomes necessary. So far, a very 
limited number of dynamic, game theoretic agricultural trade studies exist (e.g., 
Karp and McCalla 1983, McNally 1993), and none of them have employed the 
switching cost approach. 
The first objective of this study then was to develop a dynamic, game 
theoretic model of the international wheat market that incorporates strategic 
interactions among players who exercise market power, and that simultaneously 
captures the impacts of switching costs on players' strategies. This was aCcom-
plished in two stages. First, a theoretic two-period model of oligopolistic com-
petition with differentiated products and switching costs was constructed. The 
model was developed such that the importing country faced no switching costs 
in the first period, but developed switching costs as a result of its first-period 
purchases, so exporting countries and firms had some additional market power 
in the second (final) period. In each period, the exporting country governments 
simultaneously chose their export subsidies (taxes if negative) to maximize 
domestic welfare — defined as export revenues less export subsidy expenditures. 
Thus, from the political economy point of view this objective function was 
weighted towards domestic producers, since the weight on domestic consumer 
surplus was set to zero. After that, firms in both exporting countries simultane-
ously set their prices to maximize profits. 
It is important to keep in mind that this model is a so called third-market 
model in which exporting countries (the EU and U.S.) and their exporting firms 
compete only in a single third market (Morocco). This simplification was useful 
in allowing the strategic effects of certain policy shocks to be seen in pure form. 
However, domestic wheat production, stocks and consumption of exporting 
countries were not included in the model. So, one way to describe the settings 
under which the model operates is the surplus disposal concept. That is, both 
exporting countries hold very large amounts of wheat that need to be either 
exported or stored, and magnitudes of wheat exported to one importing country 
do not provide much of relief to the overall pressure to export. So, under these 
circumstances when the government of each exporting country is awarding 
export subsidies to enhance wheat exports to the importing country, one reason- 
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able form of its objective function would seem to he to maximize export rev-
enues less costs of export subsidies. However, when impacts of policy shocks 
that may cause considerable changes in domestic production, stocks and/or 
consumption of exporting countries are analyzed, welfare effects of the model 
should be analyzed with care since those changes in domestic production, stocks 
and consumption are not captured by this model. 
7.1. Theoretical Findings 
The two-period model was explained in detail to highlight the theoretical effects 
that the introduction of switching costs has on the behavior of exporting coun-
tries (both firms and governments). It was found that exporting countries' 
governments awarded lower export subsidies (or increased export taxes) and 
exporting firms charged higher prices in the second period than in an otherwise 
identical market without switching costs. The reason was that each exporting 
firm now had an incentive to exploit the importing country that, due to switch-
ing costs, had become partly locked in to the firm as a supplier. Higher prices 
implied that lower export subsidies were needed. In addition, the results sup-
ported the intuition that export subsidies (export taxes) were lower (higher) and 
prices were higher than in the initial period, in which the buyer had not yet 
become attached to any wheat supplier. These results are consistent with the 
results of To (1994). 
It was not possible to unambiguously show, however, that either an export 
tax or an export subsidy in the second period is always the optimal policy for the 
government of the exporting country without empirically analyzing the market. 
This differed from To's (1994) proposition, "in the second period both countries 
set export taxes", because the government's objective function in his model is 
different from the one used in this research. In To's model government maxi-
mizes the domestic firm's profit level plus tax revenues, whereas in our model 
the government's objective was designed to capture producer bias in agricul-
tural policy. 
Our model suggested that the smaller the wheat sector's marginal costs were, 
the more likely it was that an export tax would have been the optimal policy in 
the second period. In addition, an exporting country was more likely to set an 
export tax as the optimal policy when its first period exports were large and 
marginal switching costs were high, because in this case the importing country 
was tightly locked in to the exporting country. 
Switching costs implied that second-period prices, profits and exporting 
countries' welfare were increasing, and export subsidies were decreasing in first 
period market share, while in the absence of switching costs there was no 
connection between the markets in periods 1 and 2. Since exporting firms' 
second-period profits and exporting countries' second-period welfares depended 
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on first-period exports, switching costs made exporting countries compete more 
aggressively for market share in the first period than they would have if they 
were simply maximizing first-period profits and welfare. Hence, market shares 
matter, providing an explanation for the emphasis placed, by USDA for exam-
ple, on market share as a measure of export performance. The more aggressive 
competition on market shares implied that first-period prices, profits and export-
ing countries' welfares were lower and export subsidies were higher than in a 
market without switching costs. In fact, it was even possible that in order to 
capture a larger market share in the first period, dumping could have become a 
rational behavior of the exporting firm. 
This two-period model can he seen as an alternative framework to To's 
model to analyze strategic trade policy in the market where switching costs 
exist. Some of the other differences between our model and To's (in addition to 
the alternative government objective function) were that our model explicitly 
included switching costs in the model and, while To assumed Hotelling con-
sumer demand, we derived a linear demand structure from a quasilinear utility 
function. The main motivation to provide this alternative method was its more 
appropriate form for empirical implementation in the case of intemational wheat 
trade. Empirical application of the model with switching costs was needed in 
order to better analyze effects that changes in the economic environment have 
on players' behaviors in that market. 
Two-period models are not the most satisfactory for analyzing the effects of 
policy shocks or other shocks in the economic environment, since in the real 
world we have more than two periods and any given period is not really well 
classified as either a first or a second period, but as some intermediate period 
which is not without switching costs. Therefore, the second task was to extend 
the two-period model into a more general finite-horizon multi-period model of 
competition in a market with switching costs. Other generalizations of this 
empirical multi-period model included more general (though linear) import 
demand functions, asymmetric marginal costs and the introduction of opportu-
nity costs of public funds to capture the fact that raising tax revenues to cover 
export subsidy expenditures incurs administrative costs and creates distortions 
in other sectors of the economy. 
7.2. Empirical Findings 
The next step in this research was to econometrically estimate import demand 
functions for the empirical model. Since in the case study of this dissertation 
competition between EU and U.S. wheat in Morocco was analyzed, Moroccan 
import demand functions for EU and U.S. wheat needed to be estimated. Two 
maun reasons for re-estimation of these import demand functions arose. First, 
this study differed from most earlier studies that estimated behavioral equations 
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in international wheat trade in that monthly data instead of annual data were 
used in the estimation. Monthly data were preferred because strategic interac-
tion between players in this market happens on a transaction by transaction 
basis, and one important goal of this research was to capture that behavior.' Use 
of annual data would have concealed much of the strategic interaction occurring 
in this market as well as much of the price responsive behavior by the importing 
country. Another reason for econometric estimation was to analyze the statisti-
cal significance of switching cost parameters in order to validate our new 
agricultural trade modeling approach. 
Econometric estimates of import demand functions suggested that switching 
costs exist in the Moroccan wheat import market. They further suggested that 
costs of switching away from U.S. wheat were larger than costs of switching 
away from EU wheat, meaning that somehow the U.S. has been able to lock in 
Morocco more tightly to itself than the EU was able to do. Also, when the own-
price and cross-price import demand elasticities were compared with those of 
previous studies, it was found that this study provided more elastic estimates. 
One important reason for more elastic price elasticity estimates was that the 
monthly data reflected better the more price sensitive behavior of the importing 
country than commonly used annual data do. 
In chapter VI several different scenarios were performed and results were 
compared to a base solution of the empirical model (which corresponded roughly 
to the pre-GATT situation). One group of scenarios analyzed the effects that 
changes in key parameter values have on the behaviors of exporting firms and 
exporting countries. In particular, effects of switching costs and of opportunity 
costs of public funds were studied. In addition, effects of different degrees of 
product differentiation, of different marginal costs and of parameter asymmetries 
were analyzed. 
In a multi-period framework with switching costs, exporting countries in 
each period face a tradeoff in which they can either exploit their current market 
shares with higher prices and lower export subsidies or compete for larger 
market shares with lower prices and larger subsidies. Beggs and Klemperer 
(1992) state that we should expect firms' incentives to exploit current market 
share to dominate their incentives to increase market share that could be ex-
ploited later, and so lead to higher prices in markets with switching costs than in 
markets without switching costs. This research answers two questions that 
follow from Beggs and Klemperer: 
Do exporting firms charge higher prices and collect larger rents 
when switching costs exist in international wheat trade? 
Ts the need for export subsidies smaller when switching costs exist 
in the international wheat market? 
1  In fact, daily or transaction-by-transaction data is preferred but was not available. 
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In contrast to presumption of Beggs and Klemperer, the results of this study 
indicated that exporting firms charge lower wheat prices and higher export 
subsidies are awarded by governments of exporting countries when switching 
costs are present. Therefore, with switching costs the exporting countries com- 
peted more aggressively on the Moroccan wheat market. Asymmetry in esti-
mated marginal switching cost parameters in favor of U.S. wheat made the U.S. 
exporting firm able to earn larger profits and the EU exporting firm to earn 
smaller profits than without switching costs. 
Abbott et al. (1987) found that a targeted export subsidy program, like EEP, 
can be welfare improving because it allows an exporting country to price dis-
criminate. By subsidizing relatively elastic markets, the exporting country is in 
effect taxing countries with relatively less elastic excess demand schedules. 
Switching costs make a repeat-purchaser's excess demand more inelastic. This 
means that heavier subsidization may be required by an exporting country to 
increase its market share in a market with switching costs. 
The empirical model also provides answers to following research questions: 
Do switching costs make the EEP more costly than without consid-
eration of these costs? 
If switching costs make a targeted subsidy program's costs higher, 
does the unilateral termination of the EEP in a market with switch- 
ing costs then become a more attractive export policy choice for the 
U.S. government than in a market without switching costs? 
With switching costs, the higher per unit export subsidy led to lower price of 
U.S. wheat than in the market without switching costs. This made U.S. wheat 
more attractive to Morocco, resulting in an increase in U.S. wheat imports to 
Morocco. From the trade policy perspective, this suggests that costs of export 
promotion programs may be higher than often expected. The United States 
introduced the EEP program in 1985 to gain market share in the world wheat 
market. If the USDA did not take into account switching costs in its calcula-
tions, our results indicated that in markets like the Moroccan wheat market costs 
from the EEP bonuses for the budget of the U.S. government would have been 
underestimated. 
Switching costs did not make it more attractive for the U.S. to unilaterally 
eliminate its export subsidy program, however. This is because in the market 
with switching costs market shares matter more than in a market without them. 
Therefore, even after unilateral elimination of export subsidies by the U.S. the 
EU continued to aggressively subsidize its wheat exports in order to capture 
more market share. Therefore, unilateral elimination of export subsidies by the 
U.S., in the market like the Moroccan wheat market where switching costs 
appear to exist, would have resulted in a larger decrease in export volumes 
accompanied by lower prices paid by the importing country than in a market 
without switching costs. 
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The results further showed that the exporting country and the exporting firm 
clearly benefit from the increased importer's costs of switching to rival's wheat. 
Because of these benefits, exporting countries have incentives to exercise trade 
policies that would help to create switching costs. Some kinds of switching 
costs can be seen as the result of deliberate exporting country actions. For 
example, exporting countries' guaranteed credit programs may be seen as one 
way to create switching costs, since a loan under guaranteed credit program can 
only be used to purchase wheat from the country who provides the credit 
guarantees for that loan. 
Market shares are a commonly used measures of export performance. Gehlhar 
and Vollrath state that the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for example, uses 
market shares as an indicator of export performance. They also say that because 
of the association between export performance and market share, the loss in 
U.S. agricultural market share concerns policymakers. The empirical model of 
Moroccan wheat import market was able to provide some insight into this 
importance attached to market shares by exporting countries. If an exporting 
country is able to increase its market share, this creates additional costs for the 
importing country (Morocco) to switch away from that exporting country's 
wheat in the future. Each exporting country and each exporting firm realize this. 
Therefore, their behaviors are not just driven by maximization of current period 
welfare (exporting country) and profits (exporting firm), but also by the desire 
to increase current market share which could improve future welfare of that 
exporting country and future profits of the exporting firm. Hence, the notion of 
switching costs in the market provides an intuitive explanation why exporting 
countries and firms are often concerned with market share in addition to short 
run welfare and profits. 
The results of one group of scenarios illustrated effects of the opportunity 
costs of public funds. When the additional welfare costs of public funds were 
ignored, then the U.S. government as well as the EU government was more 
willing to use large export subsidies as a policy tool than in the case in which 
there existed additional costs of public funds. Therefore, the two superpowers 
engaged in a more severe subsidy war when fighting over market shares in the 
Moroccan wheat market. This excessive use of subsidies led to a reduction in 
total discounted future welfare of each exporting country. On the other hand, 
exporting firms' total discounted future profits improved. 
The higher the opportunity costs of public funds were, the more conserva-
tively both exporting countries were in awarding export subsidies. This implied 
that higher prices were charged by exporting firms and export volumes were 
smaller. Since attractiveness of export subsidies as a policy tool was dimin-
ished, exporting countries did not get involved in as tough a subsidy war game. 
Therefore, total discounted welfare of these countries increased. Strongly in-
creased budgetary concerns of the EU and the U.S. in recent years can be seen 
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as increased opportunity costs of public funds, and so provides a partial expla-
nation for reduced export subsidies by the EU and the U.S. in international 
wheat trade. 
Econometric estimations in Chapter V showed that EU wheat and U.S. wheat 
were imperfect substitutes in the Moroccan wheat market. When the effects of 
product differentiation were further examined, familiar results from the indus-
trial organization literature arose. An increase in product differentiation gave 
more market power to the exporting side by reducing price competition among 
exporting firms and export subsidy competition between governments. Greater 
product differentiation led to both exporting firms charging higher prices and 
both exporting country governments providing lower export subsidies than in 
the base solution. These findings implied that total discounted profits of export-
ing firms increased. Thus, the results are consistent with static theoretical Bertrand 
(as well as Cournot) games with product differentiation, which say that the 
profits of firms increase when the pro ducts become more differentiated. 
Another group of scenarios illustrated how the alternative institutional ar-
rangements (game structures) in international wheat trade change the levels of 
export subsidies (or taxes), prices, export volumes, and the payoffs for four 
players: the EU, the U.S., the EU wheat exporting firm, and the U.S. wheat 
exporting firm. A free trade scenario and the outcomes when either the EU or 
the U.S. unilaterally reforms by eliminating its export subsidies were consid-
ered. Collusive behavior by EU and U.S. governments was also examined. Two 
different issues were examined regarding the Uruguay Round GATT agreement. 
The first looked at the effects of the final GATT outcome by imposing subsidy 
expenditure limits. The second issue analyzed how the welfare effects of new 
GATT agreement differ when effects of CAP reform were taken into account. 2 
Analysis of alternative institutional arrangements showed that noncoopera-
tive behavior of the EU and the U.S. has resulted in a problematic situation in 
which unilateral elimination of the export subsidy program is always the worst 
scenario for the country that eliminates its subsidies. The improvement of U.S. 
welfare in the free trade case explained well its initial willingness to fully 
eliminate export subsidies. In fact, it was found that the level of U.S. welfare in 
free trade was practically the same as in the case when EU unilaterally elimi-
nated its export subsidies. However, for the EU only the case in which it 
unilaterally reformed export subsidies resulted in a worse outcome than under 
free trade. 
2  Whenever welfare effects of different scenarios are discussed in here, it is important to keep in 
mind that the empirical model is a third-market model in which the EU and U.S. and their 
exporting firms compete only in the single third market, Morocco. Therefore, the results of 
different scenarios are not meant to be global assessments of alternative institutional arrange-
ments, but instead illustrate their impacts on exporting country behavior in the one importing 
country market. 
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The cartel arrangement between policymakers for the EU and the U.S. al-
lowed the exporting countries' governments to capture almost ali of the market 
power. Thus, wheat exports were heavily taxed. Although, welfares of both 
exporting countries were higher than in any other institutional arrangement 
studied, the cartel's appearance is not very likely. Joint setting of export taxes 
by the EU and the U.S. is probably GATT-illegal, or at least politically incor-
rect. 
These results suggest that if the Uruguay Round GATT agreement (reduc-
tion in export subsidies) had occurred before the EU's 1992 CAP reform, then 
the qualitative effects of the actual GATT outcome would have been the same 
as under free trade, but smaller in magnitude. However, the MacSharry CAP 
reform lowered marginal costs of the EU exporting firm due to the reduction in 
the EU's internal support prices. In response to the reduction of EU support 
prices, a major decrease occurred in the level of export subsidy that the EU 
government set. Although the EU government greatly decreased its subsidy 
level, it still provided a subsidy that kept EU wheat competitive against U.S. 
wheat in the Moroccan market. In fact, the combination of export subsidy (even 
though lower than before) and lower marginal cost made it possible for the EU 
exporting firm to charge a lower price than before CAP reform. The lower price 
allowed the EU to capture some market share from the U.S. Therefore, these 
findings suggested that the EU as well as its exporting firm benefited more from 
wheat trade to Morocco after the CAP reform than before it. 
The impacts of the reduction in EU support prices on the U.S. were such that 
the U.S. exporting firm was now actually facing more severe price competition 
from its EU rival in the Moroccan wheat market. The U.S. firm was, therefore, 
forced to lower its export price. This lower price meant that the U.S. govern-
ment had to provide larger EEP-bonuses for the exporting firm to keep U.S. 
wheat competitive in this import market. However, the reduction in the U.S. 
wheat price was still less than in the EU wheat price. Therefore, the U.S. lost a 
small portion of its market share. Since the price and exports of U.S. wheat 
decreased and export subsidy expenditures increased, the reduction in support 
prices of the EU made the U.S. benefit less from its wheat trade to Morocco. 
Also, the total discounted profits of the U.S. exporting firm were lower. 
Since required GATT reductions in export subsidy levels were made from 
their pre-CAP reform base levels, MacSharry CAP reform helped to make the 
GATT upper bound for the EU export subsidy more acceptable. Thus, the 
simulation results of this research are consistent with the notion that MacSharry 
CAP reform was an important element in the process to reach GATT agreement 
on export subsidy reductions. 
The final objective of this research was to use the empirical dynamic game 
model with switching costs to investigate effects that different levels of firm 
market power have on trade outcomes. It was shown to be important for both the 
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EU and the U.S. to he able to prevent formation of an exporting firm cartel. By 
cooperating, exporting firms could extract very large export subsidies from the 
governments of exporting countries, making the exporting countries worse off. 
However, some degree of firm level market power seems to be welfare improv-
ing for the exporting countries, because with market power, exporting firms are 
able to charge higher prices for their wheat than in the case of perfectly com-
petitive firm. Thus, the results of this study suggest that when this positive 
effect of higher price received for the exported wheat exceeds the negative 
effect of exporting firm extracting higher export subsidies from their govern-
ment, then exporting countries should prefer an imperfectly competitive firm 
level market structure over a perfectly competitive market structure. 
In addition, timing in players decisions affects the degree of market power 
that each player has. In most of our analysis, governments were assumed to 
move before firms in each period. However, the wheat export subsidy program 
in the U.S. and in the EU that allows firms to bid for export subsidies seems to 
suggest the reverse order. Exporting firms negotiate a price in the importing 
country first and then request a subsidy from the government. In this sense, the 
subsidy is given ex post. An ex post scenario was presented to study effects of 
playing order. 
When the order of the play is reversed, firms are the first-movers (Stackelberg 
leaders in each period), and they have more market power than in the game 
where governments are first-movers (ex ante game). The results here provide 
evidence that export subsidies, prices paid by an importing country, and profits 
of exporting firms are higher in an ex post game than an ex ante game. Export 
volumes and exporting country welfare, on the other hand, were shown to he 
lower than in the ex ante game. As Stackelberg leaders, the exporting firms' 
position in the market is very strong. It was also shown that the ex post model 
greatly exaggerated the level of market power that exporting firms appear to 
have in actual wheat trade. In comparison with actual data, the ex post model 
suggested prices that were almost twice as high as observed prices. Export 
volumes were lower than what is observed, and the levels of export subsidies 
extracted from governmenIsere unacceptably high. The empirical model with 
ex ante (governments moving fit) structure of the game performed much better 
in describing observed behavior. N 
In order to complete the discussioi-i order of play, a game in which no one 
is a Stackelberg leader (or follower) was NstuNdied. That is, in each period export-
ing countries' governments and exporting 'firms set their strategic variables 
(export subsidies and prices) simultaneously. When this simultaneous move 
game was compared with the ex post game it provided results which were much 
closer to actual behavior. However, the base solution (ex ante game) outcome 
was still preferred over the simultaneous move outcome. 
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It is also important to keep in mind that if the firms behave perfectly competi-
tively, then the order of decisions becomes irrelevant, since firms always set 
prices equal to their marginal costs. 
7.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
This research produced several empirical as well as theoretical findings that 
improve our understanding of large exporting country behavior in the interna-
tional wheat market. However, some problems with the empirical model pre-
sented in this dissertation emerged from the results presented in Chapter VI. 
Future researchers will need to consider these problems when using the frame-
work developed here to study international commodity trade. First is the issue of 
firm level competition. The model assumed that one aggregate exporting firm 
exported wheat from each exporting country. That is, a duopoly structure was 
assumed at the firm stage of each period. Actually, there is more than one firm 
that exports EU wheat as well as U.S. wheat. Therefore, too much market power 
was assigned to exporting firms, implying higher prices than what we observe. 
On the other hand, in the absence of firm level market power, prices paid by 
Morocco were shown to be lower than observed prices, suggesting that interna-
tional wheat exporting firms are not just price takers either. 
Introduction of more than one firm selling each exporting country's wheat 
should be one area of future research. However, one problem with introducing 
several exporting firms is that it substantially complicates the model structure. 
Another problem is that more specific data would be required to do empirical 
analysis, and that data (e.g., each firm' s marginal costs) may be very difficult to 
obtain. On the other hand, if it is assumed that ali wheat exported from, for 
example, the U.S. is homogeneous good then ali firms exporting U.S. wheat 
would be involved in price competition with homogeneous product. The Bertrand 
paradox states that price competition with a homogeneous good (and without 
capacity constraints) reduces prices to marginal costs, thereby making firms 
earn zero profits (i.e., this boils down to the perfectly competitive firm scenario 
presented in Chapter VI) (Tirole 1988). However, the Bertrand paradox can 
been solved by introducing capacity constraints for the firms. Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983) show (in a particular two-period dynamic game) that for 
some market games where two firms choose how much to produce in period 1, 
and then set prices in period 2, a subgame perfect equilibrium yields the exact 
quantity produced and price as those in a one-shot Cournot game, where firms 
choose only how much to produce. 
The second weakness of the model was the structure of the government 
objective function. The opportunity cost of public funds was assumed to be 
fixed over time. However in reality, values in the governments' objective func-
tion are changing over time. The lobbying power of different special interest 
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groups does not stay the same. Farmers' ability as a special interest group to 
provide pressure on countries' trade policy decisions has been decreasing over 
time, more so in the U.S. than in the EU. An area of future research should be to 
develop a model which emphasizes two-way interaction between internal poli-
ties and international economic relations. 
The third problem of the empirical model was that it did not explicitly 
include domestic wheat production, stocks and consumption of exporting coun-
tries. This limited the model's ability to describe long term actual behavior 
when considerable changes took place in these domestic factors. Another area 
of future research should be to improve linkages between domestic behavioral 
equations and trade decisions. 
An improved understanding of the major players' behaviors in international 
wheat trade can have positive implications for future multinational trade nego-
tiations as well as for individual trading countries. On the one hand, the better 
the motives for existing export promotion policies are understood, the better the 
starting point that is provided for future GATT negotiations. On the other hand, 
it can help the EU and the U.S. to identify implications that their own behaviors 
in international wheat trade have on each other's behaviors as well as how other 
major trading countries' decisions affect to them. 
The research undertaken in this dissertation should be viewed as an effort to 
shed further light on behaviors of the European Union and the United States in 
international wheat trade. Switching costs provide an intuitive explanation why 
market shares matter as a measure of export performance. A large number of 
changes in economic environment were analyzed with the hope that a better 
understanding of strategic behaviors of the EU and the U.S. in international 
wheat trade has emerged, as well. 
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Appendix A. Supportive Numerical Analysis for the Comparative 
Statics Analysis of the Theoretic Two-period Model with Switching 
Costs. 
We strongly believe that the cornparative statics results shown in Chapter IV 
which explains the two period model are true unambiguously, but this belief 
does not mean much without providing a rigorous proof. Unfortunately, these 
analytical proofs are beyond our ability. We can derive the partial derivatives, 
pii> 0, as( las > 0, but signing them analytically has proven to be a very 
difficult task. The only thing left then is to try to fmd as much support as 
possible for our comparative statics results through nurnerical analysis. Natu-
rally, the use of numerical analysis is not a proof. However, if with numerous 
different values of parameters we are not able find a single counterexample for 
our statetnents, this could be interpreted as some degree of support for the 
comparatiVe statics reSults given at the end of two-period model section in 
Chapter IV. 
In the numerical analysis we rieed to look at results only in the relevant range 
of parameter values. The relevant range is dtawn from the assumptions and 
conditions that need to be satisfied in the model: 1) ali the paratneters ( a, b, e, 
,rl, c, 8) are positive, 2) b>e and r is small relative to b and e, 3) e2 / b2 is not 
too close to zerö, that is products are differentiated, but they åre reasonably 
close substitutesi 4) prices and export volumes are positive, 5) 	is small 
relatiVe to prices, 6) the second order conditions for a firm's problern and for a 
govemment's problem in the first-period have to be satisfied, and 7) discounted 
total profits in the. first period are nonnegative. 
Given these relevant ranges of parameter values we then take numerous 
points for each parameter within these ranges. GAMS is used to check signs of 
partial derivatives and those other statements given at the end of the two-period 
model section for ali combinationS of chosen parameter values that satisfy the 
above seven conditions. Signs of the partial derivatives are found as follows. 
ay 	IT(x + 8,0)— nx,0)
, where 0 contains ali Say we are looking at the sign of ax 
the other parameters except x and s is a small positive number. To do this 
numerically we simply first compute Y(x,0). Secondly, we compute Y(x + 
and fmally we subtract the first from the second to get a value that has the same 
sign as the above partial derivative. 
1 e2lb2 indicates the degree of product differentiation ranging from zero when the goods are 
independent to one when the goods are perfect substitutes. For more on this issue see Singh and 
Vives (1984). 
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Ali the points used in our numerical analysis are shown in Table Al. Note 
that not all of 710 permutations are relevant. Only those points were checked that 
satisfied the seven conditions shown above. Therefore, any combination of 
parameters that, for example, has e>b (i.e, import demand function has larger 
cross-price effect parameter than own-price effect parameter) or fails to satisfy 
the government s first period second-order conditions is outside the relevant 
range. 
In Chapter V we econometrically estimate parameter values for the multi-
period model that is used in our empifical analysis later on. Although the 
empirical multi-period model differs somewhat from the two-period model, 
those econometric estimates from Chapter V were used as basis for a one set of 
possible parameter values in the numerical analysis. The other parameter values 
were then picked on both sides of these values. For ali those parameter values 
the signs of partial derivatives as well as other results were as expected. That is, 
we could not find a counterexample. 
Table Al. Parameter Values Used in the Numerical Analysis. 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.83 
0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.309* 1 0.85 
1.465* 1.117* 0.816* 1 1 5 0.87 
5 5 4.5 5 5 10 0.9 
10 10 9.5 10 7 30 0.93 
20 20 19 20 10 50 0.95 
30 30 29 30 20 70 0.96 
50 50 49 50 25 90 0.99 
100 99 90 100 30 150 1 
* Values derived from the econometric estimates of Chapter V. 
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Appendix B. Data Used in the Dynamic Game Model of International 
Wheat Trade. 
This appendix provides the data used in the construction of our dynamic game 
model of international wheat trade. The first four columns in Table B1 are the 
data used in Chapter V to estimate Moroccan import demand equations. The last 
two columns provide the marginal cost data used to solve for the model's base 
solution in Chapter VI. The data are monthly time series data from July 1992 
through May 1996 for EU and U.S. wheat. 
Table B 1 . Monthly Wheat Exports From EU and U.S. to Morocco and 
Corresponding Monthly Prices Paid by Morocco and Marginal Costs for 
Exporting Firms. 
Trade flows 	Prices paid by 	Marginal costs for 
Morocco exporting firms 
Month 
U.S. 	EC 
export 	export 
metric tons metric tons 
U.S. 
price 
US$/ton 
EC 
price 
US$/ton 
U.S. 
marginal 
costs 
US$/ton 
EU 
marginal 
costs 
US$/ton 
Jul-92 0 143401 155.50 139.50 138.51 221.58 
Aug-92 76472 169248 119.11 139.50 133.36 217.91 
Sep-92 83103 106973 124.77 130.75 139.05 228.48 
Oct-92 78213 217961 128.43 133.75 141.25 233.89 
Nov-92 174060 129539 133.66 142.25 137.12 226.69 
Dec-92 60846 77689 124.20 148.00 143.05 236.42 
Jan-93 179940 39561 130.05 163.00 146.10 239.52 
Feb-93 246859 30419 134.46 166.00 148.56 239.28 
Mar-93 264777 17737 133.75 158.75 140.99 236.14 
Apr-93 274410 9515 129.36 156.75 136.58 245.55 
May-93 118634 0 119.83 144.75 130.93 249.26 
Jun-93 133974 0 108.32 130.25 119.94 237.26 
Jul-93 54857 151396 110.00 115.00 119.91 155.29 
Aug-93 142462 197469 103.19 109.75 120.48 152.39 
Sep-93 211939 62297 98.25 102.00 124.57 164.57 
Oct-93 95725 122849 110.87 109.50 129.23 172.53 
Nov-93 168562 55081 108.84 115.50 137.85 173.83 
Dec-93 165688 0 102.25 126.50 145.93 178.29 
Jan-94 117437 119376 115.46 126.25 145.20 200.69 
Feb-94 144041 157064 100.85 122.75 137.46 199.19 
Mar-94 62238 79870 94.89 121.50 133.78 202.82 
Apr-94 0 101632 152.00 99.25 133.05 202.90 
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Table Bl. continued. 
Month 
Trade flows 
U.S. 	EC 
export 	export 
metric tons metric tons 
Prices paid by 
Morocco 
U.S. 	EC 
price 	price 
US$/ton 	US$/ton 
Marginal costs for 
exporting firms 
U.S. 	EU 
marginal 	marginal 
costs 	costs 
US$/ton 	US$/ton 
May-94 24048 97549 153.00 105.50 131.48 212.28 
Jun-94 24807 0 152.00 112.50 131.54 214.51 
Jul-94 54833 0 143.00 110.88 122.86 180.35 
Aug-94 0 0 151.50 111.50 131.68 180.80 
Sep-94 0 0 167.00 147.63 144.68 194.61 
Oct-94 29499 31694 152.23 162.63 155.86 206.88 
Nov-94 0 0 #N/A 161.10 154.76 207.19 
Dec-94 0 6342 #N/A 161.92 154.39 206.94 
Jan-95 0 25945 #N/A 160.42 151.45 213.81 
Feb-95 0 152268 #N/A 158.13 149.76 182.14 
Mar-95 45913 166964 164.52 143.80 152.00 190.62 
Apr-95 6 191819 171.50 133.56 151.27 196.85 
May-95 12804 208806 155.61 138.95 158.61 195.74 
Jun-95 25416 217840 160.36 170.69 162.77 201.11 
Jul-95 0 108718 #N/A 191.75 173.80 180.15 
Aug-95 31494 65523 186.31 200.50 177.06 172.13 
Sep-95 52483 163648 198.31 206.50 184.24 178.73 
Oct-95 57610 65817 219.50 213.50 192.43 187.38 
Nov-95 56175 72259 220.50 219.00 195.00 193.73 
Dec-95 96831 102903 228.50 234.88 198.31 191.89 
Jan-96 59747 197923 223.50 223.90 194.87 193.75 
Feb-96 85876 25000 224.50 232.50 197.09 189.46 
Mar-96 92119 17391 220.00 225.88 197.42 189.84 
Apr-96 28619 100990 263.00 245.00 209.55 192.60 
May-96 0 29 250.50 268.58 224.98 195.09 
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Appendix C. Simulation Model Code for the Dynamic Game Model 
of International Wheat Trade. 
This appendix present the GAMS code for the base solution used in Chapter VI. 
SOFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST 
SINLINECOM { } 
SONTEXT 
GAMS CODE FOR THE EMPIRICAL MULTIPERIOD INTERNATIONAL 
WHEAT TRADE MODEL WITH SWITCHING COSTS 
SOFFTEXT 
SETS 
i 	Exporters /US,EU/ 
j 	Time period /1*21/ 
v(j) Time period /2*21/ ; 
ALIAS(r,j) ; 
************************************************************************* 
Import demand fimction estimates, opportunity costs of public funds, the dis-
count factor, and initial export volumes 
************************************************************************** 
SCALARS 
Discount factor 	 /0.99/ 
Cross-price effect on imports 	 /0.81646/; 
PARAMETERS 
b(i) Own-price effect on imports 
a(i) Intercept of the demand function 
M0(i) Initial export volume 
n(i) Marginal switching cost 
z(i) Marginal opportunity cost of gov fimds 
/US 1.3274, EU 0.90633/ 
/US 1.6388, EU 1.2916/ 
/US 0.88598, EU 0.87118/ 
/US 0.35373, EU 0.26385/ 
/US 1.332, EU 1.332/ 
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Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.47) in period j 
************************************************************************ 
KO(i,j), Kl(i,j), K2(i,j), K3(i,j), K4(i,j) 
************************************************************************* 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.48) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
DO(i,j), D1(i,j), D2(i,j), D3(i,j), D4(i,j) 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.51) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
HO(i,j), H1(i,j), H2(i,j) 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.52) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
E0(i,j), El(i,j), E2(i,j) 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.53) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
GO(i,j), Gl(i,j), G2(i,j) 
************************************************************************* 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.54) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
A0(i,j), Al(i,j), A2(i,j), A3(i,j), A4(i,j), A5(i,j) 
Parameters for the exporter i's equation (4.55) in period j 
************************************************************************* 
BO(i,j), B 1(i,j), B2(i,j), B3(i,j), B4(i,j), B5(i,j) ; 
Marginal cost for firm i in the period j 
************************************************************************* 
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TABLE C(j,i) 
US 
Marginal cost (100 dollars per ton) 
EU 
1 1.3 1.9 
2 1.3 1.9 
3 1.3 1.9 
4 1.3 1.9 
5 1.3 1.9 
6 1.3 1.9 
7 1.3 1.9 
8 1.3 1.9 
9 1.3 1.9 
10 1.3 1.9 
11 1.3 1.9 
12 1.3 1.9 
13 1.3 1.9 
14 1.3 1.9 
15 1.3 1.9 
16 1.3 1.9 
17 1.3 1.9 
18 1.3 1.9 
19 1.3 1.9 
20 1.3 1.9 
21 1.3 1.9 
Parameters for the final time period T 
************************************************************************* 
{To solve values of the parameters for equations (4.47)-(4.55) we need to start from the 
fmal period T. First we solve the Ks for equation (4.38). In the final period firms choose 
their prices to maximize final-period profits. The intersection point of firms' best-
response functions gives the final period prices as functions of the same period export 
subsidies and previous period export volumes. This is equation (4.38) where} 
K0(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
K1(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
K2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
(2*b(i++1)*a(i) + e*a(i++1) + 2*b(i)*b(i++1)* 
C(j,i) + b(i++1)*e*C(j,i++1))/(4*b(i)*b(H-F1) - 
SQR(e)) ; 
-2*b(i)*b(i++1)/(4*b(i)*b(i++1) - SQR(e)) ; 
-e*b(i++1)/(4*b(i)*b(i++1) - SQR(e)) ; 
164 
K3(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = (2*b(i)*b(i++1)-SQR(e))*n(i)/(4*b(i)*b(i++1) - 
SQR(e)) ; 
K4(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = n(i++1)*K2(i,j) ; 
{By substituting equation (4.38) and the same equation for firm k into estimated import 
demand functions yields equation (4.39) where} 
DO(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = a(i) - b(i)*K0(i,j) + *K0(i++1,j) ; 
D1(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = - b(i)*K1(i,j) + e*K2(i++1,j) ; 
D2(i,j)S(ORD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = b(i)*K2(i,j) ; 
D3(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = n(i)*D1(i,j) ; 
D4(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = n(i++1)*D2(i,j) ; 
{In the final period governments choose their export subsidies (taxes if negative) to 
maximize final-period export revenues less expon subsidy expenditures. The intersec-
tion point of govennnents' best-response functions gives the final period subsidies as 
functions ofprevious period expon volumes. This is equation (4.40) where} 
H0(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = - ((1 - z(i))*D0(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K0(i,j) + DO(i,j)* 
K1(i,j))/(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + Kl(i,j))) + ((1 - z(i))* 
D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))* 
(-((1 - z(i))*D0(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K0(i,j) + DO(i,j)* 
K1(i,j))*((1 - z(i++1))*D2(i++1,j) + D2(i-H-1,j)* 
K 1 (i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K2(i++1,j)) + (2*D1(i,j)* 
(1 - z(i) + K1(i,j)))*((1 - z(i++1))*D0(i++1,j) + 
D1(i++1,j)*K0(i++1,j) + D0(i--1-1,j)*K1(i++1,j)))/ 
(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + K1 (i,j))*(4*D1(i,j)* 
D1(i++1,j)*(1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*(1 - z(i++1) + 
K1(i++1,j)) - ((1 - z(i))*D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)* 
Kl(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))*((1 - z(i++1))* 
D2(i++1,j) + D2(i++1,j)*K1(i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)* 
H1(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = - ((1 - z(i))*D3(i,j) + D3(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)* 
K3(i,j))/(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + Kl(i,j))) + ((1 - z(i))* 
D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))* 
(-((1 - z(i))*D3(i,j) + D3(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)* 
K3(i,j))*((1 - z(i++1))*D2(i++1,j) + D2(i++1,j)* 
K1 (i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K2(i++1,j)) + (2*D1(i,j)* 
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(1 - z(i) + K 1 (i,j)))*((1 - z(i++1))*D4(i++1,j) + 
D4(i++1,j)*K1(i++1,j) + Dl (i++1,j)*K4(i++1,j)))/ 
(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + K 1 (i,j))*(4*D1(i,j)*D1(i++1,j)* 
(1 - z(i) + K 1 (i,j))*(1 - z(i++1) + K1 (i++1,j)) - 
((1 - z(i))*D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))* 
((1 - z(i++1))*D2(i++1,j) + D2(i++1,j)* 
K 1 (i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K2(i++1,j)))) ; 
H2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = - ((1 - z(i))*D4(i,j) + D4(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)* 
K4(i,j))/(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + Kl(i,j))) + ((1 - z(i))* 
D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))* 
(-((1 - z(i))*D4(i,j) + D4(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)* 
K4(i,j))*((1 - z(i++1))*D2(i++1,j) + D2(i++1,j)* 
Kl(i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K2(i++1,j)) + (2*D1(i,j)* 
(1 - z(i) + Kl(i,j)))*((1 - z(i++1))*D3(i++1,j) + 
D3(i++1,j)*K1(i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K3(i++1,j)))/ 
(2*D1(i,j)*(1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*(4*D1(i,j)*D1(i++1,j)* 
(1 - z(i) + Kl(i,j))*(1 - z(i++1) + K1(i++1,j)) - 
((1 - z(i))*D2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*K1(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K2(i,j))* 
((1 z(i++1))*D2(i++1,j) + D2(i++1,j)* 
Kl(i++1,j) + Dl (i++1,j)*K2(i++1,j)))) ; 
{By substituting equation (4.40) into (4.38) yields (4.41) where} 
E0(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = KO(i,j) + Kl(i,j)*H0(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H0(i++1,j) ; 
E1(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = Kl(i,j)*H1(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H2(i++1,j) + K3(i,j) ; 
E2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = K1(i,j)*H2(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H1(i++1,j) + K4(i,j) ; 
{By substituting equation (4.40) into (4.39) yields (4.42) where} 
GO(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = DO(i,j) + D1(i,j)*H0(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H0(i++1,j) ; 
G1 (i,j )$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = D1(i,j)*H1(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H2(i++1,j) + D3(i,j) ; 
G2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = D1(i,j)*H2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H1(i++1,j) + D4(i,j) ; 
{By substituting equations (4.41) and (4.42) into goverrunent i's objective 
function yields (4.44) where} 
A0(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = E0(i,j)*G0(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*G0(i,j)*H0(i,j) ; 
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A 1 (i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = El(i,j)*GO(i,j) + E0(i,j)*G1(i,j) 
(1 z(i))*(G1(i,j)*H0(i,j) + GO(i,j)*H1(i,j)) ; 
A2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) 	E0(i,j)*G2(i,j)+ E2(i,j)*G0(i,j) + 
(1 - z(i))*(G2(i,j)*H0(i,j) + GO(i,j)*H2(i,j)) ; 
A3(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) 	E1(i,j)*G1(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*G1(i,j)*H1(i,j) ; 
A4(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = E2(i,j)*G2(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*G2(i,j)*H2(i,j) ; 
A5(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = E2(i,j)*G1(i,j) + El (i,j)*G2(i,j) + 
(1 - z(i))*(02(i,j)*H1(i,j) + G1(i,j)*H2(i,j)) ; 
{And by substituting equations (4.41) and (4,42) into firm i's objective function yields 
(4.43) where} 
BO(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
B1(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
B2(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
B3(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
B4(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) = 
B5(i,j)$(0RD(j) EQ CARD(j)) 
(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G0(i,j) ; 
(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G1(i,j) + 
(El(i,j) + H1(i,j))*G0(i,j) ; 
(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G2(i,j) + 
(E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G0(i,j) ; 
(El(i,j) + H1(i,j))*G1(i,j) ; 
(E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G2(i,j) ; 
(El(i,j) + H1(i,j))*G2(i,j) + 
(E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G1(i,j) ; 
Parameters for periods 1 to T-1 
************************************************************************* 
{Now the values of the parameters in equations (4.38)-(4.44) for t=T are solved. By 
backward induction this procedure can be repeated for ali the remaining T-1 period's to 
receive the values of different parameters As, Bs, Ds, Es, Gs, Hs, and Ks. This is done in 
a LOOP that follows. 
Omegas and lambdas shown below are created just to decrease the length of 
equations.} 
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PARAMETERS 
omega(i,j) denominator in K 
lambda0(i,j) part of denominator in H 
lambdal (i,j) part of denominator in H; 
LOOP(r, LOOP(NORD(j) EQ (CARD(j)+1 -ORD(r))), 
omega(i,j) = 1 - ((e - d*(2*b(i++1)*e*B4(i,j+1) + 2*b(i)*e*B3(i,j+1) - 
(b(i)*b(i++1) + SQR(e))*B5(i,j+1)))/ 
(2*(b(i) - d*(SQR(b(i))*B3(i,j+1) - b(i)*e*B5(i,j+1) + 
SQR(e)*B4(i,j+1)))))*((e - d*(2*b(i)*e*B4(i++1,j+1) + 
2*b(i++1)*e*B3(i++1,j+1) - (b(i++1)*b(i) + SQR(e))*B5(i++1,j+1)))/ 
(2*(b(i++1) - d*(SQR(b(i++1))*B3(i++1,j+1) - b(i++1)*e* 
B5(i++1,j+1) + SQR(e)*B4(i++1,j+1))))) ; 
KO(i,j) = 	((b(i)*C(j,i) + (1 - d*(2*b(i)*B3(i,j+1) - e*B5(i,j+1)))*a(i) + 
d*(2*e*B4(i,j+1) - b(i)*B5(i,j+1))*a(i++1) - d*(b(i)*B1(i,j+1) - 
e*B2(i,j+1)))/(2*(b(i) - d*(SQR(b(i))*B3(i,j+1) - b(i)*e*B5(i,j+1)+ 
SQR(e)*B4(i,j+1)))) + (b(i++1)*C(j,i++1) + 
(1 - d*(2*b(i++1)*B3(i++1,j+1) - e*B5(i++1,j+1)))*a(i++1) + 
d*(-b(i++1)*B5(i++1,j+1) + 2*e*B4(i++1,j+1))*a(i) - 
d*(b(i++1)*B1(i++1,j+1) - e*B2(i++1,j+1)))/(2*(b(i++1) - 
d*(SQR(b(i++1))*B3(i++1,j+1) - b(i++1)*e*B5(i++1,j+1) + 
SQR(e)*B4(i++1,j+1))))*(e - d*(2*b(i++1)*e*B4(i,j+1) + 
2*b(i)*e*B3(i,j+1)-(b(i)*b(i++1) + SQR(e))*B5(i,j+1)))/(2*(b(i) - 
d*(SQR(b(i))*B3(i,j+1) - b(i)*e*B5(i,j+1) + 
SQR(e)*B4(i,j+1)))))/omega(i,j) ; 
Kl(i,j) = 	(-b(i)/(2*(b(i) - d*(SQR(b(i))*B3(i,j+1) - b(i)*e*B5(i,j+1) + 
SQR(e)*B4(i,j+1)))))/omega(i,j) ; 
K2(i,j) = 	((-e + d*(2*b(i++1)*e*B4(i,j+1) + 2*b(i)*e*B3(i,j+1) - 
(b(i)*b(i++1) + SQR(e))*B5(i,j+1)))*b(i++1)/(4*(b(i) - 
d*(SQR(b(i))*B3(i,j+1) - b(i)*e*B5(i,j+1) + SQR(e)* 
B4(i,j+1)))*(b(i++1) - d*(SQR(b(i++1))*B3(i++1,j+1) - 
b(i++1)*e*B5(i++1,j+1) + SQR(e)*B4(i++1,j+1)))))/omega(i,j) ; 
K3(i,j) = 	(1 + Kl(i,j))*n(i) ; 
K4(i,j) = 	K2(i,j)*n(i++1) ; 
DO(i,j) = 	a(i) - b(i)*K0(i,j) + e*K0(i++1,j) ; 
D1(i,j) = 	-b(i)*K1(i,j) + e*K2(i++1,j) ; 
D2(i,j) = 	e*K1(i++1,j) - b(i)*K2(i,j) ; 
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D3(i,j) = 	b(i)*(n(i) - K3(i,j)) + e*K4(i++1,j) ; 
D4(i,j) = 	-b(i)*K4(i,j) + e*(K3(i++1,j) - n(i++1)) ; 
lambda0(i,j) = 2*(d*(A3(i,j+1)*SQR(D1(i,j)) + A5(i,j+1)*D1(i,j)*D2(i++1,j) + 
A4(i,j+1)*SQR(D2(i++1,j))) + (1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*D1(i,j)) ; 
lambdal(i,j) = (d*(2*A3(i,j+1)*D1(i,j)*D2(i,j) + A5(i,j+1)*(D1(i,j)*D1(i++1,j) + 
D2(i,j)*D2(i++1,j)) + 2*A4(i,j+1)*D1(i++1,j)*D2(i++1,j)) + 
D1(i,j)*K2(i,j) + (1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*D2(i,j))/lambda0(i,j) ; 
HO(i,j) = 	(1/(1 - lambdal(Wlambdal (i++1,j)))*(-(d*(Al (i,j+1)*D 1(i,j) + 
2*A3(i,j+1)*D0(i,j)*D1(i,j) + A5(i,j+1)*(D1(i,j)*D0(i++1,j) + 
DO(i,j)*D2(i++1,j)) + A2(i,j+1)*D2(i++1,j) + 2*A4(i,j+1)*D0(i++1,j)* 
D2(i++1,j)) + D 1(i,j)*K0(i,j) + (1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*D0(i,j))/ 
lambda0(i,j) + lambdal(i,j)*(d*(A2(i++1,j+1)*D2(i,j) + 
2*A4(i++1,j+1)*D0(i,j)*D2(i,j) + A5(i++1,j+1)*D2(i,j)*D0(i++1,j) + 
A1(i++1,j+1)*D1(i++1,j) + A5(i++1,j+1)*D0(i,j)*D 1(i++1,j) + 
2*A3(i++1,j+1)*D0(i++1,j)*D1(i++1,j)) + D 1(i++1,j)*K0(i++1,j) + 
(1 - z(i++1) + K1(i++1,j))*D0(i++1,j))/lambda0(i++1,j)) ; 
H1(i,j) = 	(1/(1 - lambdal(i,j)*lambdal(i++1,j)))*(-(d*(2*A3(i,j+1)*D1(i,j)* 
D3(i,j) + A5(i,j+1)*(D3(i,j)*D2(i++1,j) + D1(i,j)*D4(i++1,j)) + 
2*A4(i,j+1)*D2(i++1,j)*D4(i++1,j)) + (1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*D3(i,j) + 
Dl (i,j)*K3(i,j))/lambda0(i,j) + lambdal(i,j)*(d*(2*A4(i++1,j+1)* 
D2(i,j)*D3(i,j) + A5(i++1,j+1)* (D3(i,j)*D1(i++1,j) + D2(i,j)* 
D4(i++1,j)) + 2*A3(i++1,j+1)*D1(i++1,j)*D4(i++1,j)) + 
(1 - z(i++1) + K1(i++1,j))*D4(i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K4(i++1,j))/ 
lambda0(i++1,j)) ; 
H2(i,j) = 	(1/(1 - lambdal(Wlambdal(i++1,j)))* 
(-(d*(2*A3(i,j+1)*D1(i,j)*D4(i,j) + A5(i,j+1)*(D4(i,j)*D2(i++1,j) + 
D1(i,j)*D3(i++1,j)) + 2*A4(i,j+1)*D2(i++1,j)*D3(i++ 1,j)) + 
(1 - z(i) + K1(i,j))*D4(i,j) + D1(i,j)*K4(i,j))/lambda0(i,j) + 
lambdal(i,j)*(d*(2*A4(i++1,j+1)*D2(i,j)*D4(i,j) + A5(i++1,j+1)* 
(D4(i,j)*D1(i++1,j) + D2(i,j)*D3(i++1,j)) + 
2*A3(i++1,j+1)*D1(i++1,j)*D3(i++1,j)) + 
(1 - z(i++1) + K1(i++1,j))*D3(i++1,j) + D1(i++1,j)*K3(i++1,j))/ 
lambda0(i++1,j)) ; 
E0(i,j) = 	KO(i,j) + K1(i,j)*H0(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H0(i++1,j) ; 
El (i,j) = 	K1(i,j)*H1(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H2(i++1,j) + K3(i,j) ; 
E2(i,j) = 	K1(i,j)*H2(i,j) + K2(i,j)*H1(i++1,j) + K4(i,j) ; 
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GO(i,j) 	DO(i,j) + D1(i,j)*HO(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H0(i++1,j) ; 
G 1 (i,j) = 	D1(i,j)*H1(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H2(i++1,j) + D3(1,j) ; 
G2(1,j) = 	D1 (i,j)*H2(i,j) + D2(i,j)*H1(i++1,j) + D4(1,j) ; 
A0(i,j) = 	E0(i,j)*G0(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*G0(1,j)*H0(i,j) + d*(A0(i,j+1) + 
Al (i,j+1)*G0(i,j) + A2(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j) + A3(i,j+1)*SQR(G0(i,j)) + 
A4(i,j+1)*SQR(G0(i++1,j)) + A5(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)*G0(i++1,j)) ; 
A 1 (i,j) = 	E 1 (i,j)*G0(i,j) + E0(i,j)*G1(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*(G1(i,j)*H0(i,j) + 
GO(i,j)*H1(i,j)) + d*(A1(i,j+1)*G1(i,j)+A2(i,j+1)*G2(i++1,j) + 
2*A3(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)*G1(i,j) + 2*A4(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j)*G2(i++1,j) + 
A5(i,j+1)*(G1 (i,j)*G0(i++1,j) + GO(i,j)*G2(i++1,j))) ; 
A2(1,j) = 	E0(i,j)*G2(i,j) + E2(i,j)*G0(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*(G2(i,j)*H0(i,j) + 
GO(i,j)*H2(i,j)) + d*(Al (i,j+1)*G2(i,j)+A2(i,j+1)*G1(i++1,j) + 
2*A3(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)*G2(i,j) + 2*A4(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j)*G1(i++1,j) + 
A5(i,j+1)*(G2(i,j)*G0(i++1,j) + GO(i,j)*G1(i++1,j))) ; 
A3(i,j) = 	E 1 (i,j)*G1(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*G1(i,j)*H1(i,j) + d*(A3(i,j+1)* 
SQR(G1(i,j)) + A4(i,j+1)*SQR(G2(i++1,j)) + 
A5(i,j+1)*G1(i,j)*G2(i++1,j)) ; 
A4(1,j) = 	E2(1,j)*G2(1,j) + (1 - z(i))*G2(i,j)*H2(i,j) + d*(A3(i,j+1)* 
SQR(G2(i,j)) + A4(i,j+1)*SQR(G1(i++1,j)) + 
A5(i,j+1)*G2(i,j)*G1(i++1,j)) ; 
A5(i,j) = 	E2(i,j)*G1(i,j) + E 1 (i,j)*G2(i,j) + (1 - z(i))*(G2(i,j)*H1(i,j) + 
G 1 (i,j)*H2(i,j)) + d*(2*A3(i,j+1)*G1(i,j)*G2(i,j) + 2*A4(i,j+1)* 
G1 (i++1,j)*G2(i++1,j) + A5(i,j+1)*(G1(i,j)*G1(i++1,j) + 
G2(1,j)*G2(i++1,j))) ; 
BO(i,j) = 	(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G0(i,j) + d*(B0(i,j+1) + B 1 (i,j+1)* 
GO(i,j) + B2(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j) + B3(i,j+1)*SQR(G0(i,j)) + 
B4(i,j+1)*SQR(G0(i++1,j)) + B5(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)*G0(i++1,j)) ; 
B 1 (i,j) = 	(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G1(i,j) + (E 1 (i,j) + H1(i,j))*G0(i,j)+ 
d*(B1(i,j+1)*G1(i,j) + B2(i,j+1)*G2(i++1,j) + 2*B3(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)* 
G1 (i,j) + 2*B4(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j)*G2(i++1,j) + B5(i,j+1)*(G1(i,j)* 
GO(i++1,j) + GO(i,j)*G2(i++1,j))) ; 
B2(i,j) = 	(E0(i,j) + HO(i,j) - C(j,i))*G2(1,j) + (E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G0(i,j)+ 
d*(B1(i,j+1)*G2(i,j) + B2(i,j+1)*G1(i++1,j) + 2*B3(i,j+1)*G0(i,j)* 
G2(1,j) + 2*B4(i,j+1)*G0(i++1,j)*G1(i++1,j) + B5(i,j+1)*(G2(i,j)* 
GO(i++1,j) + GO(i,j)*G1(i++1,j))) ; 
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B3(i,j) = 	(E 1 (i,j) + H1(i,j))*G1(i,j) + d*(B3(i,j+1)*SQR(G1(i,j)) + 
B4(i,j+1)*SQR(G2(i++1,j)) + B5(i,j+1)*G1(i,j)*G2(i++1,j)) ; 
B4(i,j) = 	(E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G2(i,j) + d*(B3(i,j+1)*SQR(G2(i,j)) + 
B4(i,j+1)*SQR(G1(i++1,j)) + B5(i,j+1)*G2(i,j)*G1(i++1,j)) ; 
B5(i,j) = 	(El (i,j) + H1(i,j))*02(i,j) + (E2(i,j) + H2(i,j))*G1(i,j) + 
d*(2*B3(i,j+1)*G1(i,j)*G2(i,j) + 2*B4(i,j+1)*G1(i++1,j)* 
G2(i++1,j) + B5(i,j+1)*(G1(i,j)*G1(i++1,j) + G2(i,j)*G2(i++1,j))) ; 
PARAMETERS 
*Quantities 
M(i,j) Period j exports from country i to importing country 
*Price 
P(i,j) 	Period j importer border price for good exported from i 
*Subsidies 
S(i,j) 	Period j export subsidy offered by government i 
*Payoff measures 
W(i,j) Present and discounted future welfare for exporting country i at period j 
Profti,j) Present and discounted future profits for exporting firm i at period j ; 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
************************************************************************* 
{After we have solved parameters for ali the time periods, we can get the equilibrium 
solutions by forward induction. Starting from the first period the equilibrium values for 
export subsidies, prices, export volumes, firms' profits, and governments' welfares can 
be easily received because they are functions of already solved parameters and initial 
values of export volumes.} 
Equilibrium Export Volumes for Period 1 
************************************************************************* 
M(i,"1") = GO(i,"1") + G1(i,"1")*M0(i) + G2(i,"1")*M0(i++1) ; 
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************************************************************************* 
Equilibrium Prices for Period 1 
************************************************************************* 
P(i,"1") = E0(i,"1") + E1(i,"1")*M0(i) + E2(i,"1")*M0(i++1) ; 
************************************************************************* 
Equilibrium Export Subsidies for Period 1 
************************************************************************* 
S(i,"1") = HO(i,"1") + H1(i,"1")*M0(i) + H2(i,"1")*M0(i++1) ; 
Equilibrium Government Welfare for Period 1 
************************************************************************* 
W(i,"1") = A0(i,"1") + A 1 (i,"1")*M0(i) + A2(i,"1")*M0(i++1) + 
A3(i,"1")*SQR(M0(i)) + A4(i,"1")*SQR(M0(i++1)) + 
A5(i,"1")*M0(i)*M0(i++1) ; 
Equilibrium Profits for Period 1 
************************************************************************* 
Prof(i,"1") = BO(i,"1") + B1(i,"1")*M0(i) + B2(i,"1")*M0(i++1) + 
B3(i,"1")*SQR(M0(i)) + B4(i,"1")*SQR(M0(i++1)) + 
B5(i,"1")*M0(i)*M0(il—F1) ; 
{By forward induction this same procedure is then repeated to ali of the remaining time 
periods to achieve the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this dynamic international wheat 
trade model. The LOOP below does this.} 
************************************************************************* 
Equilibrium Values for Periods 2 to T 
************************************************************************* 
LOOP(v, 
M(i,v) = GO(i,v) + G1(i,v)*M(i,v-1) + G2(i,v)*M(i++1,v-1) ; 
P(i,v) = 	E0(i,v) + E1(i,v)*M(i,v-1) + E2(i,v)*M(i++1,v-1) ; 
S(i,v) = 	HO(i,v) + H1(i,v)*M(i,v-1) + H2(i,v)*M(i++1,v-1) ; 
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W(i,v) = A0(i,v) + A1(i,v)*M(i,v-1) + A2(i,v)*M(i++1,v-1) + 
A3(i,v)*SQR(M(i,v-1)) + A4(i,v)*SQR(M(i++1,v-1))+ 
A5(i,v)*M(i,v-1)*M(i++1,v-1) ; 
Prof(i,v) = BO(i,v) + Bl(i,v)*M(i,v-1) + B2(i,v)*M(i++1,v-1) + 
B3(i,v)*SQR(M(i,v-1)) + B4(i,v)*SQR(M(i++1,v-1)) + 
B5(i,v)*M(i,v-1)*M(i++1,v-1) ; 
; 
PARAMETERS EXPORTS(i,j) 
PRICE(i,j) 
SUBSIDY(i,j) 
WELFARE(i,j) 
PROFITS(i,j) ; 
EXPORTS(i,j) = 100000*M(i,j) ; 
PRICE(i,j) = 100*P(i,j) ; 
SUBSIDY(i,j) = 100*S(i,j) ; 
WELFARE(i,j) = 10000000*W(i,j) ; 
PROFITS(i,j) = 10000000*Prof(i,j) ; 
FILE SOL /'BaseSoln.sol'/ ; 
PUT SOL ; 
SOL.PC = 5 ; 
SOL.PW =255; 
PUT "; 
PUT `US Exports' ; PUT 'EU Exports' ; 
PUT `US Price' ; PUT 'EU Price'; 
PUT `US Subsidy' ; PUT 'EU Subsidy' ; 
PUT `US Welfare' ; PUT 'EU Welfare' ; 
PUT `US Profits' ; PUT 'EU Profits' ; 
PUT /; 
LOOP(j, 
PUT j.TL ; 
LOOP(i, 
PUT EXPORTS(i,j);); 
LOOP(i, 
PUT PRICE(i,j) ;) ; 
LOOP(i, 
PUT SUBSIDY(i,j) ;) ; 
LOOP(i, 
PUT WELFARE(i,j) ;) ; 
LOOP(i, 
PUT PROFITS(i,j) ;) ; 
PUT 1; 
; 
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Appendix D. Comparison of an Ex Ante and an Ex Post Game. 
A simplified one-period (two stage) model without switching costs is used here 
to illustrate differences between equilibrium outcomes of an ex ante game and 
an ex post game. The ex ante game assumes that governments set subsidy levels 
before exporting firms set prices in the importing country. In the ex post game 
the order of moves by firms and governments is assumed to be reversed. That is, 
governments decide on subsidy levels only after firms have set their prices. 
It is assumed that products are differentiated and that import demand func-
tions are linear and symmetric. In addition, the firms are assumed to have 
constant marginal costs, equal to c. Notation is the same as that provided in 
Chapter IV unless otherwise stated. 
The next section states the equilibrium results of the ex ante game. Then 
equilibrium results for the ex post game are shown. Finally, the last section 
shows how results differ when timing in decisions is reversed. 
Ex Ante Game 
Firms choose prices at the second stage of the game to maximize profits, taking 
the subsidy levels chosen by the governments as fixed. Finn i's profits are 
71-j = (.13 	- C)M l . 
The import demand function, M', for this single period framework without 
switching costs is written as M' =a—bP + eP k , where i,k= U.S., EU, i k, 
a>0, and b>e>0. In the first stage, each government maximizes domestic wel-
fare by choosing its expon subsidy given expected firm behavior. Domestic 
welfare is written as 
= (pi + )mi - psi 	. 
The procedure to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is the 
same as in Chapter IV. Therefore, only the equilibrium results for export subsi-
dies, prices, export volumes, profits and welfare are presented below. 
Si =Sk = 
{,u(2b —eX4b2 —be —2e2 )— — eX2b2 e21 
—{(u-1X4b2 — e2 )+ e212+[e(2b2 — e2 )+ ,u(b — e)(4b2 e2 
174 
2[(11-1)(2b 2 — e 2 )+ zb 2 la + b(p-1)(2b 2 — e 2 )c 
 
2 	 2 	 2 — be — 2e 	— 2(b — e)(2b [,u(2b — e)(4b _ e2)] 
b,u(2b 2 — e 2 )a +b0.1-1)(b — e)(2b 2 — e 2 )c 
 mi 
2 	 2 {,u(2b — e)(4b — be— 2e2 )— 	— e)(2b — e 2 )] 
k b[142b 2 — e 2 )a 	— eX2b 2 — e 2 )C]2 ( A4-2)2 
 = = 
2 	 2 	 2 	2 [,142b —e)(4b — be —2e 	— 2.(b — e)(2b — e )]2 
— 1)(2b 2 — e 2 ) 	2b 2,4M 1 )2 
 = 
b(2b 2 	e 2 ) 
Ex Post Game2  
The model is again a two-stage game. In stage 1 exporting firms i and k set 
prices p'  and pk respectively. Then in stage 2 governments set per unit subsidies 
taking firms prices as predetermined (and therefore fixed). Note that these 
prices, pi and pk, are total prices received by exporting firms. Thus, prices paid 
by an importing country ("net prices") are now written as p'-Si and pk-Sk instead 
of Pland Pic (as in the ex ante game). The import demand for country i's exports 
is therefore written as 
= a — b(pl — SI)+ e(ii k — S k ). 
and governrnent i's welfare maximization problem in the second stage of the 
game is 
Max 	-= 	— ,uSiXa —b(p1 — Sz)+ e(p _Sc)) .  
2 For more complete discussion on ex post games see, for example, Neary (1991) and Gruenspecht 
(1988). 
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Taking prices as given, the government i's welfare-maximization problem yields 
the following solution for S'. 
a 	+ (2b2 e2 )1i + 2b2 —1)be k  
S' (pi ,pk )= 	 
(2b — e) 	,u(4b 2 —e2 ) P 4144b2 — 
Note a problem with the special case of 1.1,= 1. If additional welfare cost of 
public funds is zero, that is i = 1, then from (A.10) we see that dS' I dp' =1. 
This means that country i's government would exactly offset stage 1 price in-
creases by its exporting firm with higher subsidies, on a dollar for dollar basis. 
Recognizing this the firm would choose to set an infinite price in the first stage, 
relying on an infinitely large government subsidy to restore its competitive 
position. In the remainder of this appendix it is assumed that > 1. 
In the first stage of the game each exporting firm chooses its own price to 
maximize profits, anticipating the effects of its choice of price on governments 
subsidies in the second stage. Thus, the exporting firm i's problem is 
Max It z = (131 —c)M1 . 
The resulting equilibrium values are 
	
— ,u)(2b 2 — e2 ) + 2b2 1 	(2b 2 - e 2 Xb + — ,u) 
S' = S k = 	  
(t./ —1)(2b — e)(4b 2 be — 2e2 ) a + [p(2b — e)(4b 2 - be — 2e2 )]c' 
k 	,u(2b+e) 	(2b2 — e2 ) 
(ji
p p 
— 1)(4b 2 be — 2e 2 a el-b 2 - be-2e2 )c 
Mi=Mk= 	b(2b2 
— e2 ) 	 (u-1)(b—e) 
(2b — e)(4b 2 be — 2e2 )a ,u(2b — eX4b 2 —be-2e2 )c,  
b(2b + e)(2b 2 — e2 )[ai:1 — Cu —1)(b — e)c12 ,u(4b 2 — e2 )(M' )2 
— 1X2b — eX4b 2 be — 2e2)2 	b(u-1)(2b 2 e2 ) 
(A.16) 
	 wi wk 1-`k  
zi = rck 
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Subtracting equation (A.12) from (A.13) yields equilibrium prices paid by the 
importing country: 
2,u(3b2 — e 2 )a + b(ct —1)(2b2 — e 2 
(A.17) P = Pk =p1  — S 	
sk  
pil' 
,42b — e)(4b 2 — be — 2e2 
Comparison of Ex Ante and Ex Post Equilibrium Solutions 
In an ex post game the firms are first-movers. Therefore, they have more market 
power than in an ex ante game. This implies that firms are able to extract larger 
subsidies from their governments and charge higher prices for their wheat in the 
importing country than in an ex ante model. These results can be seen by 
subtracting the ex ante equilibrium subsidy from the ex post equilibrium sub-
sidy and the ex ante equilibrium price from the ex post equilibrium price. 
b[ua — —1» — e)c] 
p(p — 1)(2b — e)(4b 2 — be — 2e2 ) 
[2(2b2 — e2 )2 _ 4u(2') — e 2 X4b 2 — be — 2e2 ) + 2b,u2 (2b — e)(4b2 — be — 2e 2 )1_ 
[P(2b — e)(4b 2 — be — 2e2 )— 2(1)— e)(2b 2 e 2 )] 
2b(2b 2 — e 2 )2 [fla — (11 — 	— e)c] 
,u(2b — e)(4b 2 — be — 2e 2 )[11(2b e)(4b 2 — be — 2e 2 ) — 2(b — e )(2b 2 — 
Recall that a>0, b>e>0 and ii>]. The two equations above are always positive 
when a - (b-e)c 0. Condition a - (b-e)c 0 just means that exporting firms are 
exporting nonnegative amounts of wheat.3 
The larger prices paid by the importing country imply that smaller exports of 
wheat take place in the ex post model than in the ex ante model. Subtracting 
equation (A.5) from (A.14) yields 
3 It can be shown that a condition for exporting firm i to export nonnegative-amounts of wheat is 
a + ePk bc. Since bc - ePk gets larger the lower is Pk, it is sufficient to look at the case where 
Pk = c, which is the lowest price exporter k can charge. Then we get the condition a (b - e)c 
for nonnegative export volumes. 
S" Post — Sex ante = 
and 
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-2b(b — e)(2b2 — e2 )2 [ua — —1» — e)c] 
p(2b — e)(4b2 — be — 2e2 )[/./(2b — eX4b 2 — be — 2e2 )— 2(b — eX2b 2 — e 2 < 0.  
A comparison of equations (A.6) and (A.15) verifies that, due to increased 
firm level market power, firm profits are higher in the ex post game than in the 
ex ante game. 
zex post I .ex ante .= 	
[11(1/ — 1X2b e)(4b 2 be — 2e2 ) 
+2b2 ,u2 (2b — e)(4b 2 — be — 2e2 )2 — ,u(2b — e)(2b 2 e 2 X4b 2 be — 2e2 X4b 2 — 3be — 2e2
)} >0 
1,u(2b—e)(4b2 — be — 2e 2 — 	e)(2b 2 e 2 )12 
Finally, government's welfare in the ex post game is always smaller than the 
level of welfare in the ex ante game as can be seen below. 
Wea post aate 	
p(21)2 _ e2)
( 
= 
" Psst —e2) 2b2 	
—1)-Fe2 1 A4 ex ante )2 <0. wex  
b(2b2 —e2 ) 
[102  
b(2b2 — e2 ) b(2b2 — e2 ) 
b(2b 2 — e2 )2 [1.1a — (ti —1)(b — e)e]2 [4(b — e)2 (2b + e)(2b2 — e2)2  
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